Table of Contents

1.1 Introduction *

2. EU Regulation Regarding Labour Mobility Within the EU *

3. Economic Theory regarding Labour Mobility *

4. Sociological Perspectives: Theories, Citizenship, Work, Welfare and Identity in the context of the European Project *

5. Conclusions *

6. Bibliography: *

Appendix 1: Extract of the Treaty Establishing the European Community *

Appendix 4.3 *

Appendix 4.5.2 *

Appendix 4.5.3 *

Appendix 4.5.4 *

Figure 1: Percentage of EU workers to Total Labour Force …………………………………11

Figure 2: Equalisation of Wages ……………………………………………………………..14

Figure 3: Immigrant Surplus …………………………………………………………………15

Since the Treaty of Rome labour mobility has been to the forefront of the European agenda. The European Commission (EC) has put an increasing emphasis on the need to reduce the barriers to movement for EU citizens. Despite this supra-national activity, change has been painfully slow at national level. Given the existence of the single market and of the EURO, many policy makers have warned against the dangers that poor labour mobility implies for the Union as a whole. However, there is no emphasis on mobility in any of the National Action Plans for employment, even though the EU sees mobility as an important and desirable objective.

It is assumed that labour market mobility is desirable as it leads to reduced unemployment in areas of high unemployment and to reduced pressure on wage inflation in areas of low unemployment. However there are of course some downsides to mobility: e.g. brain drain in less economically advanced economies and disadvantages concerning labour mobility.

Another issue bringing mobility to centre stage is globalisation. Improved transport, infrastructure and communications has made it easier for people to move all over the world. The establishment of the EU and the globalisation means that Europe needs to be competitive on a global scale and has led to the USA and Japan being used as benchmarks for Europe to assess its performance by. There are of course social, cultural and institutional differences that can make cross-country and inter-regional comparisons very difficult. This last comment can be applied to the EU as well when it comes to the proposed harmonisation of social security and pensions systems. The practicalities of overcoming different political systems and different forms of welfare states may prove to be insurmountable. There are however some encouraging examples to be found. There has for some time been a directive on co-operation between European social security systems and in relation to pensions, we have been promised a draft directive by 2002.

Several questions arise when talking about mobility, for example how will increases in mobility affect citizens of the Union? In the absence of its own welfare state, how is the EU to provide its citizens with social rights? Why has Social Policy become of particular relevance in the discussion about European Citizenship? In order to answer this it is necessary to look at what has already been done, what are the barriers to labour mobility within the European Union and how would European Citizenship affect this? This has led us to the following main question.

The report will focus on the individual EU worker’s possibilities of migration within the EU in an economic perspective and in a socio-political perspective. The report will not deal with the discussion and problems of the overall benefits and costs of mobility/migration for several people at the same time e.g. cost concerning families, etc. The report will primarily look at economically motivated reasons or barriers for migration, and what implications this has for European Citizenship.

The report will be a critical analysis of labour mobility in a theoretical perspective, where both neo-classical and socio-political theory will be used to look at how EU regulation effect labour mobility within the European Union. The method will be deductive, where we first will look at the theory and afterwards use the theory on reality. Where it can help the understanding examples will be used from different countries in the EU.

The project is divided into three parts. The first part (chapter two) gives a view of the existing EU regulation and mobility. Thereafter chapter three will deal with the neo-classical theories about mobility and with the contradictions between theory and reality, while chapter four will look into socio-political theories pertaining to Citizenship and will investigate the interrelations between Labour Mobility and issues of Social Citizenship.

"The European Community Treaty itself prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality between nationals of Member States. From the earliest legislation, free movement applied not only to workers, but also to members of their family." (Tassinopoulos 1998, p. 86)

EU regulation has since the beginning of the Common European Market dealt with worker mobility, and in this section there will be given a picture of the existing regulation and a statistical view of migration.

Since the beginning of the Common European Market there has been a focus on worker migration and several forms of regulation have been implemented in order to improve mobility. The main driving force behind the legislation on worker mobility is economic and not social, and some of the key objectives are to increase the size and homogeneity of the EU market, to improve the internal competitive situation and the competitive position of EU in world markets and in that way stimulate economic growth. (Pickup 1990, p.73) The regulation of worker mobility especially focuses on non-discrimination and on the rights of social security, which is vital in order to get people to move between countries. Initiatives have been included in EU treaties such as the Treaty Establishing the European Community, the Treaty of Rome, the Single Act, the Amsterdam Treaty, but not in the National Action Plans which is one of the latest EU initiatives concerning workers.

The EU has in the Treaty Establishing the European Community in 1957 agreed upon several guidelines, which every Member State should fulfil within a certain time period (see appendix 1). One of the results is that freedom of movement has been possible for workers from Member States of the European Market since 1968. The guidelines concerning free movement of workers state in a proposal to the Treaty Establishing the European Community from October 1998 that nationals have

"…the right to leave their territory in order to seek employment, to join vocational training courses or to take up activities as employed persons and to pursue such activities in the territory of another Member State". (EU Document 598PC0394(02))

In addition free settlement within the EU is possible to all citizens of the EU as long as they can provide for their own needs (Kolb 1999, p.172)

The legal framework to establish worker mobility exists, and people seeking jobs within EU are, because of the treaties, given some specific rights, but that does not mean that it is easy to calculate the costs and benefits of mobility. The EU treaties don’t have specific definitions of how the implementation should be done, which can result in health care, for example, being provided at different levels depending on the country where the migrant is getting a job. The lack of standardisation can therefore create different situations for workers, because the countries have different levels and forms of welfare states and economic situations.

An initiative to improve the mobility is the establishment of an Advisory Committee on freedom of movement and social security for workers within the Community in 1998. The idea with the committee is that it should assist

"the Commission in the examination of matters arising from the freedom of movement of workers and the co-ordination of social security schemes, and the link between those matters and employment questions." (EU Document 598PC0394(03))

Another initiative is a web site where it is possible to get information relevant to migrants about residency, taxes, social security etc. in different countries. An initiative which does not have a direct effect, but may have an effect in the long run, is the legislation concerning education which make is easier for students to do part of their education in another EU country.

Worker mobility was at its highest peak in the 1960’s and has since decreased, despite the fact that a lot has been done in order to improve worker mobility, – this could be as result of a fall in income differentials and restricted willingness to migrate. The wage differentials between the rich countries in Northern Europe and the poorer countries in Southern Europe have decreased from 6-1 two decades ago to 3-1 today. A reason for the less differentiation in wages at a time with decreasing mobility can partly be explained by the increasing degree of free trade, which has become some sort of substitute for migration. (Tassinopooulos 1998, p.27, 33-34)

As mentioned earlier the mobility within the EU in total has been decreasing since the 1960’s, and the establishment of the European Common Market has not let to the expected increase in the mutual exchange of workers (Tassinopoulos 1998, p.5,23). Also the net annual migration pr. 1.000 inhabitants which includes non-Europeans, estimated on the basis of the difference between population change and natural increase, has decreased from 2,8 in 1990 to 1,3 in 1998 (corrected net migration). (Eurostat Web Site)

The ratio of foreign labour force compared to the total labour force in EU countries has remained almost stable in all countries except for Luxembourg where the percentage has increased from 17 pct. in 1983 to 36 pct. in 1995 – a net increase of 34.000 workers and France. France had in one year from 1985 to 1986 a net increase of 500.000 EU workers. This could be partially explained by the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU in 1986. Most countries except Belgium and Luxembourg keep a percentage of EU workers to total labour force under three percent. (Tassinopoulos 1998, p.55). See figure 1. Note that Luxembourg is not included in the figure.

