It was concluded that the root cause of many of the problems of the European Common Fisheries Policy was the unpredictable nature of the fishing resources.
This unpredictability, the fishermen felt, was not due to the sea's inability to consistently produce fish, but due to the changeable nature of EU fisheries management decisions and the unequal manner of their implementation. In fact, most fishermen interviewed in Ireland as well as in The Netherlands thought EU fisheries policy was a shambles.
The combination of unpredictable quota levels and the uncertainty surrounding access of fishing fleets to the various EU fishing grounds meant that the fishermen felt they had to catch as many fish as they could get away with and now, because they did not know what the situation was going to be next year. If they did not catch the fish now, someone else would.
Many of the fishermen interviewed said they realized, more than anyone, that the way they were fishing was not sustainable in the long term, and furthermore that they resented being forced into this position by national and international fisheries regulations. The Dutch fishermen gave, what they termed "the horse power race" amongst their beam trawlers, as an example of a trend which they did not want but were forced into by bad fisheries regulations.
In the quantitative questionnaire section of my study one question asked whether fishery rules and regulation were needed. All (100%) of the Irish as well as Dutch fishermen said they were needed, but with the absolutely essential proviso that the rules must be equally and fairly applied in all countries covered by the European Common Fisheries Policy. It was the overwhelming perception of the Dutch and Irish fishermen that at present (1995-1997) EU fisheries regulations are not equally applied in all EU countries.
A fear was also expressed that if fishermen were to put forward the above too forcefully themselves it might be used against them, for example by means of further cuts in fishing quota, instead of the real problem being addressed.
The strategy of fishing as much as you can, while you still can, is a perfectly sensible strategy to adopt when resources are unpredictable. But fishermen did not want this situation. They wanted predictability of fishing rights so they can afford to plan for the future and fish sustainably.
Ideally fishermen expressed the wish to have an input into fish stock assessment, to control the catches themselves and thereby keep fish prices buoyant, avoid overfishing and cut down on operating expenses.
The conclusions are that three requirements are needed to form the basis of a future fisheries policy in order to bring about predictability of resources :
- A system of long term stable sea tenure needs to be instituted
- The areas of sea tenure need to be linked to distinct groups of fishermen forming cohesive social units
- National and international fishery regulations need to be equally enforced throughout all sea tenure regions
Long term sea tenure linked to distinct groups of fishermen is essential because in this way these groups know that if they manage their stocks with a long term view in mind, they and their descendants will benefit, without the threat of a sudden influx of other fishing fleets and unexpected quota cuts.
The size, location and specific system of sea tenure would be influenced by particular circumstances but would have to take factors, such as the geographic range of the relevant fish populations and the long term economic viability of the fishing communities, into account. The system of sea tenure would have to be stable in the long term and exclusive to the social unit of fishermen concerned, unless decided otherwise by the fishermen themselves, in order to ensure predictability of resources. Fisheries research and stock assessment services would of course need to be available to the fishermen's groups.
By choosing the cohesive social unit of fishermen judiciously it should be possible to bring about a high level of internal policing, but a system of independent and equal fishery regulation enforcement will also be necessary. Both these approaches are needed for a high level of fishery regulation compliance.
The goal of a long term fixed system of sea tenure might seem initially politically problematic. But just as the predictability of the current system of land tenure on which agriculture in Europe and other parts of the world depends, has amply shown; the future viability of the commercial fishing industry depends on the predictability of its resources. The conclusion of this study is that such is the case in Ireland and The Netherlands and that, being based on sound ecological principles, this is also the case for other EU member states.
The correct system of Sea Tenure would have to take fish stock movements into account. It would have to be appropriate for regional circumstances. The system of Sea Tenure would have to keep the whole fishing community in mind, that means the small and medium operators as well as the big operations. From a Human Ecological point of view it would be most desirable, in order to have a sustainable fishing community and an economically stable fishing sector, that there should be diversity in economic units within the fisheries sector.
Sea tenure does appear to be the way to achieve predictability. The real political difficulties may lie not so much in the acceptance of the basic concept of long term sea tenure but in the fair determination of the geographical location and size of the areas of sea tenure. However, considering the potential benefits of a predictable system of sea tenure on the one hand and the manner in which present EU fisheries policy is functioning on the other, it would seem that this political goal needs to be achieved to ensure the long term viability of the sea fishing industry.