| Introduction |
Appendices |
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| Legal Cases |
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Chapter 10: A necessary condition for personhood
Introduction
Philippa Foot in discussing[i] the question of whether an action is a 'good' - and whether, in consequence, it ‘ought’ to be performed - finds it useful to distinguish between the ‘goodness’ of the action and the ‘oughtness’ of the action; her analysis relates these to the, logically more basic, concepts - or virtues - of ‘Justice’ and ‘Charity’. [ii]
Foot suggests that a contemplated action can be considered to be ‘a good’ if - in so far as it affects X - it is being done ‘for the sake of ’ X. Such actions, done ‘for the sake of‘ another, spring from the virtue of Charity. Thus, ‘good actions’ are synonymous with ‘charitable actions’.
But ought one perform such good actions? Here the situation becomes a little more complex. The judgement that a (contemplated) action is a 'good', although a necessary condition, is not a sufficient condition for advocating its performance because, Foot argues, it may still conflict with Justice. Foot’s first principle is that for an action to be one which ought to be performed not only must it be in accord with Charity - and thus be a good action - but it must also accord with Justice. But what of actions which are in accord with one but not the other virtue? Foot’s second principle helps resolve this dilemma. This principle is that, if the demands of Justice and Charity conflict, Justice must reign supreme; to assert otherwise would be to render Justice as null. Foot considers that the requirements of Justice can be crystallised[iii] into the ‘right to non-interference’ or ‘the right to be let alone’. [iv] From this discussion it is possible to draw the conclusion that no person should be subjected to interference against his will even if this be done from the most altruistic of motives.
The term ‘person’
The word ‘person’ has crept, as it were by stealth, into the last proposition. It is in fact crucial to its truth; by this I mean that if the term 'person' were replaced by, for example, the term ‘human’ the proposition would no longer be true. To see that this is so it is first necessary to analyse the concept of ‘person’ and this is, essentially, the task of this chapter. Earlier in the thesis[v] the term ‘Object of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ (‘OMW’) was coined and it is useful in attempting to delineate the ambit of the term 'person'. It will be argued that ‘person’ stands in the same relation to Justice as ‘OMW’ stands to Charity, each describing the type of objects, effects on which are considered relevant when proposed actions are being scrutinised from the perspective of the corresponding virtue. In order to explain this more fully, let us first recap on the meaning of the term ‘OMW’. So that the subsequent discussion in this chapter has a point of focus, the question (which was implicitly posed by Foot) should be born in mind: ‘Why - arguing from a philosophical, as distinct from a religious, perspective - is it permissible to put an animal out of its pain but not so a human?’ The goal of this chapter is to first clarify, and then answer, this question.
‘Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’
Ethical theories are often described as being concerned with the listing of certain prescriptive rules of behaviour - usually described as ‘good’ actions - and the justification for such rules. However, they also have in common the fact that in discussing the morality of a proposed action they will not be interested in all the effects of such an action but only those which affect a small class of objects. Thus, to take an extreme example, in discussing the bludgeoning to death of a man with a rock, the possible damage to the rock will be considered to be of no relevance to the morality of the action; in contrast, the damage to the man is considered to be of supreme relevance. It is convenient to introduce a term to distinguish between those objects, injury to which will be the concern of a particular ethical theory and those objects injury to which it will regard as of no consequence. I have used the term ‘Object of Intrinsic[vi] Moral Worth’ (‘OMW’ - for short) for this purpose.
Various ethical theories define their ‘Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ in their various ways. Thus, in Cartesianism or in mediaeval Christianity, animals had, of themselves, no moral status, i.e. to injure an animal was in itself neither good nor evil. In such a system humans were the only ‘OMW’s’.[vii] More recent ethical theories have sought to describe the injury of, or at least the cruelty to, animals as ‘evil’; some have sought justification for this assertion in the ‘fact’ that such animals are conscious. In such theories ‘OMW’s’ are defined as those objects possessing consciousness; and one corollary of this is that in such theories, humans who have permanently lost consciousness have of themselves no locus standi in moral discussions. Other ethical theories - for example, some Buddhist and early Celtic ethical traditions - have considered all objects to be ‘OMW’s’; adherents being urged not to inflict intentional damage on any object whether it be animate or inanimate.[viii]
Where can these ‘OMW’s’ be situated in Foot’s analysis? It is clear that in any particular ethical theory, ‘OMW’s’ constitute the domain within which the virtue of Charity is operative. These are the very objects capable of ‘receiving’ Charity; effects on anything lying outside this domain are irrelevant when analysing actions from the perspective of Charity. Thus, those who believe that ‘consciousness’ is the appropriate criterion for adjudging ‘OMW’ could be charitable to a conscious animal but could no more be charitable to a supposedly permanently unconscious PVS patient[ix] than to an inanimate object.
What, however, is the domain within which Justice operates? Is it the same as the domain of Charity? Justice is without doubt concerned with ‘rights’ but to whom can rights be ascribed? Let us consider, for example, the case where ‘possession of consciousness’ is regarded as the appropriate criterion for adjudging ‘OMW’. Such ethicists regard a conscious animal as worthy of moral consideration and they would consider themselves under a moral obligation to ease the lot of an animal in pain; such obligations would, as we have seen, be grounded in Charity as being done ‘for the sake of’ the animal. Would the ethicists consider that they were under any obligations to an animal which were grounded in Justice as distinct from Charity?