The legislation about worker mobility is in place, but seems not to have had the expected effect, which means there must be other barriers to worker mobility – barriers which we will look more into in the next chapter.

In this second section our main purpose is to gather up the main elements that the economic theory has presented regarding mobility of workers between different countries. We will use essentially a neo-classical approach but, in some cases, we will go further than that, introducing some new elements in the analysis and criticising some of its results.

The section is divided into 3 parts. In the first one, we will show the economic benefits that arise from the existence of mobility. After that, we are going to explain the main factors that influence the migration decision. Finally, we want to show the inadequacy of the economic theories to the reality, while identifying the existing barriers to labour mobility.

Only in a competitive labour market equilibrium it is possible to maximise the value of labour’s product. In such a market, workers are always trying to find a better job, a job where they feel more useful and productive and a job where they have higher monetary benefits and wages, in order to improve their economic situation. On the other hand, firms are continually looking for more committed and productive workers, that is they are continually searching for the best workers they can get. Naturally, these search activities lead to the equalisation of the value of marginal product of labour across firms and across labour markets, considering workers with a certain type of skills. As a result, this equilibrium allocation of workers and firms is the most efficient situation that can occur in the market and no other allocation could increase the value of labour’s contribution to national income.

The problem is that in reality is not that simple and, therefore, we cannot find such a competitive labour market. Often workers have inadequate information about the opportunities available in other jobs or in other labour markets and they often don’t know their own skills and abilities. At the same time, firms can hardly know the true productivity of the workers they hire. As a result of this imperfect information, the existing match of workers to firms is clearly inefficient and, therefore, it would be possible to increase the productivity and the value of labour in the market (Borjas 1996, p.279).

Within the mechanisms that can help to increase the efficiency of the labour market, we must focus on labour mobility, which is a very good way to improve the job match between workers and firms.

When we talk about job match, we are referring to a particular pairing between a firm and a worker and this relationship has its own unique value, since each worker has its own characteristics and each firm has its own environment. Therefore, when a firm hires a worker, they both may have a wrong idea about the value of the match and so they will be better off if they decide to look for another match. This implies that both workers and firms have incentives to look for other jobs and other workers, respectively, because this will allow them to find the perfect match (Borjas 1996, p.305). This is also true considering labour mobility between different countries. In fact, some workers may conclude that the perfect working environment for them and the firm where they feel more rewarded for their effort is located in another country and so improving mobility within the EU can contribute to an increase in the efficiency of the whole Union.

One of the main goals of the European Union (as can be seen in the Treaty establishing the European Community in 1957) is the free movement of workers, in order to achieve an harmonisation of the living standards across all member-states, namely through the equalisation of the wages and of the cost of living across all the member-states. In fact, in a competitive labour market the supply and demand of labour will shift in reaction to differences in the equilibrium wages of each specific market.

Suppose that a worker doesn’t face any kind of mobility costs if he decides to move to another country and admit that the equilibrium wage in Portugal (wp*) is lower than the equilibrium wage in Italy (wi*). If there is free movement of workers between these two countries, many Portuguese workers will naturally move to Italy. As a result, the supply of labour in Portugal will decrease (the S curve will shift to the left) and the supply of labour in Italy will increase (the S curve will shift to the right). This movement of workers only stops when we have reached the ideal situation of equal wages in these two countries (wp’=wi’). See figure 2 (NA on internet version).

It is important to point out that this result will only happen if we admit that there are not any mobility costs. If there are these kinds of costs, then in equilibrium there will be an equalisation of the wages but deducted of the costs the workers have to face, that is the wages in the various countries will differ by the amount of the mobility costs. Nowadays, there are still significant differences between the wages of each member-state and, even so, mobility has remained low. This means that these mobility costs probably exceed the gains that workers would have if they moved to another country.

Usually, it is considered that immigration imposes various costs on native workers and taxpayers. But there are also some economic benefits too and, if they are sufficiently large, the costs resulting from the increased expenditure in social programs can be reinterpreted as the outlay on an investment that has a very high rate of return (Borjas 1994, p.2). In fact, natives benefit from mobility especially because of production interdepencies between the migrant workers and the native factors of production, and this is particularly clear when these differences are very significant. However, it is important to understand that, once more this result will only occur in a competitive labour market and that mobility may have a negative effect in countries that face a problem of structural unemployment.

One important concept related to the economic benefits of mobility is the concept of Immigrant Surplus (Borjas 1994, p.5). If we consider the usual supply-demand analysis of the labour market, this result can easily be shown. Initially, let’s assume that there are only native workers in the market. In equilibrium, these workers will be employed at wage w*. As we know, the area under the demand curve represents the value of the product corresponding to all the workers hired. So, the area ABC0 corresponds to the value of national income before the arrival of foreign workers.

When foreign workers start to arrive to a certain country, the supply of labour will increase (S shifts to the right) and the wages will decrease to w’. Even so, the national income will now be given by the area AGE0, and considering that those workers will receive a total wage given by the area CFGE, the natives will benefit from an increase in the national income of FBG (Immigration Surplus). See figure 3 (NA on internet version).

It is also important to note that, even though one of the big problems of immigration flows is the decrease of the wages in the host country, it is exactly this impact on wages that allows these economic benefits to occur. If the increase in the labour supply greatly reduces wages, then the immigrant surplus will be very substantial. If the native wage is not very sensitive to the arrival of foreign workers, then the immigration surplus will be nearly 0 (Borjas 1994, p.6). We must also note that a skilled immigrant flow will tend to generate a bigger immigration surplus. This fact is a consequence of the interdependence between capital and skilled labour.

Considering a static model the migration of workers (especially unskilled) to a certain country will not be easily accepted by the population of that country because migrants tend to be net beneficiaries of the welfare system. This results from the fact that these workers are usually low wage earners and face a higher turnover than native workers (Razin 1999, p.1).

However, it is important to remember the recent demographic evolution in EU countries. People live longer now and the fertility rate is steadily decreasing over the years. Consequently, the European population is getting increasingly older. Of course, this is a problem for the welfare and pension system, that is becoming heavily burdened, because a smaller number of workers has to pay a higher value of pensions (increase of the dependency ratio). As a result, the European countries will clearly benefit from a free movement of workers, since the foreign workers, even if low-skilled, will help society to finance the benefits of the current elderly.

