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Reconsidering the
campaign of the Second Earl of Essex in Ireland leads to
some interesting - and controversial - conclusions
 The
appointment of the Earl of Essex as Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland was just one of several moves made by Elizabeth I to
defeat the power of Ireland’s defiant chieftains, and
in particular that of Hugh O’Neill. Though castigated
for his actions while holding this position both at the time
and by more recent historians, the logic of Essex’s
actions deserves reappraisal and his reputation
rejuvenation.
Following
the failure of the Spanish Armada, English expansion from
the Pale was accelerated in an attempt to secure Ireland as
a bulwark against further attack from the Atlantic. Queen
Elizabeth I recognized the strategic importance that Ireland
represented to a foreign enemy of England, such as
Spain.
The
resistance which England’s forces faced came chiefly
from the northern chieftains, who had forestalled Elizabeth’s
designs on Ireland. The principal northern chieftains of
this rebellion were Red Hugh O’Donnell, Brian Oge O’Rourke,
Donal O’Cahan, Sorely Boy McDonnell, and Hugh O’Neill,
Earl of Tyrone. It was on O’Neill above all “traitors”,
however, that Elizabeth’s anger was focussed, and
against his power and authority that her military campaigns
of the late 1590s were directed.
In
1597, under Lord Deputy Thomas Lord Burgh, the English army
was ordered into a frontal attack upon the northern
chieftains. Burgh believed that the northern rebels would be
“no match for Her Majesty’s ensigns” and that if O’Neill
“be well pressed, all is got.” Burgh died of an illness
before the fateful confrontation would take place, but the
replacement campaign in 1598 under Sir Henry Bagenal was
decimated by O’Neill and his forces at Yellow Ford.
At
the end of 1598, Queen Elizabeth selected the Earl of Essex
as her Lord Lieutenant in Ireland. Essex had been a rival of
Lord Mountjoy for this appointment, and this rivalry was, I
believe, significant in what followed. “Robert, Earl
of Essex, who at this time was credited with greater
achievements than any Englishman of the period, was made
Viceroy of Ireland, second to no one and Commander-in-Chief
of the royalist army.” High among the Queen’s
reasons for selecting Essex was that he was an experienced
and highly celebrated soldier and she believed that, if
given abundant resources of money and English soldiers, he
would quickly and successfully end the war against Hugh O’Neill.
O’Clery implies that Essex’s rivals in Elizabeth’s
court wasted few opportunities to undermine his position
during his absence in Ireland.
“The
Queen proposed to commit the government to Charles Blount,
Lord Mountjoy. The Earl of Essex, the royal favourite of the
moment, warmly opposed such a choice. He argued that a man
of varied experience was required for the conduct of the
war, that the retired and studious life which Mountjoy had
hitherto led was hardly a fit preparation for such a
service; a brave and skillful General would be needed, a man
who would possess the confidence of the Crown, and be
superior to the petty factions that had hitherto ruled
supreme in Ireland. She asked him to accept the office.”
The new Lord Lieutenant was given wide discretion for
conducting the war, and was assigned 16,000 foot and 1,300
horse for this purpose. “On one point only had precise
instructions been given to him: he was to ‘pass by all
other rebels whatever, and to head all his force against the
chief traitor Tyrone, and the Ulster rebels, his
confederates.’”
Many
historians take the position that Essex squandered his
opportunity for success in his defining mission. “In
1599, after a delay that greatly injured the English
interest, the Queen filled a post which had been left vacant
since Burgh’s death by sending a viceroy to Ireland.
She sent her favourite, the Earl of Essex . Essex further
increased O’Neill’s prestige by using –
and using up – against Munster rather than Ulster the
great military force with which he came provided.”
Such
a dismissal of Essex may be too simplistic, for it belittles
the considerable abilities of O’Neill and O’Donnell,
who set into place an effective plan of resistance. In fact,
indications are that the northern Chieftains expected to be
the targets of the English campaign. Their situation would
have allowed them to have endured a direct campaign more
favorably than would their attackers. As part of their
preparation, O’Neill and O’Donnell had solicited
the prominent Chieftains of Munster, Leinster, and
Connaught. Such allies were recruited to harass the English
with quick hitting forays, lay siege on the Pale, and
disrupt English supply lines.
O’Neill’s
confederates had learned to win their battles “by a
brilliant process of luring their unimaginative enemy into
positions where they could fight with the odds in their
favor.”
An
experienced soldier, like Essex, who had a distinguished
military record against the Spanish in Cadiz, would have
recognized such a threat and taken precautions. In fact,
estimates of Irish troop strengths in the period were as
high as 30,000, with about 9,000 in Ulster being the largest
single force. Shortly after arriving in Dublin in April
1599, Essex’s “intelligence service warned him
that Tyrone was about to move into Munster. O’Donnell
had already moved into north Connaught. Tyrone had in fact
written to one of the revolting Geraldine Chieftains in
Munster, the White Knight, that he hoped to be with him in
May.”
Intending
to prevent O’Neill from establishing a base of
operations in Munster, Essex set out to capture such castles
as could be used to good advantage by his adversaries. As he
did, he met significant opposition.
O’Sullivan
reports that “Owyn O’More with 500 foot, met him
in Leinster as he was leading his army through a narrow pass
and routed his rear guard and killed some soldiers and
officers and carried off some spoils&” “Earl
Desmond, Baron Raymond and his brother William came to the
castle’s assistance at the head of 1000 foot and a few
horse&” “On the second day of the siege,
William Burke with 500 foot and 200 horse marched to relieve
the castle&” Ten days later, O’Sullivan
reports that “By this time, Donal MacCarthy and Earl
Desmond had got together 2,500 men with whom they blocked
the passes on the road.” “At the village of
Finniterstown, the Catholics sallying out from a wood
attacked at once the first, rear, and middle divisions.”