An immediate and unavoidable difficulty is presented in that such ethical theorists often present their arguments as being in favour of so-called ‘animal rights’. Such a terminology is, I suggest, inappropriate and adds further confusion to an already difficult area.[x] The existence of such rights implies that obligations to animals flowed from the virtue of Justice; it would imply, for example, the right of the animal to non-interference[xi] (and the obligation on humans to respect this right) in cases where the animal was seriously injured and assistance was being contemplated solely for the sake of the animal. The inappropriateness of this suggests that so-called ‘animal rights’ flow, not from Justice, but from Charity and are, not rights, but obligations on humans to provide appropriate benevolent care.[xii] The appropriate claim then is not that ‘Animals have rights’ but that ‘Animals are Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ and that ‘Persons have obligations to animals’.
This example, despite the terminological
difficulties, makes clear that though the domains of Justice and of Charity may
overlap, they are not necessarily equivalent.
A term is required which can stand in the same relationship to Justice
as ‘OMW’ stands in relation to
Charity: ‘person’ is such a term.[xiii] This term describes the objects which
must be considered when the repercussions of a proposed course of action are
being examined from the perspective of Justice. They are, and only they are, the bearers of ‘rights’ ( and ‘obligations’ )
and they share the attribute of ‘personhood’.[xiv]
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this discussion:
Conclusion 10 - 1 : Rights (and obligations) can be ascribed to an individual if, and only if, that individual is a person.[xv]
Conclusion 10 - 2 : Obligations may exist towards individuals who are not persons; such obligations arise from Charity. The class of individuals to whom persons have obligations that flow from Charity are called ‘Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ (‘OMW’s’).
The possession of consciousness is the usual criterion for classifying an individual as an ‘OMW’.
Conclusion 10 - 3 : Obligations flowing from Justice - of which the most important is the right ‘to be let alone’ - take precedence over the obligations flowing from Charity.
Conclusion 10 - 4 : The right to be let alone can be analysed into:
(i) the right to be free from ‘non-beneficial’ interference; this right[xvi] flows from both Charity and Justice.
(ii) the right to be free from ‘beneficial’ interference; this right flows from Justice.
The aims of the current chapter vis-a-vis the wider argument of this
thesis.
Let us next consider the relevance of these conclusions to the general topic of this thesis which is the making of ‘end-of-life’ decisions for PVS patient; doing so will also help clarify the propositions that must be established in this chapter if the general argument put forward in this thesis is to succeed.
It has been argued in an earlier chapter,[xvii] that PVS patients should be treated as if they possess consciousness. It has also been argued that an appropriate definition for PVS patients is permanent loss of the ability to communicate.[xviii] Hence, if possession of consciousness is accepted as the criterion for being an ‘OMW’, it follows that PVS patients are owed the obligations that flow from Charity.
The aim of the present chapter is to establish the following propositions:
(T): “It is a[xix]
necessary condition for the ascription of personhood to an individual that
communication, to some minimal standard, be possible with that individual.” [xx]
Once this is established then, provided it is accepted that:
(U): “‘Personhood’ is a necessary and sufficient condition for the ascription of rights.” [xxi]
the conclusion:
(V): “Rights cannot be ascribed to an individual who is permanently unable to communicate.”
immediately follows.
From (T) it follows that PVS patients have lost their personhood; from (V) it follows that PVS patients are not owed obligations flowing from Justice but only from Charity.[xxii] The implications that flow from this will be examined in Chapter 11.
In summary, the remainder of this chapter is concerned solely with establishing the following propositions:
(T): “It is a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood to an individual that communication, to some minimal standard, be possible with that individual.”
(U): “‘Personhood’ is a necessary and sufficient condition for the ascription of rights.”
The Initial Strategy
Given an agreed definition of ‘personhood’, the method required to establish (T) is clear, although difficulties may present in its execution; it is simply to show that the definition of ‘personhood’ implies an ability to communicate; once this is established, then (T) directly follows. The method to establish (U) is equally obvious; it is to show that the definition of personhood was logically equivalent to (U). Unfortunately, since no universally accepted definition of personhood exists, an alternative strategy must be found.
Alternative Strategies
The first step towards an alternative strategy is found in noting that - for the purposes of establishing the conclusions of this thesis - a definition of ‘personhood’ is, strictly speaking, not required. This is because the term ‘personhood’ is used, in this and the following chapter, not in isolation but only as a middle term of, what is essentially, a syllogism:
(T): “The ability to
communicate is a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood to an
individual.”
(U): It is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the ascription of ‘rights’ to an individual that that
individual possesses ‘personhood’.”
(V): “Rights cannot be
ascribed to an individual who is permanently unable to communicate.”
The term ‘personhood’ functions only as a ‘placeholder’ and provided that the term is used with a consistency of meaning, it’s explicit definition is not required. It is the conclusion (V) - rather than (T) or (U) - which is of importance to the development of the argument. This latter point might suggest that it is possible to dispense completely with the term ‘personhood’ and attempt to establish the proposition (V) directly, i.e. that a permanent inability to communicate implies a loss of rights.