Furthermore, it is possible to show that, in a dynamic environment, this contribution of the migrants to the welfare state will create a surplus in the pension system that will be spread over future generations as well. Therefore, immigration does not represent a burden for the native workers or for the future generations (Razin 1999, p.10).

One issue that has been concerning both the countries of origin and of destination of these migrants is the problem of brain drain and of skill composition of the migrant labour force.

If we consider workers that live in a relatively egalitarian country, where the welfare and tax systems are very strong, the skilled workers will not have a much higher wage than the low skilled. Naturally, this situation creates an incentive for these highly-skilled workers to move to a country where they will receive a wage that reflects their true productivity (Borjas 1996, p.296). This fact is also called brain drain, since the more capable workers of the country will move to the exterior. This is mainly what happened in Ireland during de 1980’s, with most of its graduates moving to the United Kingdom or to Germany.

On the other hand, countries that have a substantial income inequality tend to offer a higher rate of return to human capital. In fact, the skilled workers are not as heavily taxed and so their income is considerably higher. As a result, it is the unskilled workers that will tend to move to other countries, where they can benefit from a generous welfare system and where wages are higher for them (Borjas 1996, p.296). The migration of workers from Portugal to France is an example of this last case. Facing a significant inequality in the distribution of income, the low-skilled Portuguese workers decided to move to another European country where they could earn much more doing exactly the same kind of jobs.

All modern analysis of migration decisions are based on the hypothesis that differences in net economic advantages, primarily differences in wages, are the main causes of migration and views the migration of workers as a form of human capital investment.

Workers calculate the value of the employment opportunities available in each of the alternative labour markets, net of the costs of making the move, and choose whichever option maximises the net present value of lifetime earnings (Borjas 1996, p.280). Formally this decision calculation can be presented as follows. The equation gives the net present value of migration (Tassinopoulos 1998, p.9):

where:

V _P = present value of net benefits

E₁ = earnings from new job in year n

E₂ = earnings from existing job in year n

N = length of time expected on new job

i = interest rate

n = year in which benefits and costs accrue

C = direct and indirect monetary costs resulting from move in the year n

Z = net psychological costs of move (psychological costs minus psychological gains)

The case V_{P >} 0 implies that expected earnings gain exceeds the combined monetary and psychological investment costs. Consequently, the person will migrate. In the opposite case the person will remain in his/her present job location.

In particular (Borjas 1996, p.281):

• An improvement in the economic opportunities available in the destination increases the net gains to migration and rises the likelihood that the workers moves;
• An improvement in the employment opportunities at the current region of residence decreases the net gains to migration and lowers the probability that the workers move;
• An increase in migration costs lowers the net gains to migration and reduces the likelihood of a move.

As we have already shown, the focus of this theory concerns the return of investment in human capital. It is, however, necessary to take various restrictions into consideration. The decision to migrate, which is based on expected net benefits, is subjected to uncertainty and imperfect information. In some instances, the expected gain from migration simply does not materialise. Furthermore, it frequently turns out that lifetime income gains from migration do not necessarily mean that migrants receive gains from earnings during the first few post-migration years. Additionally, there is also a potential lack of skill transferability, which means that the increases in lifetime earnings do not imply that the migrants will necessarily receive annual earnings equal to those received by people already in that destination. In this respect general statements of migration theory must be critically qualified with regard to the return on investment from migration (Tassinopoulos 1998, p.11).

There are mainly two groups of variables which can influence the discounted present value of the total earnings and costs streams in the equation above: region specific variables and demographic variables (Borjas 1996, p.282).

1. Region Specific Variables

1. Wage differential

The greater the annual earnings differential (E₁ – E₂) between the region of origin and the region of destination, the higher the present value of the net benefits (V _P) will be, and the more likely it will be that an individual will migrate.

2. Employment, Trade, GDP

Employment, trade and GDP are three of the major indicators of regional welfare. The higher is the difference between the region of origin and the region of destination, the higher the destination country will sound attractive, the higher is the probability that people migrate.

3. Distance

The probability of migration is inversely proportional to the distance a person must move. The greater the distance to the future region of employment, the more difficult it is to obtain sufficient information about it, the higher the transportation and psychological costs, the lower is the possibility that people move.

4. Cultural, social and political environment

Things like having friends, being socially accepted and integrated in the place of residence, participation in political decision-making and elections, once obtained and accumulated in one country, make the decision of migration harder because of the psychological cost of leaving them and the monetary-time costs of regaining them in a new place.

2. Demographic Variables

The older is a person, the less likely he or she is to migrate. There are various reasons for this:

• older migrants have fewer years to recoup their investment costs;
• older people tend to have higher levels of human capital which are specific to their present employers and this human capital is not transferable to other jobs;
• older people often have higher migration costs than younger people;
• the psychological cost of migration may rise with age;

- older people have bigger difficulties in finding a job.

There is a positive correlation between the worker’s level of education and his or her probability of migrating. This is due to the fact that:

• workers with a larger level of education and/or training display greater efficiency in their search for work in alternative labour markets reducing their migration costs;
• the regions relevant for more highly qualified workers are larger and more numerous than those relevant for lower qualified workers;
• the incentive for mobility is relatively greater as a result of greater relative income differences;
• language barriers may also constitute less of a barrier to mobility for well educated workers.

1. The Value of Immobility

If the labour market behaved as it is predicted in the neo-classical economic theory, we could expect to find very significant flows of workers within the EU countries. In fact, the differences between wages or between unemployment rates in the various countries would constitute a sufficient incentive for workers to move.

However, reality does not correspond to theory. Workers have not been moving from the countries where the wages are lower to the countries where they are higher. Consequently, there has not been an equalisation of wages across the European countries. Some of these facts can be explained by the imperfections of the neo-classical theory but, even so, this does not explain everything and very often people prefer to remain in their home country (Tassinopoulos 1998, p.35). This idea has led to the concept of Value of Immobility, that is the idea that immobility has a positive value both for the individuals and for the society.

This can be explained by the fact that a considerable part of the workers’ abilities and productivity is location-specific. In fact, these abilities may be the result of a learning process that takes place inside the firms and that is not transferable to other firms. In this case, if the workers decided to move, all these skills would be lost and the wages they would receive elsewhere would be smaller. Furthermore, it is the immobility that allows the accumulation of these location-specific skills and this is relevant not only in economic terms but also considering cultural and social factors (Tassinopoulos 1998, p.36).

The decision to move to another country also involves various kinds of risks. The worker will have to abandon a secure job and move to a period of bigger uncertainty, where it will be more difficult for him to get the appropriate information about the job opportunities.

2. Migration Costs

One of the most important barriers to mobility is the existence of a large number of monetary and psychological costs. First of all, we can identify the Adaptation Costs, that is costs that result from the need to adapt to a different socio-cultural, political or linguistic environment. It is these costs that explain why workers tend to move to countries that have special cultural bonds with their home country, or to countries that have the same language.

Considering Transportation Costs, it is important to point out that they are responsible for the fact that movers tend to go to a nearby country and not to a very distant one, especially because these costs increase with distance.

