# Tara Foundation

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# A destructive transport policy: Editorial

On 26th September 2006, Minister for Transport Martin Cullen announced the Government's approval of funding for the first phase of the Western Rail Corridor (from Ennis to Athenry), and that Irish Rail had been requested to proceed with the "detailed planning and design" of the project, including line clearance work, level crossing survey work, negotiations with landowners and local authorities, and signalling system and bridge design. The actual track renewal is to commence in 2007, and is expected to be completed in 2008. Phase 2, Athenry to Tuam, is set to be completed in 2011, followed by the Tuam to Claremorris section in 2014, with the line from Claremorris to Collooney being "preserved". The pretext for this ordering is that it is based on the level of demand for the service. In all, the work will involve the laying of 36 miles of track and "associated infrastructure", the elimination of 125 farm/accommodation crossings and the "provision" of five stations.



The timeline for the plan, with a completion date set for 2014, and the wording in which it has been announced, give the impression that what is involved is a brand new rail service. But it is anything but: it is little more than the reopening of an existing, though dormant, railway line, and for a total distance of only 86.5 miles. The lengthy completion target is extraordinary, given that the 26-mile line from Ennis to Limerick was upgraded in all of 18 months. The grandiose name "Western Rail Corridor" is a PR product, designed to conceal the paucity of what is proposed.

The gesture of developing the Ennis-Athenry section first, on the pretext of "heaviest demand for services" gives a clue to the real reasons for this project. As we discovered previously, the Department of Transport announced that it had no intention of applying for EU structural funding, even though this had the potential of funding up to 70% of the project. The last paragraph of the Department's press release contains the following: "The construction work will involve the upgrading of 36 miles of track". So what about the rest, given that the Claremorris-Collooney section is to be "preserved" or mothballed, i.e. not even upgraded, suggesting that it may never be used?

That the Western Rail Corridor is a political stunt is obvious: there is no real commitment either to restore the line itself, or to do so in a realistic timeframe. Quite simply, the Department is riding this hobbyhorse to win votes in the upcoming 2007 general election, and the triumphant reaction of certain campaign groups to the Government's simple reiteration of a commitment it has already demonstrated to be nonexistent demonstrates this fact. Very likely, when the Ennis-Athenry section is completed with "unexpected" delays and extra costs, that will spell the end of the Western Rail corridor: the "heaviest demand for services" having been met, it would be uneconomic to continue with an outdated plan whose results would not be justified by the outlay.

There are other, more important reasons however: the State does not waste its time concocting such elaborate frauds for electoral reasons alone. It is essential, first, to prevent the development of a comprehensive rail network, by proposing inadequate and extremely time-consuming schemes, and second, to demontstrate by these means that there is no alternative to the current State transport policy of committing vast amounts of capital to road programmes. This policy is seen also with the Luas project in Dublin, an expensive folly that remained for years in the planning stage, and when finally realized turned out to be mainly for providing links to industrial estates (while incidentally raising the value of rezoned land), without even serving the City Centre. The DART scheme was similar: sold as a light rail service for the whole of Dublin, it turned out to be a high-maintenance commuter service exclusively for wealthy suburbs and business parks.

That the road programmes the State is currently pursuing do not work from either an economic or an infrastructural point of view does not matter in political terms: what counts is that there is seen to be no other choice than the public funding of private sector contractors, and the furthering of the Private Finance Initiative/Public-Private Partnerships agenda. This agenda is that private construction firms, which act as front companies for multinational construction giants, accrue profits which are subsidized and maintained by taxpayers, while governments "privatize" political responsibility for the incompetent planning and implementation of the projects.

The destruction of national monuments is thus blamed on misinformed contractors, even though the State has already given legal permission for the destruction of any monument in the country which they choose to designate as an obstacle. So the globalization project is pursued with undimmed enthusiasm by the State: the formation of an "economy" which is aimed entirely at the bailout of corporations at public expense, and the rewriting of the past to agree with this policy.