Establishing (V) directly
A difficulty immediately arises in that it is not intuitively obvious why being the ‘bearer of rights’ should be logically connected to possessing the ‘ability to communicate’. It is possible to construct an argument on the basis that the obligations of Charity to an individual should be gainsaid by those of Justice only if that individual wished otherwise and so expressed his wishes. This argument essentially reduces to the point that the right to refuse beneficial[xxiii] interventions makes sense only if there is an existing ability to accept them; this implies an ability to communicate. It is only the ability to communicate that could make patent how an action - which on its face was charitable and done ‘for the sake of’ another - in fact, involved a deep trespass to the dignity of that other. However, these ideas seem too tenuous a foundation on which to seek to establish so far-reaching a proposition as (V).[xxiv]
It seems then that, in seeking to establish (V), the three concepts ‘personhood’, ‘ability to communicate’ and ‘bearer of rights’, and their possible interrelationships, are at the heart of our discussion; the concept of ‘personhood’ being useful in that it functions as a ‘bridge’ between the other concepts and allows the conclusion (V) to be established as a consequence of two simpler conclusions (T) and (U).
The possible interrelationships between the three concepts can be represented in a diagram and table which may help clarify the issues involved. (In Diagram 10-1 and Table 10-1 ‘P’ represents ‘personhood’; ‘C’ - ‘ability to communicate’ and ‘R’ - ‘bearer of rights’.)
An Aside: An explanatory diagram
Diagram 10-1: A diagrammatic representation of the relationships between the concepts ‘personhood’, ‘ability to communicate’ and ‘bearer of rights’.
The possible relationships between C, P and R are set out in the following table:
|
C® R |
X
has the ‘ability to communicate’ implies that X is a ‘bearer of rights’. |
|
R® C |
X
is the ‘bearer of rights’ implies that X has the ‘ability to communicate’. |
|
P® C |
X
possesses ‘personhood’ implies that X has the ‘ability to communicate’. |
|
C® P |
X
has the ‘ability to communicate’ implies that X possesses ‘personhood’. |
|
P® R |
X
possesses ‘personhood’ implies that X is a ‘bearer of rights’. |
|
R® P |
X
is a ‘bearer of rights’ implies that X possesses ‘personhood’. |
Table
10-1: The possible relationships between the concepts ‘personhood’, ‘ability to
communicate’ and ‘bearer of rights’.
The proposition (T) can be expressed symbolically as ‘P ® C’.
The conclusion that is sought to be established is (V), which, expressed symbolically, is:
‘not-C ® not-R’ .[xxv]
This is logically
equivalent to ‘R ® C’
This conclusion will follow from (T) provided ‘R® P’ is established.
In summary, the argument, expressed symbolically, is: ‘R ® P and P ® C, implies R ® C’
Thus, in addition to (T) we need to establish a proposition (U’) which states symbolically that R ® P. In words it states:
(U'): “The possession of ‘personhood’ is a necessary condition for the ascription of rights.”
this is less onerous to establish than is the original proposition (U).
Hence, it is possible to refine the
chapter aims given earlier; to establish (V)
it is only necessary to establish (T) and (U’) [rather than (T) and (U)].
The problem of defining personhood revisited
The recognition, as stated earlier, that no universally accepted definition of personhood exists suggested that attempts to prove (T) and (U’) through an analysis of the definition of personhood were doomed to failure. This conclusion may have been premature. The assertion that no universally accepted definition exists follows from the recognition that many definitions of ‘personhood’ have been proffered in recent times and these definitions are not logically equivalent. Because the competing definitions are not logically equivalent, there is a penumbra to the term ‘personhood’ which is uncertain; however; the definitions may well share a common core where the meaning of the term ‘personhood’ is beyond dispute.[xxvi]
A distinction - introduced by Mill - between the ‘connotation’ and the ‘denotation’ of a term is of assistance. In considering the various definitions of 'personhood' it will be seen that difficulties relate not to the connotation of the term but to its denotation. This is best explained by means of an example: in the continuing debates about the morality of abortion the statement ‘The foetus is a person’ is often encountered. This proposition is advocated by those opposed to abortion and denied with equal vehemence by those supporting a right to abortion. What is of interest in the present context is that both sides agree that if the proposition were conceded, certain conclusions would follow, namely that the foetus is the bearer of rights including the ‘right to life’; where the sides disagree is in whether the concept ‘person’ encompasses a foetus. Thus, the connotation of the term 'person' is non-contentious - it is to be a ‘bearer of rights’; disagreement is restricted to the denotation of the term ‘person’ - does it include a foetus?
Similarly, the various definitions encountered in Appendix F will be found to focus on the possible denotations of the term ‘person’ whilst its connotation - as a ‘bearer of rights’ - is uncontroversial. Returning to consideration of (T) and (U’), it is clear that (T) relates to the denotation of the term ‘person’ whilst (U’)[xxvii] relates to its connotation and is, in consequence, unproblematic.[xxviii] The problem is essentially the establishment of (T).
A short digression is useful at this stage to examine why, in discussions of the concepts of ‘person’ and ‘personhood’, questions of definition have exercised a particular dominance; especially because it allows further strategies towards establishing (T) to emerge.
The search for a definition of personhood -
a chimera?
There is a well-established philosophical
tradition of searching for the strict definitions of certain terms which underlie
particular philosophical problems in the hope that once such definitions can be
established, the associated philosophical problems can be easily resolved. Wittgenstein considered such projects to be
chimeras, born of a deep misunderstanding of the nature of language; they
originated in attempts to transpose a method from the scientific field - where
it has been highly successful - to the realm of philosophical inquiry where it
is wholly inappropriate. [xxix] It is ‘inappropriate’ because the words
which are central to most philosophic problems[xxx]
are usually words which are in everyday use: ‘handyman words with a variety of
jobs’, ‘open-ended’ words whose boundary of definition is necessarily vague[xxxi]
quite unlike the technical terms of a scientific discourse. Wittgenstein suggested a refocusing of
philosophical effort away from the search for definition and towards an
examination of how words were actually used.[xxxii] In applying his admonitions to the current
discussion, it is clear that the term ‘personhood’ is not a term of art, nor a
technical term open to definition by fiat. Attempts to treat it as such result in
individuals not normally spoken of as ‘persons’, being ascribed ‘personhood’
and conversely; such developments rather than helping to resolve philosophical
problems can only exacerbate them.