Another problem that workers have to face is related to the Housing Costs. In fact, the housing market is often too regulated and is not very transparent. Many times, it is difficult for a foreigner to find and be able to buy or rent a house in a new country, because there are many conditions to fulfil and many bureaucratic problems to solve (Tassinopoulos 1998, p.37).

Finally, migrants face quite significant Search Costs, particularly due to imperfect information. Compared to a native worker, a migrant has bigger difficulties in accessing the information he needs in order to find and choose the best job opportunities available in the market. This search process will, therefore, take longer and will cost more. At the same time this factor also increases the uncertainty of the migration process and this will make many people stay in their home countries.

3. Discrimination of Foreign Workers

The existence of discrimination in the destination country is a factor that reduces the willingness of the workers to move to that country. This discrimination is particularly important if the employers are discriminating. In fact, this can lead to a smaller number of job offers available for the foreign workers and to the concentration of these offers in firms where the employment conditions are very bad. At the same time, these workers may earn lower wages compared to the ones received by the native population, even if they have higher skills (Tassinopoulos 1998, p.38).

The discrimination of the society as a whole can result in other types of consequences. The most important of all is the possible isolation and marginalisation of these workers, but there may also be discriminatory prices for housing or other services. Of course that discrimination plays a smaller role within the EU countries, but even so this problem can arise especially when the unemployment in the host country is high.

4. Pension System

The pension system can influence mobility in two ways. First of all workers cannot take their contributions to the social security when they decide to move to a different country. Naturally, if the level of social protection supplied in their home country is very high, they will prefer to remain in their own country.

Secondly, the level of social security can also constitute an incentive for the workers to move to a certain country. In fact, a worker from a country where the pension system is less developed will have strong incentives to move to a country where he can benefit from higher pensions. Even so, we must note that this will depend on the extent to which migrants are free to participate in the system (Tassinopoulos 1998, p.38).

5. Legal and Administrative Barriers

These barriers have been losing relevance, considering mobility within the countries of the EU. Still, workers have to deal with all kinds of administrative constraints when they decide to migrate, namely get a work and residence permit. Furthermore, applying for these permits will only be possible if the workers can satisfy a certain number of conditions, many of them being rather difficult to fulfil by a non-national worker.

Another aspect that is worth referring is the fact that, quite often, the educational level of the foreign workers does not have the same value for the employers as the educational level of the native-born workers, even if they are similar. Also, many institutions do not give proper credit to a degree from a foreign university. Naturally, this will work as a disincentive for highly educated workers to move to another country.

6. Family Circumstances

Most migration decisions are not made by single workers, but by families. The migration decision, therefore, is not based on whether a particular member of the household is better off at the destination than at the origin, but on whether the family as a whole is better off. Consequently, the potential costs of migration multiply as family size increases. Consequently, with a given age and level of education, married workers tend to be less willing to migrate than single workers ( Tassinopoulos 1998, p.10).

Now that we have covered many of the issues surrounding mobility, we shall turn our attention to European Citizenship. We will try to elaborate on some of the socio-political theories which influence the behaviour and development of EU citizenship rights. Key to our discussion will be an attempt to emphasise the centrality of work in terms social identification, which is in itself a precondition for citizenship. However, we will try to balance this emphasis with an investigation into the significance of social citizenship and its relation to the welfare state.

If we accept work as the primary aspect of citizenship, then mobility becomes the key to a true European Citizenship. However, if we take the notion of social citizenship on board, then this basis becomes less tangible. Therefore our discussion will include an elaboration of ideas of inclusion and exclusion, especially in relation to their significance for the citizenship debate.

Our socio-political theories are going to focus mainly on Integration Theory on the political side and Social Integration Theory on the more sociological side.

The neofunctionalist conception of international organisation finds direct expression in the European Union. Neofunctionalism represents an outstanding theoretical achievement, having contributed more than any other approach to the understanding of supranational and transnational processes in the world as general and as regards regional communities like the European Union in particular(Groom, Taylor 1990 p139). For example Andrew Moravcsik states "Neofunctionalism remains the sole attempt to fashion a coherent and comprehensive theory of European integration"(Moravcsik in Saeter 1998 p11). And despite the fact that neofunctionalism has been out of fashion since the 1970s, many authors think that it is time to reconsider them today. For example writes Paul Taylor that "The recent experience of the European Communities suggest that they will return to the center-stage"(Groom, Taylor 1990 p20).

Integration in terms of neofunctionalism can be defined as a gradual transfer of loyalty from the national level to central community institutions. This has an obvious resonance with what we see in the European Union in relation to emerging ideas about a common European identity and citizenship. A key concept of neofunctionalism is that of "spill-over". The idea being that integration in one sector (e.g. Economics) is likely to trigger off integration in other sectors too (e.g. Social Policy measures). That could be viewed as the broad macro perspective, in our application of neofunctionalist theory. There is however an equally relevant micro perspective, where broad policy decisions in the EU (e.g. Freedom of Movement for Workers) have been used by the Commission and the ECJ to expand the range of European measures to include related areas (e.g co-ordination of Social Security Systems, Health & Safety measures in the Workplace, Equality Issues, and Social Dialogue between the Social Partners). As a simple neofunctionalist model of integration doesn’t take into account the constraints and demands of the international environment, we are going to use a revised version of neofunctionalism (Groom, Taylor 1990 p148-149, Saeter 1998 p20ff). This version of neofunctionalism states that instead of a more or less automatic spill-over, there is a dual possibility of either function or dysfunction, dependent on the intentions of the actors. These terms are explicitly related to the purpose of the actors, that is the action patterns and the result of the interaction may bring some unintended consequences. Depending on the kind of learning experienced by the actors, the result may be either functional, i.e. creative in the sense that it enhances the original purpose of the actors, which implies integration or dysfunction, forcing a re-examination of the purposes among the actors such as to involve disintegration. The main actors of the integration are no longer the primarily supranational institutions, but national governments, acting on the basis of self-interest, and convergence and / or redefinition of actor interests are seen as preconditions for further integration. A theoretical discussion of the European Union’s "integration in general and strict neofunctionalism in particular can gain immensely from taking this approach more properly into consideration"(Saeter 1998 p13). As long as the member states exists as formally sovereign states both in the setting of the European Union and in international relations, the union resembles more a confederation than a federation, and the introduction in the European Union of the principle of subsidiarity can be seen as a measure aimed at maintaining the identity of the nation state as the primary unit as regards to the legitimising of the integration process as a whole. And as long as this is the case, the main legitimising superstructure in the European Union will be confederal (Saeter 1990 p52/70, Groom, Taylor 1990 p144). Spill-overs can be seen as results in task expansion and occurs when policies are made in carrying out an initial task. This granting of power can only be made real if the task itself is expanded, as reflected in the compromises among the states that are interested in the task. Spill-over according to this definition can occur in a number of ways. A given step in integration might very well alter the conditions of competition in a manner that calls for new central policy decisions, either to restore something, or to open up new opportunities for all the affected parties. Another possible outcome is that the alterations, strains and distortions resulting from one integrative step may result in pressures by groups for their correction. Spill-over may also occur because an integrative step is redistributive in its effects, between member states. That is, it benefits some member states more than others, and this will lead the disadvantaged states to look for ways in which they can redress the balance in their favour, possibly in another sector altogether(Groom, Taylor 1990 p142). Some politicians and bureaucrats are also faced with problems caused by previous integration in areas which are functionally connected and try to solve them by further steps of integration(Groom, Taylor 1990 p140).

