Pjmy posted 01-06-99 07:16 PM ET (US)        

"The summer of 1941, Thach's Fighting Three went ashore at NAS San Diego to reequip with Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats. This gave Thach much more opportunity to test new ideas. He liked to simulate various flying formations by laying out matchsticks on the kitchen table of his home in nearby Coronado--often a relaxing diversion before retiring for the night. The next day he would try his ideas in the the air. While he was at San Diego, information reached Thach from the Fleet Air Tactical Unit describing the new Japanese Zero carrier fighter. The FATU Intelligence Bureau of 22 September 1941 gave the Zero a top speed of between 345 and 380mph, a cruise of between 210 and 250mph, and an armament of two 20mm cannons and two 7.7mm machineguns. Thach also may have seen other estimates, emanating from Claire Chennault in China. Chennault possessed firsthand experience in battling the Zero. he rated its top speed at 322mph, but more important, warned fo the Mitsubishi's incredible manueverability and high climb rate. At atny rate, the estimates sketched a formidable opponent, if one gave any credence to them. Thach was inclined to credit the reports he saw, as he felt they appeared to have been written by a fighter pilot. It was not comforting that the potential energy might already possess a fighter that could outperform the F4F-3s just reaching the squadron.

"Faced with the possibility of encountering fighters that were faster, more maneuverable and swift climbers, Thach began thinking of tactics to overcome these vital advantages. Out came the matchsticks in earnest. He concentrated on developing a cruise formation that would offer protection en route to battle, the time when his fighters would be most vunerable to surprise attack from above. In dealing with an attacking fighter, the defender has two basic options: turn away and run, or head into his assailant to counterattack or try spoiling his aim. In fighting a Zero such as described, Thach knew it would be suicidal to break away unless the defender had a hell of a long lead. Thus the crux of the problem lay in developing a maneuver in which the defender, in deciding to stay and fight, could line up a shot on the attacker. Because of extensive training in deflection shooting, Thach felt confident his pilots could score hits, even if offered only snap bursts at fleeting targets.

"Thach made his breakthrough when he decided to deploy the two sectons abreast of each other at a distance at least equal to the tactical diameter (turning radius) of the F4F Wildcat. Once he assumed this formation, he saw many opportunities for the defender. Being abreast of one another, the sections had good lookout, particularly over the tail of the opposite pair. Thach evolved a lookout doctrine in which the section on the right watch above and behind the left squadron, and, similarly, the pair on the left observed the tail of the right section. They could warn each other of imminent attacks by signals, hastend by the fact they were already looking in each other's direction!

" In terms of dealing with attacks, all four planes could fire on enemy fighters executing opposite (head-on) attacks. If the enemy charged in from above and behind, one section could turn to shoot at any fighters bouncing the other section. Thach quickly determined that the best procedure was to have the section that spotted an attacker going after the other section, itself turn immediately toward the threatened compatriots. This would be the signal to alert the other section and would also get the two counterattacking planes moving in the porper direction for a shot at the enemy.Seeing the other section turn toward them, the section in dangeer would know they were about to be attacked. Their reaction would be to turn toward the other section and set up a scissors with them. This maneuver would help spoil the aim of the attackers and give the defenders time to work thier counter. If the attacker pulled out early, then the unattacked section would get a side shot at him. If the attacker maneuvered to follow his targets around in their turn, then the unattacked section could line up a head-on run. Now this was mutual defense!

" Thach was very excited and eager to present his discovery to the squadron."

The First Team

Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbour to Midway

pp480-481

John B Lundstrom

Naval Institute Press

Daff RSAF posted 01-07-99 08:07 AM ET (US)            

Hmm interesting ...Bmbm and I used the thach-weave with great results this weekend. It's a great way of winning a co-alt fight in a inferior turning airplane.

A small note...According to some of the webpages I went through went we were doing the EMC burma road, claimed that Chennault never faced Zero's in Burma.

(Apperantly they were never used there)

I can dig up the URL's if anyone's interested.

Daff

lazs posted 01-07-99 12:00 PM ET (US)            

Thanks Pjmy, that's the way I thought it read but I couldn't find the report. So... that would mean that woofies post on the weave was either "intentionally missleading" or he just has deficient skills as a researcher. or... both.

lazs

avin posted 01-07-99 12:01 PM ET (US)            

quote:

:Thach made his breakthrough when he decided to deploy the two sectons abreast of each other at a distance at least equal to the tactical diameter

Anybody else feel there's something wrong here? This is basically the finger-four formation, and this paragraph reads like Thach thought he'd invented it.