Thus, before any attempts at definition or discussion of the term
‘personhood’, the usages of the term ‘person’ - particularly borderline usages
as, for example, in the term ‘non-person’
- must first be examined. The concept
of ‘personhood’ must be used in such a way that it is at least consistent with such usages of the term ‘person’. This linguistic exploration of the term
‘person’ offers an additional strategy in the furtherance of our aims and is
briefly sketched in Section 2.
Linguistic investigation as a strategy
A further reason for scepticism towards attempts at resolving philosophical problems by means of a search for precise definitions is that - particularly in ethical matters - such attempts can serve as a subterfuge in that if ethical problems are portrayed as simply matters of easily resolvable linguistic convention,[xxxiii] ethical choices can masquerade as simply linguistic choices. This difficulty can also arise if what are essentially ethical questions are considered to be resolvable solely by an examination of linguistic usage. It is important that this issue be directly addressed and the correct role for a linguistic investigation be clarified. Thus, assuming that an examination of linguistic usage is unequivocally supportive of (T) - in the sense that linguistic usage is not inconsistent with (T) - what conclusion should be drawn?
The appropriate conclusion is that
traditionally there has been an acceptance of (T) and, as such, the linguistic
investigation is persuasive, but not conclusive, evidence for (T). An analogy may help clarify this
distinction: suppose a discussion centred on whether women should be accorded
equal rights with men in the workplace, a linguistic examination - which contrasted
the usages of the terms ‘man’ and ‘woman’ in the context of their work and its
value - might well conclude that man’s work was consistently given a higher
value than was women’s. The question as
to whether this should continue to be so is a quite separate issue and should
not be confused with how these matters were traditionally resolved. An examination of the first question
requires the adoption of the perspective of the social reformer, the second,
that of the social anthropologist.
These perspectives are being separated in this chapter so that only in
Section 5 - ‘Conclusions’ - will consideration be given to whether rights should be restricted to those with whom
communication either already exists or can be established at some future
time. The earlier sections will
consider only whether it is possible to justify (T) and (U’) from within schema
which have traditionally found an acceptance either in the philosophical
community (Section 1, 3 and Appendix F) or within the wider society as shown by
linguistic usage (Section 2).
John Locke
The philosopher to first raise the problem of personhood in its modern form[xxxiv] was John Locke whose discussion of the nature of definition is also singularly insightful. These aspects of Locke’s philosophy give a convenient framework within which to begin a discussion of personhood and the problems of its definition and they will be sketched in Section 1. This section will also investigate whether (T) and (U’) would find support from within Locke’s philosophy.
Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument’ as a strategy
The last - and by far the most powerful - strategy for establishing (T) comes from the realisation that refutations of (T) are irretrievably embedded in Cartesian philosophy. This emerges when certain anti-Cartesian aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, relating to the self and language, are contrasted with their Cartesian counterparts. The clearest entry into this discussion is through the acknowledgement that, in setting out the broad ambit of the term ‘personhood’, two distinct approaches are possible:[xxxv]
(i) The first - the ‘atomistic’ approach - seeks to determine the personhood of an individual by considering his characteristics without reference to his social environment and, for example, seeks to characterise a person in terms of his cognitive skills or brain development or, from a religious perspective, possession of a 'soul'.
(ii) The second - the ‘social’ approach - regards personhood as essentially a concept born out of social interaction and no more applicable to an isolated individual than is the concept of ‘sociability’.[xxxvi]
The first approach regards the individual as logically prior to society whilst in the second, the individual is a product of society; the first approach draws its succour from Cartesian philosophy, the second from contemporary philosophy.[xxxvii] In an earlier chapter[xxxviii] it was mentioned that the perspectives of Cartesian philosophy permeate much of Western intellectual culture;[xxxix] one example of such is the widespread assumption that ‘personhood’ can be ascribed to an isolated individual. Though this assumption drew its original sustenance from the Judeo-Christian tradition of the soul, its modern expression originates in Cartesian philosophy - Descartes being in some respects a secular apologist for Christian beliefs. From a Christian perspective, it is clear that to possess a ‘soul’ does not require any prior participation in society or possession of language or ability to communicate with others; a ‘soul’ being a gift from God, not from society; furthermore, the fact that an individual possesses a ‘soul’ is that which creates the obligation on others to value, or respect, that individual; yet this is precisely the connotation of the concept of ‘personhood’. Hence, the equation of ‘personhood’ and ‘possession of a soul’ easily follows as does the corollary that personhood is an ‘atomistic’ property.
These same conclusions are equally valid within Cartesian philosophy. To Descartes, the starting point of his philosophy - the setting to the ‘cogito’ argument - was that of an isolated, questioning, individual. Descartes presupposed nothing - no society, no social community, no governments or nationality, no culture, no history, nothing, just a thinking thing; on this basis he began his project and set out to construct his philosophy. Descartes’ method was that of universal doubt but his isolated individual was unable to doubt his very own existence as a thinking thing and this gave him the secure foundation from which he could begin to repossess the world. Thus, to Descartes man could rise to his full stature as a self-reflective, rational, questioning being, independent of society.
