The origin of the great Yangtze River lies in Tibet, flowing 6,300 km to the Changjiang Delta and into the East China Sea. Known as the Golden Waterway, the Yangtze's silt-laden waters bring fertility to 24 million hectares of farmland. The so-called "Three Gorges" dam, (whose construction phase is now just completed) would submerge a magnificent 200-km stretch of the river. The proposal is to generate 13,000-18,000 megawatts of power for industry. The Chinese state has also promoted the notion that the dam will prevent life-threatening floods downstream and improve major navigation arteries, such as the Jingjiang stretch of the Yangtze and the Chuanjiang River. The gargantuan concrete structure, over 150 meters high and 1,000 meters long, will create a reservoir 500 km long and include 26 turbine generators and two 80-meter ship locks. The price tag for the 17-year project is between US $10 and $20 billion, therefore providing a necessary shot in the arm for the troubled Western dam-building industry, with lucrative consulting contracts and machinery and equipment sales.[2]

Project Summary

"The Mother of all Dams" as environmentalists know it, is the World's largest hydroelectric project, the largest nation state project since the Great Wall, and by far the world's most environmentally and socially destructive infrastructure plan. On April 3, 1992, China's National People's Congress approved the Three Gorges dam, and in so doing set in train a process that will displace 1.3 million people. [3] . According to a leaked Chinese government security document, the resettlement operation, which has already forcibly moved 100,000 people, is "spawning outrage among resettlers". The authors (public security cadres) recommend that the opposition be dealt with by a "swifter and heavier punishment policy."[4] The dam, now at an advanced stage of construction, will be approximately 600 feet in height, creating a 1-mile (2km) wide, 400 mile (600km) long reservoir on the Yangstze, flooding hundreds of villages and displacing almost 2 million people before the aspirational completion date of 2009.[5]

Dam Building-The Background

Chinese rivers support enormous agricultural wealth. The alluvial soil in many areas is so fertile that it permits as many as two harvests per year. These rivers have been affected by soil erosion from logging operations, pollution and large-scale hydroelectric dams. Before the formation of the People's Republic of China (1949), only 23 large / medium scale reservoirs and dams existed in China. The revolution initiated a vast program of dam construction, especially during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60). These dam projects were propagandized on the basis of national economic development and promotion of social and political cohesion.

As a result, there are more than 20,000 large dams (more than 15 meters high) in China, more than any other country in the world. The available evidence clearly indicates that these dams have not provided effective flood control. In most instances, the dams have had highly destructive social consequences, including the forced resettlement of over 10 million human beings. Dams in China have suffered some of the most catastrophic failures in the world. In one season, dam collapses in Henan province caused 230,000 casualties. [6] According to Dr. Baruch Boxer of Rutgers University, a Chinese environmental policy expert, since the 1920s the idea of Three Gorges has intrigued "planners, engineers, ideologues, visionaries and scoundrels alike [who] have used it either to trumpet commitment to nationalistic ideals, assuage national pride, get rich and powerful, or strengthen competing government planning and energy bureaucracies when their autonomy and power were threatened." Sun Yat-sen, a founder of the 1912 Chinese Republic, first proposed the dam in the 1920s; Chinese Nationalist officials surveyed the dam site in the 1940s with the help of the Bureau of Reclamation, a US federal dam-building agency.

Since World War II, hundreds of technicians, engineers and scientists from over 300 agencies, institutes and universities have contributed to research and planning for this long-awaited project. In 1984, enthusiasm for the scheme culminated in the US Bureau of Reclamation signing a five-year agreement to provide technical and consulting services to the Yangtze River Valley Planning Office. A preliminary design for the project was completed in 1985.

In 1986, the Chinese accepted Canada's offer to finance a feasibility study for Three Gorges, beating out a close rival, the US Three Gorges Working Group, a high-powered consortium that included the US Army Corps of Engineers, the US Bureau of Reclamation, the American Consulting Engineers Council, Bechtel Civil and Minerals, Coopers and Lybrand, Merrill Lynch Capital Markets, Morgan Bank, Morrison-Knudsen and Stone & Webster Engineering.

The Canadian consortium, Canadian International Project Managers-Yangtze Joint Venture, is made up of five Canadian engineering companies: Lavalin International, SNC, Acres International, Hydro-Quebec International and B.C. Hydro International. The feasibility study included a detailed review of 30 years' worth of Chinese studies, analysis of dam height alternatives and an evaluation of socioeconomic and environmental aspects - namely, resettlement, health and wildlife.

