3rd October, 2001
Dr. Henry: I thank the Minister for coming into the House this evening. The Minister will be well aware of the United Nations Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, of which we were early signatories. Many countries were enthusiastic about signing it and the convention was ratified in 1975. This convention was designed to curtail and eliminate the proliferation of bacteriological weapons.
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One problem with the original convention was the absence of a verification protocol. In other words, there was no method to ensure that the countries who said they had no such weapons were telling the truth. Ireland has been an enthusiastic supporter of an ad hoc group established in the early 1990s to introduce a verification protocol.
I addressed the House on an Adjournment debate matter regarding this issue. The fifth review of the convention is due in November and December and I expressed the hope that we could use our pressure within the group to have a verification protocol introduced. Matters appeared to be progressing well but unfortunately, on 25 July, the US pulled out of the ad hoc group, for reasons that can only be described as bizarre. In his address to the group Ambassador Donald Mahley said that the US had decided it was not in its interest to continue with the negotiations. This was an extraordinary development after six and a half years of negotiations. It is even more extraordinary when the US Government must have known that without unanimity the group could not proceed. In view of Ambassador Mahley's speech one would have to conclude that pressure had been put on the US Government by the pharmaceutical and biotechnological drug companies because they are very much involved in the production of these products.
The ad hoc group collapsed and the US said it would consider matters but it made no concrete proposals. Ambassador Mahley's speech was extraordinary in a number of respects. One of the most bizarre was the proposal that we should work towards better protection against disease, for example better vaccines and so on. That is very well for the sophisticated nations but how can it be applied to the developing countries?
We know that the US and Russia are working on genetically modified bacteria so that while we may have vaccines for common bacteria we will not have them for, say, genetically modified anthrax. It takes approximately 18 months to vaccinate people against anthrax, yet in one night enough anthrax could be sprinkled over a city from a glider - not even an airplane would be necessary - to kill hundreds of thousands of people within a very short period of time.
Ireland leads the UN Security Council at present. At least three members - the US, Russia and China - have biological weapons and between 12 and 20 countries are reckoned to have them. Unfortunately, some have been acquired by their erstwhile allies in the US, Russia or China. Perhaps the tragedy on 11 September will have modified the US view on this because everybody now appears to be terrified of biological weapons. They have the potential to do terrible damage.
I wish people would stop talking about rogue states because the stealing of these weapons from the major states is far more likely to get us into trouble. In 1996, Larry Wayne Harris, a microbiologist, stole bubonic plague from one of the laboratories in the US to show how easily this could happen. He produced his evidence to the CIA and got an 18 months suspended sentence for his troubles. We know there are considerable problems in Russia regarding the payment of State employees and the possibility of theft from such institutions would have to be considered likely. We know that nuclear weapons, including warheads, have been stolen and acquired by the Burmese military junta. They have been sold by the Russian Mafia in exchange for drugs. It is much easier to steal and sell something like bubonic plague, anthrax and smallpox.
I ask the Minister to use our position to request the US to return to this ad hoc group and to try to push forward the protocol verification. It is essential because this issue concerns genocide and human rights. The Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention is not a trade agreement; it is not for pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies to interfere in it. This is a human rights issue and I ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make a commitment to promote it within the UN Security Council.
Minister for the Marine and Natural Resources (Mr. Fahey): The Senator will be aware that the 1972 Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC, prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons and provides for their destruction. The ultimate objective is to achieve a total ban on these weapons. Ireland signed and ratified the convention soon after negotiation concluded in 1972. The convention is a laudable and necessary instrument of international law, but its effectiveness is impaired by the fact that, at the time of negotiation, no provisions were included to ensure verification of compliance by states parties. In the intervening time it has been generally acknowledged that the absence of a means of enforcing the convention's provisions was a serious omission which should be made good.
To that end, in September 1994, a special conference of BTWC states parties established an ad hoc group to address the matter of devising a verification protocol, such as exists in the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Ireland was extensively engaged in the work of this group, working with EU partners to establish agreed positions. In particular, Ireland has supported efforts to devise an effective verification mechanism including random visits to possible sites of manufacture of biological weapons.
The ad hoc group was mandated to devise a draft verification protocol for presentation to the fifth BTWC review conference which is scheduled to meet in November and December this year. However, in July this year certain difficulties emerged in this complex negotiating process and it became clear that the ad hoc group would not be able to fulfil its mandate of concluding a protocol. Ireland, along with our EU partners and many other countries, has not hidden our disappointment that the group failed to reach agreement on a verification protocol. It was a most regrettable development but we remain strongly wedded to the idea that a protocol is indispensable. We will persist in our commitment to the ad hoc group protocol process and to multilateral efforts towards finding a common understanding on the matter. Along with a group of like-minded countries, we have urged the ad hoc group to continue its work. By the time the review conference meets in November and December we hope that the intervening period will have allowed countries to reflect on their positions, and we would hope for a constructive approach to sustaining the possibility of an inclusive multilateral negotiating process.
The process of negotiating a verification protocol is in a state of some uncertainty at this point. Following widespread media coverage, many will be aware that the US was unable to accept the text of the draft protocol. However, we are encouraged by the US statements that it will not be withdrawing from multilateral endeavours to strengthen the BTWC in all its aspects. The US said that it will develop other ideas and different approaches that could help to achieve the common objective of effectively strengthening the BTWC. We look forward to hearing these ideas in a timely fashion and to assessing whether they will strengthen the BTWC in a complementary manner.
The question can arise as to whether the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention could be an effective instrument against terrorists and their use of such weapons. Such conventions primarily address weapons held by states and as such are not immediately effective against individuals or groups. However, an adequate multilateral verification system for chemical and biological weapons promises in the longer term to reduce and eliminate the danger of their falling into the hands of terrorists. We should not lose sight of such a multilateral avenue even in the present crisis. More immediately, those countries who participate in export control regimes must consider what steps might be possible to improve and strengthen co-operation in this field, to prevent acquisition of the means of producing such weapons by terrorists or those who support them.
For its part, Ireland will continue to advocate energetically in all relevant fora the necessity for devising and implementing an effective means of verification with the objective of ensuring compliance with, and strengthening of, the convention. The Senator may be aware that within the United Nations system the Security Council does not have primary responsibility for this and other disarmament issues but we are convinced that most states are seized of the importance and urgency of resolving this matter. The forthcoming review conference will be an appropriate forum to pursue this objective as will the United Nation's First Committee, which considers disarmament matters. While the presidency of the Security Council does not in itself offer a direct opportunity to pursue the matter expressly, we will continue to be vocal and active wherever it may assist in advancing efforts to negotiate a verification protocol between member states.