However, Wittgenstein in his ‘Private Language Argument’ [xl] (‘PLA’, for short) found the Achilles heel of the Cartesian project: the supposition that an individual could have a ‘private language’ - that is, that he could begin this process of questioning and doubting without the necessity of assuming a prior social environment within which those very tools that are necessary to begin the process of doubting and questioning, would have been generated. Wittgenstein’s ‘PLA’ denies the possibility that such a private language can exist; it implies that an individual, isolated from all contact with his fellow man, can never develop language. To Wittgenstein, language is essentially a social activity; the existence of language depends on social rules and social interaction. From this it follows that an isolated individual cannot have a ‘reflexive consciousness’ [xli] because a reflective consciousness depends on concepts and concepts cannot exist without language.[xlii] The ‘PLA’ renders Descartes’ concept of the isolated questioning individual, incoherent.
This result is of considerable importance because, had the ‘atomistic’ approach to personhood been sustainable, it would have provided substantial grounds for arguing against (T). Conversely, the social approach grounds personhood irrevocably in social interaction and, as communication to some minimal extent[xliii] is a necessary condition[xliv] for such interaction, (T) readily follows.
The term ‘ability to communicate’ has been much used in these last pages in relation to the definition of ‘personhood’ and plays a crucial role in the development to the argument. Difficulties exist in connection with it: for example, the problem of distinguishing between ‘communication’ and ‘random, or reflex, or echo response’ must be resolved and the level of communication that is envisaged in (T) must be specified; these problems are considered in Section 4.
Finally, conceiving of the term ‘personhood’ in terms of ‘ability to communicate’ is an oversimplification as it links the status of personhood too closely to current abilities. The attribute of 'personhood' has a certain ‘momentum’ - what I term ‘stickiness’ - so that once the term is assigned to an individual, it adheres for a time even in the absence of ability to communicate. This occurs, for example, when an individual sleeps or is unconscious. The concept also has a certain presumptive quality - what I term ‘precociousness’ [xlv]- so that if it is believed that at some future time the concept will be applicable, then it is considered to be currently applicable, albeit in an attenuated form; for example, it is ‘precociousness’ which enables a baby, and in some cases a foetus, to be considered to be a person.[xlvi] These properties will be briefly discussed in the final conclusions section, Section 5.
In summary this chapter focuses on establishing the two propositions (T) and (U’):
(T): “It is a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood
to an individual that communication, to some minimal standard, be possible with
that individual.”
(U'): “The possession of
’personhood’ is a necessary condition for the ascription of rights.”
The chapter will be developed in the following Sections:
|
Section 1: |
A sketch of Locke’s theories of definition and personhood.[xlvii] |
|
Section 2: |
Some examples of everyday usage of the term 'person’.[xlviii] |
|
Section 3: |
Some philosophical authorities for a ‘social definition’ of personhood.[xlix] |
|
Section 4: |
Some problems associated with the ‘communication criterion’.[l] |
|
Section 5: |
Should rights be restricted to those with whom it is possible to communicate? The terms ‘precociousness’ and ‘stickiness’. Conclusions.[li] |
Section 1: A sketch of Locke’s theories of definition and personhood.
On Definition
An understanding of Locke’s view on the nature of definition is crucial to an understanding of his treatment of general terms such as ‘man’ and ‘person’. Locke’s approach to these questions differs radically from the Platonic approach and is best understood when seen in contrast with it.
Plato, in his ‘Theory of Forms’, considered that our use of general words presupposes the existence of some abstract form or pattern which ‘embodies’ the general concept; for example, in stating ‘X is a man’, we presuppose that some ‘essence of man’ exists in its own right and that ‘X’ instantiates or fits this pattern. From such a perspective, the method for resolving problematic cases lies in attempting to lay bare the essence of the concept - i.e. by finding its definition - so that a comparison might take place between the supposed instance and the essence, to see whether there is, in fact, a congruence. To Plato, such definitions[lii] were antecedent to human activity and belonged to the very nature of things.
Locke, in contrast, considered that general terms had no existence prior to human activity and were simply a product of human classification:
”There are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but are hairy and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us that have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language too. ... If it be asked whether these be all men or no, all of human species, it is plain the question refers only to nominal essence ... But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence, ... it is wholly impossible for us to answer, ... the next thing to be considered is how and by whom these essences become to be made. ... it is evident that they are made by the mind and not by nature ...” [liii]
Locke takes an example that closely touches the questions at the heart of this chapter: [liv]
“ ... if several men were to be asked concerning some oddly-shaped foetus, as soon as born, whether it were a man or no, it is past doubt one should meet with different answers. Which could not happen if the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the species of substances, were not made by man with some liberty, but were exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature, whereby it distinguishes all substances into certain species.” [lv]
Thus, to Locke, a resolution of the question ‘Is X a person?’ cannot be found by attempting to lay bare some actual essence - ‘personhood’ - which exists antecedent to human activity but is to be found by finding the common thread, if such exists, linking the various uses of the word ‘person’ in everyday language, i.e. finding its ‘nominal essence’.[lvi] It is to be expected that the boundaries of this ‘nominal essence’ will have some indeterminacy.