System Integration Theory has a long history in Sociological writings, coming from a tradition started by Spencer and Durkheim. Delanty (1997, p.73) has called for Social Integration Theory to be used for a conceptual basis of citizenship in the context of the European Union. He described Social Integration in Parsonian terms, namely "a system of norms, taking shape as a civic and political culture within the framework of stable institutions and a modern state". Habermas (in Delanty, 1997) put the definition slightly more succinctly. He described it merely as a " common normative order", without which society would cease to function. Habermas connects Social Integration to participation through communication. That is why work can be seen as one of the major institutions to link people into the broader society. However, what Delanty was calling for was for a new framework to be realised which could account for the unique systems and supranational identity of the EU.

In terms of the EU, we have a situation where the 15 member states have been integrated in terms of economics, polity and in administrative terms to varying degrees. Social Integration focuses on the micro, "life world" (Delanty, 1997, p.75) perspective. It is meant to be a form of positive integration as opposed to the essentially negative integration that has been to the fore in the EU up to this point. So instead of merely regulating the economy (removal of obstacles to the free market) , there is a need for a more positive social element to balance the negatives and to attempt to give the EU a greater legitimacy. As a consequence social issues have become increasingly important in the EU. They are nonetheless subordinate to the hegemonic economic project.

That being said it essential to emphasise the continuing dominance of the nation states in terms of the provision of social rights. The EU can never really hope to compete with the national welfare state as it lacks the institutional and legitimising roles that nation states enjoy. However, there are signs that ‘EU rights’ are beginning to supplement national rights (i.e. are in addition to).

What do we mean when we discuss Citizenship? The concept is highly problematic and contested so it becomes necessary for us to elaborate what we mean by the term. Sartori (in Mullard, 1997 p.237) saw Citizenship as being of direct relevance to people’s lives as "it represents the benchmark of personal freedom, dignity, hope, freedom from fear and personal autonomy".

Marshall is the veritable father of citizenship discourse. He saw citizenship as being primarily focused around class issues. Today, however, citizenship is more about who is, and who is not part of a common society. Current discussions centre around redressing the balance between Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities, particularly in the context of work and the welfare state (Esping-Anderson, 1990). Marshall also conceived of Citizenship solely in terms of the nation state, however citizenship is now seen as a more complex process of hybridisations and dualities. So now we can look at layers of citizenship and identity: Local - Regional - National - Supranational (e.g. The EU). Mullard (1997, p.237) sees citizenship as a dual process of inclusion and exclusion causing social tension between those who can actualise their rights and those who cannot.

Citizenship is composed of three forms of Rights (Civil, Political and Social) as well as Responsibilities. For a full discussion of these turn to Appendix 4.3.

Work is seen as the primary interaction in society which integrates people into society and legitimises their role within. There has been increasing pressure on the EU to adopt American style free market practices, including a flexible labour market. Work has undergone significant changes in the last few decades due to the declining importance of the fordist model of employment. The status of work, conceived as income-creating activities is still seen as the decisive societal force in determining dominant structures and the development of society.

The link between work and citizenship appears to have been ignored for quite some time according to Leisink and Coenen (1993, p.2). This could be because citizenship is commonly associated with a public relationship between the state and its citizens whereas work is regarded as a private relationship between employers and employees. However, as Leisink and Coenen (1993, p.3) point out, the major development which has made citizenship so topical, namely the crisis in the welfare state, is directly related to work.

Work could be identified as the major form of social participation. Through work people enter into social networks. In areas of high unemployment, the loss of such networks can make it very hard for people to hear of job vacancies through peers who work. Work also serves as a form of social identification and gives people access to the necessary resources to function within society.

When we speak of work, it is necessary to emphasise that most commentators refer to paid, or more specifically wage, employment and do not refer to unpaid care or voluntary work. According to Oakly (1974), such work does not offer the same social contacts, participation in collective purposes, a positive status and identity in the same way a professional job does". However, such domestic work obviously does confer a certain identity and position within society. In many societies, it is not necessarily even a negative position, but it would be safe to say that it is unlikely that such household work would be highly regarded by the hegemonic patriarchal model of work (Grint, 1991).

The centrality of employment becomes even more clear if we turn our attention to the unemployed, who are deprived of many forms of social participation as they do not have paid work and therefore cannot afford many types of socialisation. e.g. there are many forms of leisure activities such as joining a club/society, or even having a phone, which could become unaffordable to those on welfare. (This could then link into the underclass debate).

In the light of restrictions being placed on European welfare states, low levels of social security contributions could be seen as being barriers to social participation. If social rights were the same as civil or political rights, could we then argue that the state has a responsibility to offer its citizens work?

Despite the fact that work, according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR: Article 23), is one of our fundamental human rights, Dahrendorf (in Leisink & Coenen, 1993) argues, it has become a scarce commodity. This led Dahrendorf to suggest a right not to work, but many authors (incl. Leisink & Coenen, 1993) feel that this would do little to redress the imbalances that exist within the labour market. They suggest that instead we accept a qualified right not to work, that is the right to refuse work. This could, at the very least, protect people from being forced into becoming part of the working poor. Politically the emphasis has concentrated on reserving citizenship rights for those who meet their obligation to work.

A number of concerns need to be raised. Can somebody who is not in employment be said to be necessarily not contributing to society? Voluntary and care work contributes to the well being of society yet these people are overlooked in the eyes of the hegemonic economic libretarian discourse. Leisink and Coenen argue for a right to work, but in a very broad sense, so that work includes those who contribute to society, but are outside of wage employment.

Welfare states and citizenship are intrinsically linked as it has become obvious that the socially excluded are those whose citizenship rights have either not been actualised or have been denied. The welfare state is the main method used by governments to guarantee people’s social rights. In the absence of any substantive ’European Social Model’, it has to be asked as to how Europe intends guarantee its citizens social rights?

Those socially marginalised groups (e.g. the unemployed) are denied many of the existing rights as they pertain only to workers. Therefore, the issue of mobility in the EU doesn’t apply to those who are excluded. It also implies that there is a severe deficit in the EU in terms of its provisions of social rights. Atkinson (1999, p.157) called for an EU ‘Bill of Rights’ which would consolidate and develop key social and political rights.

Pierson (1998, p.205) argues that while evidence for an EU welfare state is "extremely scarce", if one focuses on the extent to which the EU has constrained the autonomy of nation states’ social policies or the ways in which enactments in other policy fields have had a social policy effect, the role of the EU looks far more extensive. So what we have seen is a ‘Europeanisation’ of national welfare states through an increasing array of social policy legislation and mechanisms. Therefore, we are left with an interesting situation where EU regulations and legal decisions (through the ECJ) have led to enhanced social rights for all EU citizens through member states own welfare systems.