Although the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Canadian Government’s foreign aid agency, who sponsored the feasibility study, refused to comment on the division of tasks, sources within the industry reported that Acres International and Quebec Hydro worked on the resettlement and environmental components respectively. [7]

Potential Threats

In 1986 the CIDA financed the official $14 million feasibility study for the Three Gorges dam, which was then reviewed by a World Bank funded panel of international experts, thus providing a cloak of objectivity. The Canadian engineers who carried it out the study recommended that the dam be built at a height that would displace three quarters of a million people, more than the entire population of Washington, D.C. The benefits of doing so outweighed the costs, they claimed. [8] The consortium then formally delivered the study over to China's Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power (MWREP). The State Council, the highest policy-making body, and the National People’s Congress then approved the project. When it was approved, the Chinese government used the document to secure international financing, setting into motion the next round of international competition to land the Three Gorges contract.

Neither the funding agencies nor the Canadian engineering consortium disclosed any information about the study, claiming that the Chinese government requested strict confidentiality. As a result, Probe International, a Toronto-based aid and environmental research policy group, requested two documents using the Canadian Access to Information law: the Memorandum of Understanding between the Chinese and Canadian governments and the agreement between CIDA and the Canadian International Project Managers consortium.

Similarly, the Washington-based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) requested from the US Bureau of Reclamation documents relating to the social and environmental aspects of the Three Gorges Project through the Freedom of Information Act.

The secrecy surrounding the study prevented opposition from gaining momentum abroad. The Chinese government played its part in suppressing debate within China, using the standard methods of jailing journalists who dared question the feasibility of the project, disinformation, and physical force. [9][10] Questions about the project's ecological, social and economic impacts and overall merit remain unanswered. [11] Probe International managed to unearth the Canadian-backed study and the relevant conclusions, and applied their own analysis to the engineer’s calculations.
An application was made through the Canadian Access to Information Act for a copy of the Three Gorges Feasibility Study, and eventually the report was released, despite the engineers' efforts to keep it secret. It is apparent that the Canadian government hoped that the Three Gorges Feasibility Study would lead to "hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of business for Canada."As for the engineering firms, which include SNC-Lavalin, Acres, Hydro-Quebec International, and British Columbia Hydro International, it is apparent that they expected lucrative contracts if the dam were built. When in possession of the feasibility study, nine associated colleagues from around the world were contacted; an engineer, an economist, a chemical limnologist, and other experts, and requested to apply their expertise to the feasibility study carefully and provide a critique. Their findings were published in the book

Damming the Three Gorges: What Dam-Builders Don't Want You to Know. [12]

What was found is a source of concern. The feasibility study was inconsistent, systematically biased, inaccurate, and incomplete. To give an instructive example, the project would make economic sense only if 500,000 people were left in the active flood storage area around the perimeter of the reservoir, where they, of course, would be flooded. As for the submerged spillway bays (27 in number), each one with an average flow equivalent to that of the Missouri River, the engineers were confident they could design, construct, and operate them, even though their size would be "well beyond proven world experience." When it came to predicting the dam's flood control benefits the engineers had to guess, because the data, apparently, was not available for a proper hydrodynamic analysis.
The expected costs and benefits of the development scheme, as it turns out, were based on "unsubstantiated engineering and compromised economics, not on the values that the winners and losers would arrive at under a regime in which the property rights of the victims were upheld." With such an undisguised assault on the property rights of individuals and communities in the name of ill-defined and improvable development benefits, governments and governmental institutions such as the Chinese government, the World Bank, and the CIDA have wilfully disconnected the "development" process from the indigenous population at large.

Environmental concerns:
There are many environmental problems with the Three Gorges Dam. Lt. Gen. John W. Morris, former chief of the US Army Corps of Engineers, has voiced skepticism over the projected flood control benefits. In addition, a report by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference has stated that flooding problems in the middle and upper courses of the Yangtze would not be solved by the project. The Asia-Pacific People's Environment Network (APPEN) reported that although flood protection is a major justification of the project, no economic analysis of the actual reduction in flood risk on the downstream flood plain has been performed.

Improved navigation in the waterways upstream of the Three Gorges Dam also seems unlikely due to heavy siltation predicted by Chinese river transport authorities. The Yangtze is the third most silt-laden river in the world; 70 percent of its silt would likely end up trapped in the dam's reservoir. The seriousness of the silt problem was demonstrated at China's Sanmen Gorge project on the Yellow River: so plagued is it by silt that the dam now generates only 20 percent of its intended power capacity.