On Personhood
E. J. Lowe argues[lvii] that Locke was responsible for setting the terms of the modern debate on personhood and personal identity and that it was he who first discerned ‘a question to which previous philosophers had been oblivious’. Scruton believes that the modern distinction between ‘being human’ and ‘being a person’ is attributable to Locke:
“Man, he argued, is not the same concept as person. The first describes a part of the natural world; the second is a ‘forensic concept’: it features in our inquiries into responsibilities and rights.” [lviii]
Locke’s primary concern was to explain the concept of ‘personal identity’. This necessitated a clarification of the term ‘person’:
“ ... to find wherein personal identity consists, we must first consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and, as it seems to me, essential to it ...” [lix]
This functions as a denotation of the term person and it bears a considerable resemblance to Descartes’ res cogitans.[lx] It differs from the Cartesian concept in that, to Descartes, a res cogitans was a thinking substance, Locke, in contrast, does not locate personhood in substance but in continuity of consciousness which he believes to be independent of substance. The reason for so doing is intimately connected with his connotation of the term ‘person’:
“It is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merits, and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness;... ” [lxi]
To further explore these ideas it is necessary to first examine the meaning of the term ‘identity’ - as used in such phrases as ‘personal identity’ - and to then consider how Locke elucidates the distinction between the concepts of ‘man’ and ‘person’.
Locke’s theory of identity
Locke first considers the concept of identity as it applies to plants and animals. In so far as an animal, or a tree, might be said to be the same animal or tree, notwithstanding that each constituent element of the original had changed so that no atoms of the original still remain, it is clear that this sameness cannot consist in identity of substance. Much as we commonly say a river is the same river as flowed yesterday although it contains none of the same water, Locke locates the identity of plants and animals in a subsisting principle of organisation which persists although the substance through which it manifests, changes continually.[lxii] This principle of organisation is expressed in the physical form of the animal or plant. Let us next consider the principle of identity as applied to ‘man’ as distinct from ‘person’.
An ambiguity
A difficulty arises in that the term ‘man’ is ambiguous both in its present usage and, to some extent, as used by Locke. In modern speech the term ‘man’ can have purely biological connotations such as when it is used in contrast to ‘animal’. In this usage - manB - the term is synonymous with ‘male, human of a minimum age’. The term can also be used as a term of value - manV - as in ‘He is a (real) man’ where it has a meaning similar to ‘male person’. Locke appears to use the term in both senses; he uses it in the sense of manB when, for example, he says:
“... it being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person, if person, man and substance are three names standing for three different ideas; ...” [lxiii]
Later he discusses[lxiv] the case of the Abbot of Saint Martin:
“When the Abbot of St. Martin, says he, was born he had so little of the figure of a man that it bespake him rather a monster. It was for some time under deliberation whether he should be baptised or no. However, he was baptised, and declared a man provisionally (till time should show what he would prove). Nature had moulded him so untowardly that he was called all his life the Abbot Malotru, i.e. ill-shaped.” [lxv]
Flew, commenting on the latter passage, reads ‘man’ as ‘manV’, and argues[lxvi] that Locke abandoned his earlier position where questions regarding the ‘real essence’ of the term ‘man’ - as distinct from the ‘nominal essence’ - were regarded as unanswerable. To Flew, Locke, at this crucial juncture, momentarily lost his nerve and implicitly accepted a definition of man stated in Cartesian terms. I suggest that Flew is mistaken and that an adequate defence to his charges can be furnished by a reading of ‘man’ as ‘manB’ in the above passage in conjunction with a further elaboration of Locke’s distinction between ‘man’ and ‘person’.
Identity of ‘man’ and identity of ‘person’
To return to the problem of identity as it applies to ‘man’ and to ‘person’; the continuity of the identity of a man (i.e. as ‘manB’) is - like that of an animal or a plant - expressed in the continuity of the physical form of the man. The continuity of the identity of a man (i.e. as ‘manV’, or ‘person’) is expressed in continuity of consciousness.
A reformulation of Locke’s position
A path through the difficulties encountered in Locke’s exposition of personhood can be found by expressing his distinction between ‘man’ and ‘person’ in terms of a number of criteria :
Criterion 1: X has the bodily form of a man.[lxvii]
Criterion
2: X has the ‘mental form’ of a man - i.e. X can talk and reason.