Did Thach re-invent it, or did he hear about it from elsewhere?

pjmy, thanks for posting this. Does this book say anything about the formation and tactics used by the USN prior to Thach?

avin

Pjmy posted 01-07-99 04:34 PM ET (US)            

It appears that once the US went to three 2-plane sections from the old two 3-plane formations, which made formation flying much easier...they used an A-B-C Section Echelon stepped-up formation for the 6 planes in cruise, and then when entering a combat zone, they would switch to a 6-plane division stepped-down echelon formation.

In early 1941, combat reports from England reported the use of a "weaver" at the tail of the formation, and this was put into testing. (They were not told that the "weavers" were suffering the highest casulaties!) It was disliked as it burned excessive fuel for the weavers.

But this "weaving" philosophy apparently the inspiration for Thach.

The formation is different from the finger four in that the finger four had equal distances between all planes....the new Thach formation (primarily a defensive posture which replaced the old Lufberry circle) had the two sections in line abreast which enabled them to turn into each other.

Thach originally called the defensive formation the "defensive beam position".

(All that from quickly scimming about 10 pages of the article on the Thach Weave.)

Pjmy

funked posted 01-07-99 05:13 PM ET (US)            

PJMY: Thanks for your posts! I hope to see more discussion of tactics on this board in the future.

Formations like this (planes abreast with long lateral spacing between elements) are great for pairs as well as for a 4-ship formation like you describe.

If anybody wants to fly like this in the main, just give me a buzz on private. I've been known to switch countries to fly with wingmen.

It's really fun when you are flying a view restricted plane (Mossies of late for me) about d10 abreast and you spot a bandit coming from behind your wingman. Then you watch as he chooses a victim, and turn into the attack as he reaches guns range while your wingman evades.

Frequently he will attempt to track your wingman and present an easy target. At the very least you get a momentary guns solution even if he tries to hit and run or pitchback after a missed guns pass.

Fun fun fun!

Funked Up

avin posted 01-07-99 05:53 PM ET (US)            

quote:

:The formation is different from the finger four in that the finger four had equal distances between all planes....the new Thach formation (primarily a

Deciding that planes would fly together in two sections of two planes was a breakthrough of sorts, in particular if Thach was unaware of German fighter pilot doctrine. Part of the reason for sticking with finger-four for the Germans *was* the excellent defensive and lookout ability it offered.

I can see this leading on, for example, to Valencia's mowing machine, which I've previously considered a pretty standard adaptation of German double-attack doctrine. But upon giving it a little thought, it seems the USN might well have re-invented the wheel here. pjmy, does this book deal with Valencia as well?

Doesn't matter. I can see I'm going to have to buy it. Thanks, pjmy.

avin

Pjmy posted 01-07-99 11:01 PM ET (US)            

John B. Lundstrom's series: The First Team and The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign are two of the very finest books on WW2 aviation I have ever read. His research is so incredibly deep and broad, it is at times unbelievable. When describing the actions, for example, around Midway in Book 1, he essentially describes the individual actions of almost EVERY single pilot/plane involved on both the American and Japanese sides. It truly is amazing. If a torpedoe just missed, he describes who (probably) dropped it, which way they were attacking, etc etc...stunning.

They're pricey, but I have yet to read anything remotely as well researched. As an example, the appendices of Book 1 include:

1) The Making of Carrier Fighter Pilots, US Naval Fight Training, Japanese Naval Flight Training

2) Fundamentals of Aerial Fixed Gunnery

3) Fighting Colors, Insiginea, and Markings

4) Naval Flight Formations and the "Thach Weave"

5) Japanese Combat Methods

6) List of US Navy Fighter Pilots

7) Bureau Numbers of Fighter Aircraft

And thats just the appendices of Book 1!!! There are 450 pages preceding the appendices covering the Naval Aviation war from Pearl Harbour to Midway.

Book 2, which I haven't even yet started (having now read book 1 twice) covers Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942. And its as thick as the first volume.

The Naval Institue Press publishes both and can be checked out at the Naval Institute's web page:

www.usni.org

Pjmy

Pjmy posted 01-07-99 11:19 PM ET (US)            

Avin,

In answer to your question, I have never heard of Valencia or the "mowing machine"....please do explain.

Pjmy

syke posted 01-08-99 12:09 AM ET (US)            

Daff,

It's true Chennault never faced Zeros, the AVG fought Ki-43s instead. However, they thought they were fighting Zero's and referred to them as such in their combat diaries.

syke

Dnil posted 01-08-99 01:25 AM ET (US)            

If you liked book 1, book 2 is much better IMHO, but I am fascinated by Guadalcanal. These books are MUST have for Naval aviation types. I recommended these awhile back on this board, but didnt get any responses. I read book 2, 5 times and still read chapters at times. Another book that is a must have for you WB types is "Warpath Across the Pacific" by Lawrence J. Hickey. The most detailed book I have read on B-25 operations in the S. Pacific. He deals with the 345th BG, the "Air Apaches". He has 3 more Group histories coming soon with the "Red Raiders" being next. I personal cant wait for the A-20 book due later. This one is pricey to around $70, but he will sign it for ya.