#### Skellig Michael: The Denial of History as State Policy by hanshiro

The Skelligs Rocks, 8 miles off the coast of Co. Kerry, constitute one of only two UNESCO World Heritage Sites in Ireland. However, the Office of Public Works (OPW) is currently engaged in reconstruction work there. On the South Peak of Skellig Michael, an altar, dating probably to the ninth century, has been destroyed by unsupervised workmen. In addition, there has been extensive rebuilding carried out on the main complex, which has led to considerable damage to the original structures. The work has proceeded without an Environmental Impact Assessment; while the Department of the Environment and OPW have argued that, because the Skelligs are a national monument (thus covered by the National Monuments Act 2004) and because the current work is part of an ongoing programme of conservation dating back to the 1980's, neither an EIA nor planning permission is necessary.

According to UNESCO guidelines, a Management Plan for each World Heritage Site must be submitted, and made available in published form, to direct the management of the site and any preservation work deemed to be necessary. A "management strategy" was submitted to UNESCO at the time the Skelligs were inscribed on the World Heritage List, and despite a statement by the OPW/Department of Environment management team that a "Management Plan" was approved by UNESCO in 2002, in fact no such plan exists as yet. The management team also failed to inform UNESCO of the rebuilding work on the Skelligs before it was commenced, even though UNESCO guidelines state specifically that "specific reports and impact studies" must be submitted "each time exceptional circumstances occur or work is undertaken which may have an effect on the state of conservation of the property.

In addition to being a WHS, the Skellings is a Special Preservation Area and a Bird Sanctuary, and as such any work carried out there without an Environmental Impact Assessment contravenes the EU Habitats Directive. No explanation has so far been forthcoming from the OPW on how it managed to secure a dispensation from the Directive. ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) have issued a series of charters intended to serve as a guide for restoration work. The "Nara Document on Authenticity" from 1994 states: "Conservation of cultural heritage in all its forms and historical periods is rooted in the values attributed to the heritage. Our ability to understand these values depends, in part, on the degree to which information sources about these values may be understood as credible or truthful. Knowledge and understanding of these sources of information, in relation to original and subsquent characteristics of the cultural heritage, and their meaning, is a requisite basis for assessing all aspects of authenticity."

The Venice Charter (1964) is intended as a guide to the thinking behind restoration work. It states: "Wherever the traditional setting exists, it must be kept... No new construction, demolition or modification which would alter the relations of mass and colour must be allowed... The process of restoration is a highly specialized operation... It must stop at the point where conjecture begins, and in this case moreover any extra work which is indispensible must be distinct from the architectureal composition and must bear a contemporary stamp. The restoration any case must be preceded and followed by an archaeological and historical study of the monument... The valid contributions of all periods to the building of a monument must be respected, since unity of style is not the aim of restoration."

Despite the contention of the Department of Environment that the works being carried out are "minimal", photographic evidence demonstrates widespread and systematic rebuilding of stonework in a manner completely at variance with the previously extant remains. Examples of the OPW's cavalier interpretation of their international obligations are the following: in the main monastic complex, an altar that was in use by pilgrims up to the 1930s has been removed, on the grounds that it was "merely" built by the nineteenth century lighthouse keepers, and a nineteenth century wall was replaced by a new wall on the lines of the original early Christian retaining wall. The management team have referred to the deformation of the upper terrace walls and their reconstruction of the walls "on the original line of the wall being repaired".

This is reconstruction according to a preconceived notion of how the remains should look, not investigation of the existing remains; in other words, anything which does not fit the management team's ideas of what is "early Christian" is removed, and worse, remains are dismantled and reordered into what the management team have decided they should look like.

This approach to archaeology, the idea that the accumulated layers should be respected rather than being simply stripped away as of no interest to reveal the "original" layer underneath, is based on a deeply flawed and mistaken ideology. Unfortunately, it seems to have attained to the level of a professional craze; in Italy, numerous masterpieces such as Michaelangelo's Sistine ceiling and Last Supper have been "restored" according to the notions of art historians, with not the slightest appreciation of the importance of preserving the essence of an artwork as a historical fact.

The layers of history cannot be stripped back to reveal a supposedly "original" essence; the desire to do this is a desire to deny that history has intervened between the creation of the work and its ultimate reception by the "restorer", and it is also to deny that the ways in which a work was understood and received through the centuries has any importance to one's own standpoint. The consequences of this can be immediately and painfully registered: just as the "restorers" of the Sistine ceiling have remade it according to their own limited aesthetic and historical perceptions, and in the process deprived it of much of its value, the OPW have engaged in a programme of dehistoricizing the Skelligs, thus asserting that there is no difference between the remains they reorder and their own understanding of them. In case there should be any dispute as to this understanding, all evidence of the intervening history must be cleared away, the slate wiped clean.