European Identity would appear to be of a more rational nature, compared to national identities. It hinges on four major goals (see Wallace & Wallace, (1998) and Roche and van Berkel, (1998)):

0. Economic Prosperity

0. Peace in Europe

0. Stabilisation of Democracy

0. Material well being well being based upon social security and solidarity.

Most of the activities in the EU are linked to these basic goals. There is a basic contradiction in the debate on the European identity. On the on hand, national identity is in many ways seen as the normality and the European identity is normally measured against it. Many statements on the growth or weakness of European identity assume that it should have the same basic characteristics as national identities and hence would replace them. On the other hand, the European identity has conditions which differ from national identity in many respects. For example, the European identity cannot be based on one language as most (but not all) national identities are and therefore will the European public be more fragmented, linguistically, than the national identities. Most European nations were formed along pre-existing social and cultural lines and have had their own specific institutions, symbols, be they political, social or cultural. In terms of a European identity, the EU has to be seen as providing an institutional basis for a European identity and support for European integration largely depends on the success or failure of the EU project. This holds true regardless of whether or not all European countries participate in the EU or not (be it voluntary or involuntary); the EU has become the voice for Europe and has provided many of the symbols necessary for the development of a true European identity. In some respects this identity has become more real than symbolic. For example the European Commission represents all of our interests in world trade negotiations (GATT/WTO).

European citizenship is a form and experience of citizenship which is currently both "embryonic and contested when compared with national citizenship, and whatever social reality it has, lies more in its future potential than in its contemporary experience and practice"(Roche & van Berkel, 1997; p.5). In western Europe we have entered into a period in which the structures and experience of national citizenship have to give up ground to and coexist with other structures and experiences and governance regimes and rights, in particular those of the European Union. It may be that a formal supra-national citizenship, like European citizenship, is unlikely ever to be a commonly perceived as having more than a secondary status as compared with national level forms of rights and participation. But even such a form of a secondary status for supra national citizenship would be a considerable improvement on current forms of membership and participation in transnational social formations and processes. At this stage in the European Union we are, more or less, excluded from full participation in the European Union because of the lack of development of the necessary institutions and processes of socio-economic and civil-political dimensions of the European Unions public sphere, it’s constitutions and its citizenship (Roche & van Berkel, 1997; p.7, 19).

In order for the concept of European citizenship to advance it needs to break itself free from the current emphasis on worker’s rights. At every level of the Union, economic policy has emphasised market competitiveness and efficiency over other issues such as gender, class, low pay, the working poor and so on. This is evident in the Union’s perception of social exclusion which focuses almost solely on wage issues to the detriment of these other factors. Another element of the European citizenship debate which has almost totally been overlooked is the area of citizenship responsibility. Nobody appears to be expected to fulfil any of the traditional concepts of paying taxes or endeavouring to contribute to the welfare of the Union as a whole. Kolb (1999, p.178) suggests that in the absence of any meaningful citizenship that we should conceive of ‘consumers’ of worker and some social rights, as opposed to citizens. However, this is perhaps a little unfair. At the very minimum, to be an EU citizen confers one with some privileged rights of access to fifteen European countries. That being said, one is only is only a ‘full’ citizen in one of those fifteen and in the other fourteen nations one remains a secondary, if privileged, citizen. However, this should not be undervalued in the context of "fortress Europe", as even those limited rights place ‘us’ in an élite group. If we also take into account the arguments of Atkinson elucidated in section 4.4.2, we can see that the Union has used its influence in primarily economic areas to expand influence into the areas of social policy rights. As a result, the position of the EU as a provider of rights has been legitimised and therefore the concept of European citizenship is continually being advanced. With a fundamental ‘Bill of Rights’, Europe would be able to offer far more to its people, be they consumers without responsibilities, or ‘full’ citizens of the Union. As a final caveat however, Kolb (1999, p.179) warns against using the notion of EU citizenship too candidly, because if it does not offer a meaningful citizenship, the danger of playing with a symbolically powerful concept could jeopardise its legitimising value.

The effort of creating the ’Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers’ (see Appendix 4.5.3) was a logical extension of the neofunctionalist analysis of earlier experiences of European integration and national policy adjustments, but was to prove much harder to embed. The new shared doctrine of market liberalisation and the new regulation had a narrower political base than the old social market doctrine used to have. It began to emerge that regulatory instruments and competition, the mode for liberalising movement of services and products, were beginning to define the scope for collective social policy (Nugent 1994 p283ff, Wallace, Wallace 1998 p143). While quite extensive barriers to European Union action have prevented any true federalisation of European social policy, the dynamics of creating a single market have made it increasingly difficult to exclude social issues from the European Unions agenda. The emergence of multi-tiered structure, is however less the result of welfare-state building ambitions of Eurocrats, than a result of spill-overs from the single market initiative. Spill-over is the process through which the completion of the internal market has lead the European Union to invade and take part in the domain of social policy(Wallace, Wallace 1998 p186). One of the crucial points of tension between developing the common market and national welfare states has been regulations governing the mobility of labour across the jurisdictional boundaries of member states. Intra-European migration is quite small, compared with the United States. In 1995 there was around five million workers, including their dependents, who actually exercised this freedom. But these numbers have today surpassed the critical mass necessary to generate continuous litigation at the European Court of Justice(ECJ) level. In legal terms, the adaptation of social policy to developed context of interstate commerce does not require a quantum leap in European migration itself. Individuals, as litigants, and national courts, together with the European Court of Justice itself, are the central actors in shaping this multi-tiered European Union policy domain(Wallace, Wallace 1997 p195-196). European law, for example, says that a member state may no longer limit most social benefits to only its citizens. Regarding EU migrants, the state no longer has any power to determine whether they have a right to benefits or not. Benefits must today be applied to or be withheld from all. A member state may today no longer insist that its benefits apply only to its territory and thus can only be consumed there. As a result, a member state can only, to a limited extent, exercise its power to determine the territory of consumption. Member states are no longer entirely free to prevent other social policy regimes from directly competing with their own. Thus, the state has lost its power to determine how the people living within its boarders are protected(Wallace, Wallace 1998 p196).