Dnil

Maj. 900th Bloody Jaguars

Hooligan posted 01-08-99 01:45 AM ET (US)            

Pjmy. Thanks for the recommendations. I hope that you are making a commission :P .

avin posted 01-08-99 02:56 AM ET (US)            

quote:

pjmy wrote:

I have never heard of Valencia or the "mowing machine"....please do explain.

All I know is from Shaw. It's in the chapter on Division Tactics, under the "fluid four" subheading. It's page 275 of my edition.

Selected quotes follow. Forgive me if I quote some stuff you're familiar with. This is to convince anybody reading this thread that doesn't have a copy of Shaw to rush out and get it now.

"The most effective attack doctrines generally build the divison by combining two or more elements of two fighters....."

"As a case a case in point, consider the example of a four-plane division composed of two sections. Each section may fly welded wing, but the two sections can cooperate as in double attack........This combination of fighting wing and double attack doctrines is commonly known today as "fluid four", and it has been widely used by many air services from the time it was first introduced by Werner Moelders...." [note: Shaw has subsequently gone on to find that fluid four doctrine was used by the Finnish Air Force before Moelders. See http://www.sci.fi/~fta/tactics.htm

Click on "The Winter War" for more info]

"In fluid four doctrine each two-plane section essentially replaces one fighter of the double attack pair...."

"The effectiveness of this fluid four doctrine is probably best demonstrated by a four-plane division of U.S. Navy F6F Hellcat fighters led by Lt. Eugene Valencia (23 victories) during WW2. His division, nicknamed "Valencia's Mowing Machine," accounted for the destruction of fifty Japanese aircraft without a loss (or even a hit). This team developed fluid four tactics, which were by no means universally accepted by the Navy at that time, to a fine art. The name "Mowing Machine" was derived from the alternating attacks by the two elements of the division, which traded roles as engaged element and free element (top cover), producing action resembling that of the blades of a lawn mower."

What I'm seeing is that Valencia probably owes a debt to Thach. And that Thach and Valencia might well have re-invented the wheel here.

avin

Pjmy posted 01-08-99 10:04 AM ET (US)            

Thats the problem with dilettantes like me. I can barely remember reading that! (Pulled out my Shaw to check...nope...thats slipped away...time to read that again too.)

Valencia's tactics would appear to be an extension or development of Thach's. Thach's priority was a defensive maneuvre to minimize his pilot/plane's defiencies (turn radius/speed/climb) and maximize their abilities (powerful gun-suite/excellent gunnery). Once the newer faster aircraft like the Hellcat and Corsair were available, and with numerical advantage, the emphasis would have switched from a purely defensive to an offensive posture. But the successful lessons learned would most likely have been used as the foundation for new tactics.

It often amazes me how slow the RAF was in catching on to or developing modern tactics. The USN and the LW appear to have been much more eager for their junior commanders to develop and test new tactics.

Also, does anyone know what formations/tactics the AVG were using around this time?

I'll have to go read up on IJN combat (again).

Pjmy

funked posted 01-08-99 10:16 AM ET (US)            

Re: Shaw

Shaw also spends a lot of time on the two-ship version of the formation if not the tactics. Combat spread baby!

Funked Up

=925 CABS=

Mors Ab Alto!

Rojo1 posted 01-08-99 02:23 PM ET (US)            

A bit of further info on Thatch and the development of the Thatch Weave. Before he cold bring it to the Navy brass for acceptance, he had to prove it would work. Since there were no Zekes for him to play with, he had to find a way to test his theories using the planes available. He set up a series of exercise using 2 and 4 Wildcats to a side. One side would fly with a maximum allowed throttle setting of 50% of full mil power -- they represented the American aircraft. The other side got to use full power as they saw fit -- these represented the better performing Zekes. That way, the superior climb and level speed of the Japanese planes could be affectively simulated. Of course, certain other disparate performance parameters could not be simulated this way, but it gave Thatch and his test subjects a fairly objective way to evaluate the new tactics with aircraft of diffent performance characteristics.

Rojo

SrdFtr posted 01-08-99 05:30 PM ET (US)            

Avin!

Thanks for the ref to the Shaw 'chapter'; it was a great read! But phrase like "covered...earlier" and "discussed in a previous chapter" makes you want to shout at the monitor: "Dammit mon! Publish the bloody book!"

SrdFtr