This denial of history, the notion that the accumulated layers of the past can be swiped aside to enable immediate access to the object, achieves the very reverse of what it professes: such an understanding reforms the object in its own image until it sees nothing but its own reflection there. Such an attitude can only be labelled cultural fascism, and it is the ideology that governs the State's archeological and cultural policy.

(I would like to thank Mr. Michael Gibbons for the information in this article.)

Please see our short video by going to the Media page at http://www.tara-foundation.org



Sceilg Mhichíl (Skellig Michael)



Sceilg Mhichíl in relation to the Irish coast

## August Licence Giveaway by turoe

In a press release on 19<sup>th</sup> August 2006, the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Noel Dempsey, announced the latest round of exploration licences for the Donegal, Slyne and Erris Basins. The press release was issued under a Strict Embargo to stop information leaking out before the release date. As the release date was a Saturday, it was guaranteed that there would be little media reporting of the event.

The successful applicants: Statoil Exploration, (Ireland) Limited, with Shell E & P, Ireland Limited as partner; Serica Energy (UK) Ltd; Island Oil & Gas PLC with Lundin Exploration BV and Endeavour Energy (UK) Ltd. as partners; Island Oil & Gas PLC with Lundin Exploration BV as partner. In a comment about the "deal" the Minister stated: 'The hydrocarbon potential of this area has been *illustrated by the Corrib gas field*, and this licensing round offers a new opportunity for exploration in an area that currently remains under-explored.' (1)

Extent: there are 71 full blocks and 31 part blocks. The acreage on offer in this Licence Round covers approximately 25,000 square kilometers.

This move by the government is significant; as it is an attempt to copper fasten the 1992 revision of the original 1975 terms drafted by Minister Justin Keating who attempted to establish an Irish oil and gas industry at a time when huge oil and gas reserves were discovered in the North Sea. The manner in which the terms were changed has been investigated by the Centre for Public Inquiry (now defunct) and the Mahon Tribunal, but obviously merits further investigation.

Licensing Terms: The type of license issued is a frontier license; that is, a deepwater offshore licence. (p. 64. The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, Fiosru: Centre for Public Inquiry, 2005). The duration of the four phases of the licenses is fifteen years, from May 2006, to May 2021. The so-called "surrender of acreage" clauses in the 1991 terms, is a revision of the 1975 requirement for the surrender of 50% of the original licensed area back to the State within four years. The 1991 requirement merely obliges the licence holder to sink an exploratory well within three years, and if there is no proposal to sink a second exploratory well, then 50% of the area will be returned. Once a second well is sunk, the State cannot demand the return of the fields.

The current offshore licences are divided between international (for example, Shell), and Irish-controlled concerns (for example Providence Resources). Shell holds a large share of the frontier licences, including

four blocks in the Rockall Basin, and five blocks in the Slyne/Erris basins, where the Corrib field is located. (p.72., ibid.) Statoil, which shares the Corrib lease with Shell and Marathon, is also a major licence holder, holding frontier licences in ten blocks along the Atlantic margin.

The Italian company ENI holds frontier licences in eight of the Atlantic margin blocks between the Donegal basin and the southern Slyne basin, along with six blocks in the south of the Porcupine Basin, due west of the Kinsale gas field.

OMV Ireland, the Irish subsidiary of the Austrian oil and gas company OMV, holds a 10% share in the Shell-operated licence in the Rockall Trough.

Providence Resources, and Island Oil and Gas, holds frontier licences in four blocks in the north Porcupine Basin, which holds the Connemara field explored by BP. (2).

Providence Resources has several prospects in the Porcupine Basin. It holds an 80% stake in the 16-year frontier licences for several blocks in the Porcupine Basin in the Atlantic Ocean.

Providence claim to have identified a possible 25 trillion cubic feet of gas and 4 billion barrels of oil in the Dunquin Prospect in the Porcupine Basin. Providence also holds licences for the Ardmore, Hook Head and Helvick prospects in the Celtic Sea.