For these and other reasons, many scientists, engineers and environmentalists around the world share the view of Brent Blackwelder of the Environmental Policy Institute in Washington, DC: that the Three Gorges Project could be "the most disastrous dam ever built:"

• Shen Ganqing, a senior MWREP engineer, fears Shanghai's municipal and industrial water supply would be jeopardized by salt water intruding into the Yangtze coastal delta. This, he claims, could result from the low flow downstream of the dam. He is also concerned about the reintroduction of schistosomiasis, once endemic to the area.
• Silt trapped behind the dam would deprive downstream flood plains and estuary fisheries of vital nutrients. These effects, combined with reduced flows, could cause an overall decline in agricultural and fisheries production, as is the case with the Aswan High Dam in Egypt.
• Upstream, an estimated 80 species of fish could be wiped out as a result of the dam's reservoir. Downstream, wetland habitat disrupted by the project could endanger both wildlife and fish populations.
• The weight of the Three Gorges reservoir could trigger an earthquake in an area that has very high seismic activity, according to Yan Kai, chairman of the Chinese Committee on Large Dams.
• The US Three Gorges Working Group warned that landslides, which are common in the Three Gorges area, could cause disastrous floods and possibly a tidal wave similar to the disaster at Italy's Vaiont Dam in 1963.

Projected Resettlement:
Beyond the litany of environmental concerns, the most politically troublesome aspect of the project for the Chinese is the resettlement of up to one million people. The reservoir will submerge 10 cities and more than 100,000 acres of precious farmland, harbors, railroads and archeological treasures.
[13][14][15][16][17][18]
The Hong Kong Environment Center initially expressed optimism, stating that the Chinese government was highly sensitive about resettlement. The group claimed that China does not want to be seen harassing its people, particularly Tibetans living in the hilly areas of Sichuan province.
In 1986, the vice-president of Canadian International Project Managers Ltd., Jean Gagnon, proclaimed that for the Chinese State, "moving 300,000 people in China is a very small thing - they do that every second year in Beijing." A small matter, that is, for Jean Gagnon, though not for the hapless residents of Beijing. [19][20][21][22]

Acres International estimated the cost of resettlement at $3.5 billion, or 30 % of the present total cost of the project. Based on past dam projects, this is an unusually high proportion given to resettlement - even though it amounts to a mere $3,500 for each displaced person. Some sources indicate that the actual numbers displaced are being deliberately under-reported by the Chinese State, and that the actual figures are much higher than the 1.2 million estimate. If the figures were reported accurately they might provide a “lightning rod” for opponents of the project.[23]

With the far-reaching negative impact and overwhelming costs associated with the Three Gorges Project, there is a total absence of comprehensive proposals for alternatives. Experts at the Tennessee Valley Authority and the US Army Corps of Engineers went so far as to suggest that a series of five or six smaller dams along the Yangtze River could better match energy demand with supply, allow for a more efficient system of waterway locks and avoid the need for massive resettlement of rural people. China could also implement more cost-effective projects to improve the efficiency of industrial and commercial energy use, China is not proceeding with any of these options.[24] http://209.200.101.189/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=776

The role of the Export Credit Agencies:
It is crucial that the role of the ECAs (Export Credit Agencies) be recognized in the tragic saga of the Three Gorges Dam. The dam could not have been completed, or even initiated, without the crucial necessary funding and propaganda provided by European, Canadian and Japanese ECAs. The Canadian ECA, the Export Development Corporation (EDC), is itself directly involved in the Three Gorges Dam project, an involvement initiated through direct political intervention, providing loans to the Chinese State and guarantees to Canadian companies involved in the project. [25][26] The general public are simply unaware of the existence of these agencies. ECAs are not beholden to shareholders, but only to states; therefore they have successfully avoided the intense criticism that has afflicted the World Bank over many years.
The activism and sustained criticism directed at the World Bank for many years over its funding of dam projects has resulted in the World Bank stepping back from much of their direct involvement in such projects. However, the ECAs have stepped right into the breach, with virtually limitless support for of some of the most controversial and destructive projects ever seen. The funding of dams is a key part of the work of ECAs. Dam projects have forced the explusion of 40-80 million people worldwide during the 20th century. Dams are highly inefficient in terms of power generation, and a liability in terms of environmental impact and sheer cost, they would not be sustainable but for the funding that is provided for their continued expansion in the developing world by the ECAs.
Export Credit Agencies are public bodies that provide government-backed loans, guarantees and insurance to corporations from their home countries seeking to carry out business abroad in developing nations; most industrialized nations therefore have at least one ECA.[27] For example, Canada’s EDC can lend money at below market rates to various governments in order to allow these to pay for goods and services purchased from Canadian companies. Money lent in this fashion is often used to finance large-scale projects such as constructing hydro dams, nuclear power stations and pulp mills. ECAs often issue political risk assurance to Northern corporations when those companies invest in business activities in politically unstable countries. This type of insurance is meant to offset the risks of investing in countries where governments have limited commitment to the rule of law and little accountability to the people. [28]