The current process of economic and monetary union, if unaccompanied by an equivalent and compensatory political process of building a democratic and social union, could exacerbate the issue of social exclusion. The projects of the single market and the single currency are of crucial importance to European citizens. Not only do they determine whether people are included or excluded economically, but they also determine the status of people’s social and political rights. On the other hand it may also entrench long standing forms of social exclusion(Roche & van Berkel, 1997; p.1-5). Social inclusion refers to the policies which attempt to tackle and alleviate the problems mentioned above. Nation state forms of citizenship, with their close connection to feelings of national identity, and through their restrictions on immigration and naturalisation processes, can also contribute to problems of exclusion as well as offer possibilities for inclusion. With increased international movements of labour combined with the European Union’s political response to such economic trends, the potential for identity formation at the nation-state level necessarily becomes more tenuous and fragile. Therefore, social recognition through formal economic participation becomes increasingly important, as one’s nation state becomes less relevant to citizen status and rights claims, than mobility and participation in the active society (Roche & van Berkel, 1997; p.122). Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty does not seem to provide the total freedom of settlement in another European Union country, hence you can say that the in Treaty the civil rights are not complete in order to create a common European citizenship. For example, in order to avoid movement of unemployed workers from a member state with low social protection to member states that offer high levels of protection, two conditions must be fulfilled by European citizens if they want to settle in another member state. They must be financially independent and not dependent on social security (Roche & van Berkel, 1997; p.39) Furthermore, their opportunity to have access to the civil service in their country of residence remains severely limited. One problem today is that nationals of member states who exercise their right to work and live in another member state thereby disenfranchise themselves. In practice they sacrifice their right to be electors in a democracy. The problem is that they will have no right to vote for the government that makes the laws they have to obey and levies the taxes they have to pay. In reality you are turned into a second class citizen, in that while you do enjoy the civil protection of the courts, and rights of welfare and education for you and your family, and pay full taxes, you don’t have the right to vote for the government (edt. Modood, Werbner 1997 p233ff). Today the growing importance of the European Union is associated with the loss of citizenship rights, at least by many citizens of welfare states like Denmark and Sweden (Barbalet 1988 p2).

As work is considered to be one of the key components of citizenship and identification, it can be said that the EU, through legislation, has provided a relatively comprehensive set of workers’ rights. However, not all barriers to mobility have been removed and the proportion of EU citizens willing to migrate remains quite small. Despite lacking a welfare state, the EU has tried to come up with new ways of meeting its citizens social rights. However, much remains to be done to harmonise EU Social Policy in order to facilitate mobility. One area of particular concern is those people who are excluded from the process of European citizenship. The Union’s emphasis on work as the basis for its citizenship has led to a social deficit, whereby those most at risk are further marginalised. Using a revised version of neo-functionalist theory, we have illustrated how and why social policy (and therefore rights) have come to the fore of the EU agenda. For the first time since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), all fifteen member states are participating in the social charter. This gives the EU an unprecedented opportunity to enhance the social rights it provides its citizens., which could have positive implications for the economic situation in the EU as a result of enhanced opportunities for mobility.

By using both economic theory regarding free movement of labour mobility and socio-political theories regarding European citizenship we have answered the question:

What are the economic barriers and benefits to mobility and what are the implications of these for European citizenship?

Even though the legal framework regarding free movement of labour within the European Union is in place, and the fact that labour mobility can lead to benefits for the welfare in the European Union as a whole, the labour mobility within the European Union has not increased as expected. One of the goals of the European Union is to create harmonisation between the member states such as equal wages which can be established according to neo-classical theory by mobility. In addition several of the European countries is in lack of labour, since the working population is decreasing while the older population is increasing. Conditions which could be improved by an increased labour mobility.

But besides benefits, there also exists both economic and sociological barriers to labour mobility. Barriers which can be caused by wage differentials, cultural, social and political environment, pension systems and migration costs. The decision of migrating or not, also depends on the job opportunities, education, language, discrimination against foreigners etc. Barriers can differ from person to person, but as long as the barriers are larger than the benefits, the labour mobility will not increase. There is also a social perspective which can add to a more broad understanding of the reasons why people chose to migrate or not to migrate. Key to this is the provision of social rights at the EU level, through social policy harmonisation.

So, where do we stand in terms is European Citizenship? The centrality of mobility to the European Citizenship debate has become clear. Work has been the main focus of the EU through its largely economic ambitions and the central question now is whether or not this emphasis can be balanced with a new social dimension? This could also lead to an enhanced economic position through the reduction of social obstacles to mobility.

In terms of the status of European Citizenship, what we have concluded, theoretically, is that there are undeniable foundations for a European Identity. There are also an array of civil and political rights which provide the minimum requirements for Citizenship to exist, but much remains to be done. European Citizenship is as yet not on a par with national citizenship, but its rights can be seen as supplementary to national ones. One area of hope for a more comprehensive set of citizen rights for the EU is the forthcoming fundamental ‘Bill of Rights’ for EU citizens.

Labour Mobility is not only an economic question. It is not merely an issue of wages or ‘rights’ surrounding movement or settlement, as there are also many social and political issues. In order for Mobility in the EU to compare to that of the USA, it is necessary for member states to focus their attention on areas such as pensions, welfare systems, taxation and an array of social factors. This could have broad ranging implications for EU citizens and the rights they enjoy.

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 6. Bibliography:

Atkinson, R. (1999) Citizenship and the Struggle Against Social Exclusion in the context of Welfare Reform in Bussemaker, J. (ed)(1990)

Barbalet, J.M. (1998): Citizenship Open University Press: Stratford

Borjas, G. (1996): Labour Economics. McGraw-Hill International Editions. Harvard.

Borjas, G. (1994): The Economic Benefits of Immigration. National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge.

Borjas, G. (1998): The Economic Progress of Immigrants. National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge.

Bussemaker, J. (ed) (1999) Citizenship and Welfare State Reform in Europe Routledge: London.

Coenen, H. & Leisink, P. (eds) (1993) Work and Citizenship in the New Europe Edwin Elgar: Cheltenham.

Delanty, G. (1997) Beyond the State? Citizenship and European Social Integration in Mullard, M. & Lee, S. (eds) (1997)

Esping-Anderson, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism Polity Press: Cambridge.

Freeman, R. (1996): Searching for the Effect of Immigration on the Labour Market. National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge.

Groom, A.J.R. & Taylor, P. (edts) (1990): Frameworks for International Co-operation Pinter Publishers: London

Kolb, A.-K. (1999) European Social Rights towards National Welfare States: additional, substitute, illusory? In Bussemaker, J. (ed) (1999)

Modood, T. & Werbner, P. (edts) (1997): The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe Zed Books: London

Mullard, M. (1999): Discourses on Citizenship: The Challenge to Contemporary Citizenship in Bussemaker, J. (ed)(1999)

Mullard, M. & Lee, S. (eds) (1997): The politics of Social Policy in Europe Edwin Elgar: Cheltenham.

Nemo, P. (edt) (1997): The European Union and the Nation State. Centre national dela recherche scientifique Paris

Nugent, N. (1994): The government and the Politics of the European Union. McMillan Press: London

Ortega, J. (1996): How (Good) Immigration is: a matching analysis. Institute for International Economic Studies. Stockholm.

Pickup, L. (1990): Mobility and Social Cohesion in the European Community – A Forward Look. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Loughlinstown House. Dublin.

Pierson, C. (1998): Beyond the Welfare State, the New Political Economy of Welfare Polity Press: Cambridge.

Razin, A. (1999): Unskilled Migration: a Burden or a Boon for the Welfare State. National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge.