Criterion
3: X has self-consciousness i.e. in Locke’s words ‘can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and
places’. [lxviii]
The test for ascribing the term ‘man’ is primarily ‘Criterion 1’ though ‘Criterion 2’ may be used to resolve cases of doubt.[lxix] The criterion for ascribing the term ‘person’ is ‘Criterion 3 ’.[lxx]
That Locke uses Criterion 1 as the necessary, and usually sufficient, condition for using the term ‘man’ is evident from the following:
“... the idea in our minds of which the sound man in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form: since I think I may be confident that whoever should see a creature of his own shape and make, though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would still call him a man; or whosoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophise, would call or think it nothing but a cat or a parrot and say the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent rational parrot.” [lxxi]
Locke then relates the story of Prince Maurice and the talking parrot and poses the question:
“... if this parrot and all of its kind had always talked ... as this one did, whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of rational animals; but yet whether for all that they would have been allowed to be men and not parrots? For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in most people’s sense, but of a body so and so shaped, joined to it; ...” [lxxii]
Locke later returns to a discussion of the term 'man' when - just before discussing the case of the Abbot of St. Martin - he says:
“ ... it has been more than once debated whether several human foetus should be preserved or received to baptism or no, only because of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of reason as infants cast in another mould; some whereof, though of an approved shape, are never capable of as much appearance of reason all their lives as is to be found in an ape or elephant, and never give any signs of being acted by a rational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which only was found wanting, and not the faculty of reason, which nobody could know to be wanting in its due season, was made essential to the human species.” [lxxiii]
If my reading of Locke is correct, then the discussion of the examples of the Abbot and of the foetus relates not to whether they were persons (i.e. manV ) but to whether they were men (i.e. manB). Had they the obvious form of men then, to Locke, there would be no question but that they were men, but in cases of doubt it was permissible to see if they developed reason and the ability to communicate. This does not imply that Locke - as suggested by Flew - accepted the possession of reason as the definitive criterion for personhood. This is evident from his treatment of cases where there is no doubt that Criterion 1 - i.e. that X has the bodily form of a man - is not satisfied, for example in the case of the ‘rational parrot’, just considered, Locke is emphatic that they are parrots and not men. Further evidence that Locke did not accept the Cartesian concept of person is clear from his statement that:
“It would possibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a very dangerous falsehood, if I should say that some changelings, who have lived forty years together, without any appearance of reason, are something between a man and a beast: which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a false supposition, that these two names, man and beast, stand for distinct species so set out by real essences, that there can come no other species between them ... Here everybody will be ready to ask, if changelings may be supposed something between man and beast, pray what are they? I answer, changelings; which is as good a word to signify something different from the signification of man or beast, as the names man and beast are to have significations different one from the other.” [lxxiv]
My use of Criterion 3 in defining personhood may seem to be an unjustified interpolation on Locke’s distinctions, in that it explicitly separates rationality from personhood. It can, however, be justified but it is first necessary to contrast Locke’s view of the linkage between ‘possession of thinking substance’ and ‘personhood’, with Descartes’.
Descartes believed that man consisted of two substances, a bodily substance and an immaterial ‘thinking substance’; the possession of such a thinking substance, or ‘soul’, being the necessary and sufficient condition for being a person. Locke, in contrast, found the idea of thinking substance unhelpful; it did not advance - in fact it confused - the search for personal identity. He argued - at considerable length and using many ‘thought experiments’[lxxv]- that ‘personhood’ could not be equated with the possession of such a thinking substance because the one person might have two thinking substances[lxxvi] or different persons may have the one thinking substance.[lxxvii] Thus, ability to think - i.e. possession of a thinking substance - was of no concern to Locke in his attempt to clarify personal identity. He appeared to acknowledge that animals[lxxviii] might have such a thinking substance but since he considered possession of personal identity as the crucial condition for the ascription of rights - i.e. for personhood - this does not present the difficulties to him that it would present to Descartes.
To Locke ‘continuity of consciousness’ - and not possession of thinking substance - is the crucial criterion,[lxxix] this is so because his concept of person is intimately connected with the assigning of rights and responsibilities:
“In this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment ...” [lxxx]
This suggests the conclusion - also supported by the discussion of the case of Abbot Malotru[lxxxi] - that the judgement that ‘X was not a person’ implied that ‘rights’ were not to be accorded to X and in particular that the killing of X would not be murder;[lxxxii] this permits the conclusion:
Conclusion 10 - 5 : To Locke, possession of personhood is a necessary and sufficient condition for the ascription of rights.
A final reformulation of Locke’s position
Locke’s definition of the term ‘person’ suggests that the concept ‘person’ was logically prior[lxxxiii] to that of ‘personal identity’. [lxxxiv] This, however, is not borne out in the development of his argument and, furthermore, it has the disadvantage that it does not clearly distinguish his position from Descartes’. I suggest an alternative formulation of Locke’s theory, in which ‘personal identity’ is regarded as being logically prior to ‘person’; this permits ‘person’ to be defined as one who possesses ‘personal identity’; ‘personal identity’, in turn, being defined in terms of ‘continuity of consciousness’.[lxxxv] This permits a clearer view of the structure of Locke’s arguments.
The suggested approach is similar to that adopted by Owen Flanagan in his discussion of personhood.[lxxxvi] Flanagan considers personhood to reside in the possession of a reasonably viable ‘story of the self’ which allows the individual and the world to interrelate[lxxxvii] - the individual to relate to the world out of a sense of a personal history or personal continuity, and the world to relate to the individual through its having (from a knowledge of the personal history) the ability to predict the individual’s likely responses. Flanagan describes the case of ‘Jimmie’ who lost his long term memory to alcoholism:
“ ... ‘whatever was said or done to him was apt to be forgotten in a few seconds’ time’ ... Jimmy was ‘isolated in a single moment of being, ... He is a man without past (or future) stuck in a constantly changing, meaningless moment.’ ” [lxxxviii]
From a Cartesian perspective, Jimmy - who is a thinking human being - would be categorised as a person. From Locke’s perspective, Jimmy - in that he satisfies Criteria 1 and 2 but not 3 - would not be categorised as a person: he lacks continuity of consciousness and he, therefore, lacks a personal identity;[lxxxix] hence, he cannot be considered to be a person.
Locke: Conclusions
In an attempt to see how the proposition (T)[xc] would be resolved from within Locke’s philosophy, we can pose the following question:
Can the term ‘person’ denote an individual with whom communication can never be established?
Because a third party could ascribe the term ‘person’ to another only if he could first communicate with that other and determine that the other possessed a ‘continuity of consciousness’ and furthermore, since personhood is - to Locke - ‘a forensic concept’ and communication is required before responsibility can be assigned, it is clear that
Conclusion 10 - 6 : To Locke, the ability to communicate is a necessary condition for ascription of personhood.