Therefore the corporations are themselves indemnified by the state, but the projects funded are often disastrous for the populations of the host countries. By the removal of incentives for accountability and efficiency, ECAs encourage unsustainable and potentially destructive investments. The result of these 50-year old practices across the world have resulted in inflated project costs, environmental destruction, various human rights abuses and crippling debts for Southern countries that now have to pay for economically unsustainable projects. In fact, ECAs now hold a significant amount of the debts owed by the most heavily indebted countries, which means that the principle western nations, through their public-funded ECAs now indirectly control much of the economies of the developing world to ransom. [29] There is a long list of corporations involved in the Three Gorges Project, many of which are receiving aid from ECAs. Therefore the corporations who are directly involved in the Three Gorges project are being indirectly subsidized by taxpayers in Canada, Germany, Japan and Switzerland through the ECA device.[30] [31] [32] Conclusion: The structural work on the dam was completed on the 6th of June 2006, with the last of the concrete poured to complete the wall.[33] This is the moment of truth, when the main concrete wall itself must begin to hold water after the temporary cofferdam is demolished in a series of planned explosions. The flood control season usually lasts from June until August, so one declared reason for the dam’s existence is now to be tested.[34] The Chinese State propaganda apparatus is openly celebrating its role in this disastrous project, which despite total suppression of debate has faced considerable opposition. It has nonetheless been propelled forward, through outright force and fraud against the targeted populations involved.[35] [36][37] These are relatively simple matters for a state increasingly willing to resort to brutal and murderous actions against those who attempt to resist the Chinese state's process of land seizure, a process that is intensifying. The greatest tragedy of the Three Gorges Dam Project is that it is totally unnecessary. Large hydroelectric dams are rapidly becoming technologically obsolete in the energy sector across the world. Due to its unprecedented size and complexity, the dam is technically and organizationally complex, at an experimental stage and difficult to finance. An American executive whose company operates private power plants in China stated that the Three Gorges dam is: "is like the U.S. nuclear program; it will take forever, it will cost all the money in China, and it won't make any power for 30 years." He went on to explain that the final cost of power generation could be at least $2,000 per kilowatt, (more than $36 billion), making it "very uncompetitive if you charge any capital costs for the power." [38] Large dams, energy analysts have concluded, are costly and uneconomic due to their high capital investment costs and poor operating performance. A 1998 study concluded that power from China’s large hydro dams costs about 6 to 7 cents per kilowatt-hour, compared to less than 4 cents for gas-fired power plants, 4 to 5 cents for new coal plants, and over 7 cents for nuclear power, excluding transmission and distribution costs. The Three Gorges dam is expected to be even more expensive, at 8.4 cents per kilowatt-hour. This however is not the final cost of Three Gorges power as transmission and distribution costs are not included in the estimate. Due to the unusually large size of the dam, because China’s existing power transmission networks are outdated and unreliable, and because the local transmission grids are not connected to the country’s larger grids, the central government must spend $30 billion over the next 3 years in a new national transmission grid. This will push the cost of Three Gorges power even higher than 8.4 cents per hour. [39] The most relevant point however is that China’s power needs have in themselves been overstated. With thousands of state factories closing after privatization, electricity consumption dropped sharply in 1998, with many power plants running well below capacity. China does indeed have huge market potential for energy services, with 60 million rural people lacking access to electricity, and the country’s annual per capita power consumption is a third that of the global average. However, the real problem for Three Gorges is competition from the new generation of smaller, cheaper power plants.