Roche, M. & van Berkal, R. (edts) (1998): European Citizenship and Social Exclusion

Ashgate Publishing: Aldershot

Saeter, M. (1998): Comprehensive Neo-functionalism Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: Oslo

Tassinopoulos, A. (1998): Mobility and migration of labour in the European Union and their specific implications for young people. CEDEFOP Document, European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, Greece.

Wallace, H. & Wallace, W. (1998): Policy Making in the European Union OUP: Oxford

Document 598PC0394 (02): http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/dat/1998/en597PC394_02.html

Document 598PC0394 (03): http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/dat/1998/en-597PC394_03.html

Eurostat Web Side (May 2000): : http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/Public/datashop/print-product/EN?catalogue=Euro stat&product=3-po020in-EN&mode=download )

The Treaty Establishing the European Union as Amended by Subsequent Treaties

Rome, 25 March, 1957: www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/texts/BH343txt

Treaty Establishing the European Community

as Amended by Subsequent Treaties

Rome, 25 March, 1957

Article 48. 1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by the end of the transitional period at the latest.

2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.

3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health:

1. to accept offers of employment actually made;
2. to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
3. to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
4. to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public service.

Article 49. As soon as this Treaty enters into force, the Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives or make regulations setting out the measures required to bring about, by progressive stages, freedom of movement for workers, as defined in Article 48, in particular:

1. by ensuring close co-operation between national employment services;
2. by systematically and progressively abolishing those administrative procedures and practices and those qualifying periods in respect of eligibility for available employment, whether resulting from national legislation or from agreements previously concluded between Member States, the maintenance of which would form an obstacle to liberalisation of the movement of workers;
3. by systematically and progressively abolishing all such qualifying periods and other restrictions provided for either under national legislation or under agreements previously concluded between Member States as impose on workers of other Member States conditions regarding the free choice of employment other than those imposed on workers of the State concerned;
4. by setting up appropriate machinery to bring offers of employment into touch with applications for employment and to facilitate the achievement of a balance between supply and demand in the employment market in such a way as to avoid serious threats to the standard of living and level of employment in the various regions and industries.

Article 50. Member States shall, within the framework of a joint programme, encourage the exchange of young workers.

Article 51. The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, adopt such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers; to this end, it shall make arrangements to secure for migrant workers and their dependants:

1. aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of the several countries;
2. payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Member States.

There are three main types of Citizenship Rights:

1. Civil Rights: These are rights which are unconditional and are those which are necessary for individual freedom. These rights are guaranteed by legislation and enforced by the judiciary.
2. Political Rights: This consists of the right to participate in the exercise of political power. For example, the right to vote for all citizens (above a certain age) and the right to stand for election Political Rights are protected (normally) by the constitution. These rights are also unconditional.
3. Social Rights: These are made up of the right to the prevailing standard of living and the social heritage of the society. These rights are significantly realised through the social services and the educational system. As a consequence these rights are highly subjective and are conditional. That is, they are far more vague and depend on the policies of government.

These rights, however, have not been static. As with any social or political concept, they have evolved over time. What has happened in more recent times is that citizenship rights have become more or less universalised, as a consequence of the universalising of the nation-form. Civil and political rights are universal rights concerned with protecting the space for citizens, regardless of their class or status, to pursue their activities unimpeded by state actions. Not all civil and political rights are explicitly defined. Civil and political rights demand state action and expenditures. whereas social rights require state intervention to secure the provision of benefits for particular categories of welfare claimants. Social rights also differ from civil and political rights. Although every citizen has an obligation to comply with the law, a citizen who is suspected of not having fulfilled this obligation has the right to due process of law. Similarly, political rights enable citizens to take part in the political life of their community, without compelling them to do so. Civil and social rights may in some cases constrain the state, for example civil rights can be seen as rights against the state whereas social rights are claims for benefits guaranteed by the state. For persons to consume as citizens, the state must provide and is obliged to perform certain specific actions and in order for the persons to act as citizens. There must be freedoms that the state are not allowed to invade, which implies that there are actions that the state cannot perform. The expansion of citizenship in the modern state is both the hallmark of its achievements and the basis of its limitations (Barbalet, 1988).

Citizenship is essentially concerned with membership of and participation in a society, but citizenship also demands that its members share in the responsibilities towards the welfare of their community. Esping Andersson (1990) at the turn of the nineties pioneered the discussion about citizenship towards that of responsibilities. This occurred in the context of the decline of welfare states across the world. Economic liberalism would dictate that such measures are inefficient and cause structural unemployment. Also the changing demographics of Europe have made public pension systems appear unviable in the long run, causing many people to challenge the rationale of current welfare systems which emphasise the ‘right to entitlements’. Esping Anderson and others argue that citizens have a responsibility to work and to contribute to society and as Bussemaker (1999) points out that many people are now forced to work in order to earn benefits, indicating a decisive shift from rights to responsibilities.

European citizenship formally came into being in Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union which entered into force in November 1993. Though it was not until this Treaty that some transnational political rights were introduced, elements of common citizenship already existed in European Union regulations regarding legal and social rights and in policy concerns about access and belonging. The goal of freedom of movement, in article 118 of the Treaty of Rome, is the foundation for some equivalents of traditional civil rights, since elucidated in the jurisprudence of European Court of Justice(23-24). The principle of freedom of movement for workers also gave rise (spill over) to two new regulations. The first of these prevented member states from discriminating against migrants in terms of access to insurance-based social benefits, while the second protected them and their families in relation to other social assistance. The Treaty of Maastricht also connects with the European Convention on Human Rights, and refers to rights to information and redress within the common institutions, and requires member states to agree upon certain transnational political rights. It also includes the right of a national of any member state to be protected by the diplomatic and consular services of another state when outside the Union and the rights to vote and stand for office in municipal and European elections, but not general elections.(Roche & van Berkel, 1997; p.26) This in itself places migrant EU citizens in a secondary position within nation states compared to its citizens.

The EEC Treaty provided for the development of a Community social policy. It did so in two ways; Article 117-122 stated that there should be closer co-operation between the member states in the social field, and that the member states should apply the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. Article 123-128 laid the foundation for a European Social Fund(ESF) which was to be used primarily for the purpose of assisting the unemployed by means of vocational re-training, resettlement allowances, and temporary financial aid. In 1989 a major boost was given to Community social policy when the Commission produced "The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers". The Charter was inevitably somewhat general in its terminology and character, but it contained some fundamental principles which should apply to the member states. Among these were:

0. free movement of workers

0. equal treatment in access to unemployment and social protection

0. freedom of association and collective bargaining

0. employment on the basis of fair remuneration

The European Union has developed a number of measures during the past few years, now known collectively as the Structural Funds, designed to help weaker regions to adapt to the changing economic conditions of an increasingly integrated European economy. Their scale has been progressively expanded as the European Union has undergone enlargement, and as the scale and variation of regional problems have increased. Today the Structural Funds are of central significance to any consideration of the linkage between the Union’s economic and social policies and, in particular, to its commitment to promote economic and social cohesion (Roche & van Berkel, 1997; p.140).

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