Then, “Desmond followed him for six days as far as
Decries, attacking night and day and thinning out his army. “
We also learn that Essex made an expedition into Offaly
against the O’Connors and O’Moores –
having little success.
The
presence of so many Gaelic forces, who were able to respond
so quickly to the arrival of Essex is indicative that a
strategy had been in place prior to the Lord Lieutenant’s
arrival. In fact, a Gaelic Confederation extended throughout
Ireland, and – with some justification –
expected to be reinforced, if need be, by large numbers of
Spanish soldiers. Numerous letters had been sent back and
forth between King Phillip II of Spain and O’Neill, O’Rourke,
and O’Donnell. In all of these, the King expressed
support and his promise to send money and troops. Indeed, a
second Armada was launched in 1597, and had only been
prevented from landing by severe weather.
By
the time of Essex’s arrival in 1599 confederate
chieftains allied to O’Neill included the Wicklow
clans of O’Byrne and O’Toole, as well as the
McCarthys, the O’Reillys, the Maguires, the O’Moores,
the Lacys, the Tyrells, the MacDevitts, the O’Sullivan
Beares and others. Expectations on both sides included the
possibility of a Spanish landing in Ireland.
Despite
the real difficulties confronting him, and Elizabeth’s
condescending letters, Essex nevertheless obeyed his orders
and directed his campaign against Ulster. During that
campaign, “he burned down one of Sorely Boy’s
castles on Rathlin Island and massacred his wife and
youngest sons together with some 600 people.” O’Neill
and his allies engaged a “scorched earth”
policy, in which no food or shelter was left intact for the
invaders. Each advance captured only ruins which were
increasingly more difficult to victual and hold. As of the
21st of August, no less than 18 of Essex’s “Captains
and Lords and Colonels of the Army” had signed a
document, after a Council of War, declaring that a further
expedition into the north would be “unwise and against
their judgment.” But on August 28th, Essex ordered
them onward. He finally made contact with O’Neill in
early September and pursued him through thick woods for a
time, before O’Neill sent a messenger asking for a
parley. “It was a curious meeting, for Tyrone was on
horseback, in a river (the Larne), with the water to his
horse’s belly, and Essex stood on the bank. What they
said to one another will never be known. A further meeting
was arranged. They agreed to a truce. Tyrone withdrew into
the heart of his country, and Essex dispersed his army.”
Upon
his return to Dublin, Essex received two stingingly
sarcastic letters from Elizabeth questioning his commitment
to ending the war, and challenging even his courage. But the
Queen specifically ordered him to remain in Ireland and
bring the war to a conclusion. Essex, possibly fearing that
his position was being fatally undermined in London by those
who wished him ill, decided to go at once to London and
explain himself to the Queen. Essex brought with him one Sir
Christopher St. Lawrence, who was forceful in warning Essex
about his rivals’ ability to prejudice the Queen’s
mind against him. In fact, St. Lawrence “proposed to
murder Lord Grey de Wilton” to reduce one such
influence against Essex.
The
fortunes of Essex, however, were already ruined. He was sent
to the Tower of London, where he was later involved in a
plot against the Queen, and eventually sent to be beheaded.
His successor in Ireland was his old rival, Lord Mountjoy,
who is credited with the eventual victory over the Gaelic
Confederation at the Battle of Kinsale. Yet, the outcome of
even that ill-fated battle might have been reversed if Hugh
O’Neill’s more cautious counsel had been
followed.
Those
students of history who dismiss Essex’s campaign in
Ireland seem to underestimate the strategic advantages that
had been constructed by O’Neill and O’Donnell.
The confederate chieftains allied to O’Neill had
decisively made their presence felt during Essex’s
southern campaign, and would have represented a terrible
risk to his forces, had Essex chosen to ignore
them.
Had
Essex launched an immediate campaign into Ulster, he would
have placed his army in grave danger of being surrounded and
cut off from his supply lines. This would have played
precisely into the tactics employed by O’Neill
throughout his career, and it would not have been
complicated – as was Kinsale – with any sense of
urgency to rescue a Spanish ally under siege.
Bibliography:
Lughaidh O’Clery, “Beatha
na Aedh Rua O’Domnaill” with notes by Rev.
Dennis Murphy, S.J., Fallon & Co., Dublin,
1895
C.P. Meehan, “Fate &
Fortunes of the Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnell”,
Edmund Burke & Co., Dublin, 1886
G.A. Hayes-McCoy, “Irish
Battles – A Military History of Ireland”, Barnes
& Noble, N.Y., 1969
Sean O’Faolain, “The
Great O’Neill”, Mercier Press, Dublin,
1942
Cyril Falls, “Elizabeth’s
Irish Wars”, Syracuse University Press,
1997
Phillip O’Sullivan, “History
of Catholic Ireland” published as “Ireland under
Elizabeth”, Translated by Matthew J. Byrne Sealy,
Bryers, and Walker, Dublin, 1903
Niall Fallon, “The Armada in
Ireland”, Wesleyan University Press, 1978
© Ted Meehan MMII
About the
Author
Ted Meehan is an independent
scholar with a special interest in late Gaelic Ireland. He
is a former teacher of American and European History at
Archbishop Carroll High School in Radnor, Pennsylvania, and
has had articles published on a variety of topics in
Philadelphia Inquirer, the Los Angeles Times, the National
Catholic Register, and the Periodical for the Association of
Energy Engineers, among others
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