By 2009, when the dam is fully operational, new high-efficiency combined cycle plants will provide an affordable and reliable supply to users. The economic and environmental advantages of combined cycle plants are many. They convert fuel to heat and electricity efficiently, using less fuel than a conventional power plant. Conventional power plants, (whether fueled by coal, oil, gas or nuclear), use steam turbines, converting only 30-33% of their the fuel’s heat to electricity. The rest is released as waste heat into the atmosphere or into an adjacent body of water. The new generations of gas turbines, however, convert over 40% of their fuel into electricity. When the heat given off by the gas turbine is used to drive a steam turbine (in what is known as a combined cycle plant) to produce additional electricity, the plant’s fuel conversion efficiency is boosted by 50% or more. When all remaining waste heat from a combined cycle plant is used in applications requiring steam or hot water, a process known as cogeneration, the plant’s fuel conversion efficiencies can reach up to 60-90%. Since higher fuel efficiency translates into lower energy costs, power consumers across the world are installing their own gas turbines, thus lowering their costs, reducing harmful emissions while accelerating economic output. Combined cycle plants are commonly fueled by natural gas that burns more thoroughly than solid/liquid fuels and contains no heavy metals or sulphur. When fired with natural gas, these plants produce virtually no particulate matter or sulphur dioxide, 90% less nitrous oxide, and 60% less carbon dioxide emissions than coal fired plants equipped with the latest pollution control technology. [40] These plants are well suited to consumers with large electricity and energy requirements (heavy industry, universities and shopping centers, etc.) as they are built on-site, they do not require long distance transmission, thus lowering electricity costs to consumers, and they eliminate the energy costs associated with long-distance transmission from huge power projects in sparsely populated areas to distant markets. They can simply be plugged into existing transmission grids to provide power at a local or national level, and are simple to finance as they can be installed and commence generating power within 9 months to 2 years, enabling lenders to receive a quicker return on their investment. Large coal plants take 5-7 years on average, hydro dams take 7-10 years, and it is expected that Three Gorges will take about 17 years to construct.

Combined cycle plants have already replaced aging coal and nuclear plants in many parts of the world, and are expected to dominate the global market for new energy providers for the foreseeable future.
Even the flood control aspect of the dam has been completely overstated by Chinese State authorities. The Three Gorges dam was originally proposed as a flood control dam, but in 1958, when it was concluded that flood control alone could not justify the dam’s construction, planners set about redesigning the dam for hydropower and navigational purposes. However, according to critics, the dam is useless for controlling floods downstream caused by six major tributaries along the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze. Upstream, the dam will increase an already high flood level at the Chongqing, due to the storage of floodwater and sedimentation in the reservoir. The inevitable result is that flood damage in Sichuan province will become even more serious. In either case, the flood diversion areas and lakes along the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze are much more important than the Three Gorges reservoir for controlling flooding. Increasing numbers of Chinese scientists disagree with the state’s emphasis on dam-building as a flood control strategy because they believe that it fails to address the underlying problem: the continued loss of forest cover in the Yangtze watershed, and the accompanying loss of 13,000 square km. of lakes, which traditionally acted as diversion areas in the middle and lower reaches, due to siltation, land reclamation schemes and completely uncontrolled development. The Yangtze valley residents would be better served by a program of dyke and channel improvements, designated overflow areas, development zoning, flood proofing and flood warning systems, all of which are have been ignored. [41]

Concluding Statement:
The Three Gorges Dam will not produce power, under the most favorable of circumstances, and will cost at least 2 to 3 times more than power from gas turbines, combined cycles and renewable power. The most likely scenario is that it will become far more costly, as increasing technical problems and operational conflicts plague the dam, reducing output, encouraging the country’s industrial consumers to leave the state-run system for cheaper independent or self-generated power, thus raising electricity prices for the remaining consumers, the general population. This phenomenon, known as the “death spiral” is threatening many utilities worldwide with bankruptcy, with cheaper generating alternatives becoming readily available. Countries and corporations that have built large hydro dams and nuclear power stations are now faced with vast “stranded costs” – investment costs unrecoverable from ratepayers – as consumers turn towards cheaper alternatives. The greatest difficulty that has now appeared for the global hydropower and nuclear industry is just what to do with these stranded costs once electricity markets are opened for competition. In the US alone, stranded costs could reach as much as $200 billion, therefore many utilities operating these expensive plants could potentially go bankrupt in the transition to full market pricing and competition. If the Three Gorges Corporation even attempts to recover all of the dam costs from ratepayers, a “death spiral” into bankruptcy is inevitable. To avoid this otherwise inevitable crisis, central government will have to force consumers to purchase Three Gorges power by the active prohibition of competition and imposing the projects enormous costs upon ratepayers. However, the more likely arrangement will be that the government will directly subsidize the source of Three Gorges power by off-loading part of its debts onto another state agency or financial corporation. The Far Eastern Economic Review reported (January 28th 1999) that the Chinese State plans to form special asset-management companies to absorb the bad debts of the 4 largest state banks: including the China Construction Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, both major lenders to the Three Gorges Project. This device of indirect debt-financing will burden the taxpayers of China with the costs of this unproductive project for an unspecified number of years, ensuring that state funding will continue even after nominal completion of the project, an arrangement more often associated with so-called Public Private Partnerships (PPP’s). [42] [43] [44]