Petroceltic holds production and exploration interests in seven blocks and part-blocks in the Kinsale field area.

Aberdeen-based Ramco Energy has interests in a number of blocks but has recently sold a number of its exploration blocks to Lundin Petroleum, a Swedish company, which has been granted licences in the August 2006 round.

(1)

http://www.dcmnr.gov.ie/Natural/Petroleum+Affairs+Division/Latest+News/Minister+D empsey+Awards+Exploration+Licences+for+Slyne+Erris+Donegal+Area.htm

(2) p.72, ibid

## The New Atomic Warfare by turoe

Reporter Lesley Stahl on U.S. sanctions against Iraq: We have heard that a half million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: *I think this is a very hard choice, but the price--we think the price is worth it.* (1)

The implications of the use of "Depleted" Uranium weapons in Iraq and in Yugoslavia are extremely serious, and bear detailed examination. There has been very little attention paid to the consequences of what the US military refers to as 'zero-sum warfare', or *omnicide*: namely, total war of extermination waged against the environment and entire populations, in sum, the total elimination of historical experience. (2)

The effects of Depleted Uranium as a weapon will be outlined, but as horrific and all-embracing as these are, it is vital to view the totality of the evidence and the central purpose of atomic warfare: the covert extermination of targeted populations.

#### What is Depleted Uranium?:

The term 'Depleted' Uranium is a misnomer. It refers to the waste left after enriched uranium is separated from natural uranium in order to produce fuel for nuclear reactors. During this process, the fissionable isotope Uranium 235 is separated from uranium. The remaining uranium, which is 99.8% uranium 238, is misleadingly called 'depleted uranium'. While the term 'depleted' implies it isn't particularly dangerous, in fact this waste product of the nuclear industry is 'conveniently' disposed of by the industrialized production of lethal weapons. (1)

Depleted uranium (DU) is the highly toxic and radioactive byproduct of the uranium enrichment process. It is referred to as "depleted" because the content of the fissionable U-235 isotope is reduced from 0.7% to 0.2% during the enrichment process. The isotope U-238 makes up over 99% of the content of both natural uranium and depleted uranium. Depleted uranium is roughly 60% as radioactive as naturally occurring uranium, and has a half life of 4.5 billion years. Depleted uranium is chemically toxic. It is an extremely dense, hard metal, and can cause chemical poisoning to the body in the same way as lead or any other heavy metal. However, depleted uranium is also radiologically hazardous, as it spontaneously burns on impact, creating tiny aerosolized alass particles which are small enough to be inhaled. These uranium oxide particles emit all types of radiation, alpha, beta and gamma, and can be carried in the air over very long distances. Depleted uranium has a half-life of 4.5 billion years, and the presence of depleted uranium ceramic aerosols can pose a long-term threat to human health and the environment. (2)

#### Depleted Uranium at War:

In the 1950's the United States Department of Defense became interested in using depleted uranium metal in weapons, because of its extremely dense, pyrophoric qualities and because it was cheap and available in *huge quantities*. It is now given practically free of charge to the military and arms manufacturers by the nuclear industry, and is used both in tank armour and in armour-piercing shells known as depleted uranium penetrators.

Over 15 countries are known to have depleted uranium weapons in their military arsenals - UK, US, France, Russia, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan, Thailand, Iraq and Taiwan with depleted uranium rapidly spreading to other countries. (3)

The range of DU weaponry now available to NATO countries (U.S., British and French forces) is extensive: from the penetrating tips and counterweights of cruise missiles to the DU rounds to the 120 mm cannon shells used by the U.S. M1A1 "Abrams" tanks, the Gatling machine-gun ammunition used for the U.S. A-10 "Warthog" airplanes, "Apache" helicopters, and "Harrier" fighters. Depleted uranium was first used on a large scale in military combat during the 1991 Gulf War, ("Operation Desert Storm") and has since been used in Bosnia in 1995, and again in the Balkans war of 1999. It was used again in the 2003 Gulf War ("Operation Iraqi Freedom"). (4)

A sub-commission of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights appointed a rapporteur to investigate the use of depleted uranium, among other types of weapons, after passing a resolution which categorized depleted uranium weapons alongside such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, napalm, and cluster bombs as a 'weapon of indiscriminate effect'.

"Civilian" Applications for Depleted Uranium:

Depleted uranium is also to be found in civilian products. For example, it is used as ballast in aeroplanes, [with disastrous consequences in 1992 when an El-Al jet crashed into flats near Amsterdam]. (5) Depleted uranium was also involved in the recent Stansted Korean Air crash - see CADU News issue 3 for full report. (6) (7)

It is also used in some hospital equipment. The recent Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community) objective, which allows the 'recycling' of lowlevel radioactive waste into consumer goods, has also raised concerns that depleted uranium will be used in this fashion. (8) (9)

- (1) <u>http://www.cadu.org.uk/intro.htm</u>
- (2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) <u>http://www.chugoku-np.co.jp/abom/uran/index\_e.html</u>

(5)

http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http://www

- (6) <u>http://www.cadu.org.uk/info/civilian/3\_1.htm</u>
- (7) <u>http://www.vanderbilt.edu/radsafe/0001/msg00156.html</u>



A Typical Cylinder Storage Xaul

Depleted uranium storage yard.



This map was released by the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses (Bernard Rostker, Under Secretary of the Army) to the Presidential Special Oversight Board (former Senator Warren Rudman) on November 19, 1998 in Washington, DC. (Source: Wikipedia.)

### East Timor: Timeline of the Coup (Part III) by turoe

East Timor's Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri resigned on June 26th amid an unrelenting campaign backed by the Australian government media for his removal. The announcement came less than 24 hours after a meeting of the ruling Fretilin party had refused to bow to demands by President Xanana Gusmao to sack the "illegal leadership" of Alkatiri and party president Francisco "Lu-Olu" Guterres. Gusmao had dramatically threatened to resign if his demands were not carried out, but backed off over the weekend. (1)

Fretilin's central committee appealed to both Gusmao and Alkatiri to remain in their positions, but Alkatiri immediately was pressurized by Horta, a close Gusmao ally, who had announced his intention to resign "because the government is not functioning properly." Australia Foreign Minister Alexander Downer immediately declared that he would be "very sorry" if Horta resigned, stating: "He [Ramos-Horta] has been a good friend and very effective foreign minister."

A factor in Alkatiri's decision was the prospect of legal charges after the "hit squad" allegation aired in the Australian media, and the follow-up arrest of former interior minister Rogerio Lobato, who was detained by Australian soldiers last week. (2) (3)

Alkatiri's resignation, however, was not primarily triggered by this campaign for his dismissal, but by the fact that Fretilin's own supporters were entering the fray, raising the prospect of a descent into civil war. Fretilin leaders have been blocking members and supporters from staging counter-rallies in opposition to the relatively small anti-Alkatiri protests orchestrated by Gusmao, Ramos-Horta, opposition politicians and various rebel police and army officers. On June 26<sup>th</sup>, it was reported that 18 truckloads of Fretilin supporters were heading toward Dili to support the government. (4)

In a brief press statement, he declared his willingness to step aside, to prevent "any deepening of the crisis" and "believing that all militants and sympathizers of Fretilin will understand and support this position." A successor remains to be appointed, but Fretilin, the primary national liberation movement in East Timor, will inevitably confront a similar campaign if it fails to select someone acceptable to Gusmao and his Australian handlers. (5)

To ensure that his resignation is final, it was announced that Alkatiri would be charged with crimes against the state and imprisonment for up to 15 years. Chief Prosecutor Longuinhos told the newspaper *The*  Australian: "It's related to the matter of him having knowledge of the weapons distribution and not doing anything about it." Even if it were true that Alkatiri and Lobato were involved in distributing weapons to Fretilin supporters, which is highly unlikely, the situation involved a collapse of the country's security forces and threats of civil war by the rebel leadership. There has been no suggestion that any of the pro-Australian rebels, such as Major Alfredo Reinado, will be prosecuted for sedition, treason or other crimes against the state. (6) (7)

Speaking from Indonesia, Howard could scarcely conceal his delight at Alkatiri's departure. "It seems to me to be part of the process of working out the difficulties, resolving the impass, breaking the logjam. To that extent I am pleased." In a fine display of hypocrisy, he added that he had no view on any proposed successor for Alkatiri: "It's not for me to nominate the prime minister of that country; it's an independent sovereign country." (8)

Under the cloak of preventing a move towards civil war in East Timor, the Australian government has been systematically undermining East Timor's sovereignty. At the centre of the political chaos which erupted in April and May are dubious figures such as Reinado, who trained at the Australian Defence Academy in 2005, and who has close political associations with Ramos-Horta.