A useful historical precedent is the Suez Canal, constructed in Egypt after the successful British and French defeat of Egyptian efforts to expand indigenous industry. The project resulted in vast profits for Europe, while it “led to a costly debt which took (Egypt) over 3 decades to pay off, and to the inevitable occupation of the country.” (Chomsky, Noam. P.117-118 World Orders Old and New, Pluto Press, 1994). Such mega-projects, a European example being the PPP-driven Irish national roads programme, ensure that the host country is loaded with costs which can never be repaid, and which will serve to bury the population under a mountain of ever-increasing percentage-ridden debts. This process is a more sophisticated form of economic warfare than the relatively crude form of historical imperialism. The “leaders” of the Peoples Republic of China, in pushing through and completing this project in the face of substantial opposition from within the state apparatus and the wider society itself, have earned the applause and gratitude of their international sponsors. It is difficult to conceive of a single act that poses a greater threat to the environment, the political and social structure, and the economic-well being of China, then the Three Gorges Dam. This new Great Wall of China is a tribute and fitting monument to China’s military dictatorship, which provides a front of opposition to the Western powers, but which nonetheless continues to serve their long-term imperial goals.

Sources

[1] http://www.irn.org/programs/threeg/ http://www.probeinternational.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=15281

[2] http://209.200.101.189/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=776

[3] http://www.eca-watch.org/problems/asia_pacific/china/index.html#3gorges

[4] http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/prop-pr.html

[5] http://www.eca-watch.org/problems/asia_pacific/china/index.html#3gorges

[6] http://www.irn.org/programs/china/

[7] http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/pi/documents/three_gorges/Damming3G/ch01.html

[8] http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/pi/documents/three_gorges/Damming3G/ch01.html

[9] http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=7007

[10]http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=9688

[11] http://gaya.scienza.de/001.htm

[12] http://www.probeinternational.org/pi/documents/three_gorges/Damming3G/index.html

[13] http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=4041

[14] http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=3156

[15] http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=9087

[16] http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=7917

[17]http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=6603

[18] http://www.arch.mcgill.ca/prof/sijpkes/arch374/winter2001/dbiggs/three.html

[19] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/china0304/1.htm

[20] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4107609.stm

[21] http://www.olympicwatch.org/news.php?id=98

[22] http://www.opendemocracy.net/arts-photography/hutong_destruction_3632.jsp

[23] http://www.irn.org/programs/threeg/resettle.html

[24] http://209.200.101.189/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=776

[25] http://www.probeinternational.org/pi/edc/index.cfm?DSP=subcontent&AreaID=40

[26] http://www.probeinternational.org/pi/3g/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=855

[27] http://www.eca-watch.org/eca/index.html

[28] http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=subcontent&AreaID=163

[29] http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=subcontent&AreaID=163

[30] http://www.eca-watch.org/problems/asia_pacific/china/racetothebottom_chinacase_1999.html

[31] http://www.probeinternational.org/probeint/ThreeGorges/who.html

[32] http://www.irn.org/pubs/wrr/9701/3g.html http://www.irn.org/pubs/wrr/9612/hermes.html

[33] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5000092.stm

[34] http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may2006/2006-05-29-01.asp

[35] http://www.irn.org/programs/threeg/resettle.html

[36] http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EA24Ad05.html

[37] http://www.hrw.org/summaries/s.china952.html

[38]http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=926

[39] http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=926

[40] http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=926

[41] http://www.probeinternational.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=1055

[42] http://www.probeinternational.org/tgp/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=1055

[43] http://www.pppforum.com/faq.html#facts

[44] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Private_Partnerships

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