The dispatch of Australian warships which took place on May 12<sup>th</sup>, was undertaken without informing the East Timorese government, but action was withheld until the outcome of a challenge to Alkatiri at a Fretilin congress on May 17-19<sup>th</sup>. (9)

Only when Fretilin delegates overwhelmingly endorsed Alkatiri's leadership did Canberra exploit the escalating violence engineered by his political opponents and "rebel" soldiers as the means for arm-twisting Dili into "inviting" an Australian-led military intervention. (10) Even as the troops were landing in East Timor, Howard provocatively declared on May 26<sup>th</sup> that the country "has not been well-governed." This was the signal for the Australian media barrage demonizing Alkatiri as "widely hated," autocratic and a Marxist, responsible for the escalating crisis. If necessary, Gusamo had to sack the prime minister. Alkatiri initially refused to resign, and Gusmao lacked the constitutional power to remove him. The propanganda campaign was simultaneously shifted and intensified. Proceeding with constant vilification of Alkatiri, Australian journalists and his political opponents created various allegations. No charge proved too incredible: rebel leader Lieutenant Gastao Salsinha told a reporter that Alkatiri was responsible for the massacre of 60 people, but refused to reveal the location of this supposed mass grave. (11)

At the same time, Gusmao and Ramos-Horta, with the support of the Australian media, mounted an East Timorese version of the US-backed "colour revolutions" in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Hundreds of anti-Alkatiri supporters were brought into Dili in trucks, under the protection of Australian troops, to demonstrate outside government buildings. Images of these "protests" have been broadcast around the world as "proof" of Alkatiri's unpopularity and the need to remove him. (12) Australia's objection to the Alkatiri government is not its supposed "Marxism." The real hostility is towards a government that attempted to follow a non-aligned political and economic policy, in however weak and uncoordinated a fashion, in order to strengthen its incredibly weak and precarious position, by playing the various powers off against each other. The Alkatiri government, therefore, following formal independence in 2002, had strengthened ties with the former colonial power, Portugal, sought economic assistance from China and Japan and received aid from China.

In relation to Australian, and by extension American, imperial aims in East Timor, the "crime" of Altakiri is that he did not follow orders and attempted to balance competing interests against each other. Above all, he refused to bow to pressure immediately to Australian orders and hand over the bulk of the Timor Sea oil and aas, which is East Timor's by international law. In the Australian issue of 27<sup>th</sup> June, commentator Mark Dodd stated: "Alkatiri's departure should spell good news for Australian companies wanting to do business in Dili. Too many were scared away when he was in charge." In its editoral, The Australian, in the forefront of the campaign to remove Alkatiri, prophesied that the Australian-led occupation would last indefinitely, declaring: "Australia will have to keep troops on the ground for the foreseeable future in East Timor." With Alkatiri removed from power, Australia has greatly tightened its grip over East Timor. Retired Portuguese General Alfredo Assuncao declared in an interview: "What interests the Australians most is oil and aas...So what better way to control these enormously rich resources than to be physically present and control the country's political system?" Assuncao described Australia as: "the main enemy of the country [East *Timor*, "seeking to "control everything and everyone." (13)

(1) <u>http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/jun2006/etim-j27.shtml</u>

- (3) <u>http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/jul2006/tim3-j29.shtml</u>
- (4) <u>http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/jun2006/etim-j27.shtml</u>

- (7) <u>http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=10914</u>
- (8) <u>http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/jun2006/etim-j27.shtml</u>
- (9) Ibid.
- (10) Ibid.
- (11) Ibid.
- (12) Ibid.
- (13) Ibid.

<sup>(2)</sup> Ibid.

<sup>(5)</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>(6)</sup> Ibid.