Could, however, an isolated individual ascribe the term 'person' to himself? In that, to Locke, the term ‘person’ was essentially a:
“... forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit, and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness and misery.” [xci]
it is clear that Locke embeds ‘personhood’ in a social context.[xcii]
Section 2: Some examples of everyday usage of the term 'person’
As has been discussed in the Introduction to this chapter, philosophical questions are rarely concerned exclusively with how particular words are used in everyday speech,[xciii] consequently it is not to be expected that an exhaustive cataloguing of current uses of the term 'person' would resolve the philosophical problems associated with the concept of personhood. However, it is important that the opposite error is not made and that the concept of ‘person’ is sought to be defined without reference to its many usages in contemporary language; to do so can only exacerbate confusion in that a further shade of meaning - a ‘philosophical meaning’ - is added to an already heady mix of ambiguity. If it is desired to define a term which is in current use and to assign to it a meaning different to that which the word normally bears, then it is surely wiser to coin a new word for what is after all a new concept. These questions were much discussed by the Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin. Austin, having noted that certain words had only a philosophical usage, continued:
“... but most words are in fact used in a particular way already, and this fact can’t be just disregarded. (For example, some meanings that have been assigned to ‘know’ and 'certain' have made it seem outrageous that we should use these terms as we actually do; but what this shows is that the meanings assigned by some philosophers are wrong.) Certainly, when we have discovered how a word is in fact used, that may not be the end of the matter; ... we may wish to tidy the situation up a bit, ... draw the boundaries and distinctions rather differently.” [xciv]
Austin counsels against attempting to find a characteristic common to all usages of a word[xcv] particularly when attempts to do so involve:
“... dismissing some (if not all) the ordinary uses of a word as ‘unimportant’.” [xcvi]
Aside from the problem of the relationship of the existing uses of a term to a proposed definition of that term, Austin also points out a further problem that may arise: this concerns the question of whether a word can refer to a novel object which shares many, but not all, of the characteristics of objects to which the word usually refers;[xcvii] Austin takes an example:
“Suppose that one day a creature of the kind we now call a cat takes to talking. ... then other cats, not all, take to talking as well; we distinguish between talking and non-talking cats. But again we may, if talking becomes prevalent and the distinction between talking and not talking seems to us to be really important, come to insist that a real cat be a creature that can talk.” [xcviii]
Austin’s solution lies in the use of ‘adjuster-words’ [xcix] such as ‘real’, ‘true’ or 'like' - though we could, of course, insist that talking cats were to be called by a different name, ‘tats’, for example. The appropriate solution to be adopted would appear to hinge on the importance to us of the consequences of the distinction between talking, and non-talking, cats. Assume that certain important consequences followed on being designated ‘a cat’ and we ask ‘Do these consequences equally apply to ‘tats’?’ It is certainly clear that retaining the old term ‘cats,’ - rather than using the new term 'tats' - would mainly serve to obfuscate the problem.
How does this relate to our discussion of PVS patients? Firstly, it counsels against too readily describing PVS patients as persons since the differences between them and those to whom the term normally refers are obviously of considerable importance. Secondly, it clearly shows that the question ‘Are PVS patients persons?’ is to some extent tangential to the essential issue which is whether ‘Should PVS patients have rights?’ [c]
Has, then, the linguistic investigation of the term ‘person’ any point? To answer this let us assume that the results of an exhaustive investigation of the uses of the term ‘person’ show that the term:
* always signifies one ‘worthy of respect’ and
* is never applied to one who has not the ability to communicate;
What conclusions can be drawn? It may be that some who are not persons are also worthy of respect. Let us rule out this possibility so that ‘person’ is synonymous with ‘worthy of respect’. Can we now conclude that an individual who has permanently lost the ability to communicate is not worthy of respect? We can certainly say (given our assumptions) that, traditionally, this has been the case. Let us next assume the permanent inability of PVS patients to communicate, what now follows? Had the PVS condition not been a recent phenomenon, but existed for some considerable time, it would be possible to conclude from the results of our hypothetical investigation that PVS patients had not traditionally been accorded the status of persons and were not considered to be bearers of rights. However, the situation is more complex in that both the term PVS and the condition itself are of recent origin. Thus, no linguistic investigation can resolve the question of whether PVS patients are persons. At most our linguistic investigation of the term ‘person’ could show that traditionally those who had no ability to communicate were not accorded rights.[ci]
Conclusion 10 - 7 : The maximally relevant conclusion (in relation to the 'personhood' of PVS patients) that could be drawn from a linguistic investigation of the term ‘person’ is that, traditionally, rights were not accorded to those with whom, it was believed, communication was not possible.
The above discussion shows not only the maximal relevant conclusion that could be drawn from a linguistic investigation but also the direction in which such an investigation should proceed; for if the maximal relevant conclusion which could be drawn from a linguistic investigation of the term ‘person’ is that traditionally those who had no ‘ability to communicate’ were not considered ‘worthy of respect’[cii] then our linguistic investigation should concentrate on contexts where the relationship of the term ‘person’ with the concepts of ‘ability to communicate’ and ‘worthy of respect’ is put under strain; the following have been chosen as providing examples of such contexts:
(i)
The contrast between an ‘impersonal’, and a ‘personal’, God.
(ii)
The difference between treating an individual ‘as a person’ and ‘as
an object’.
(iii)
The link between the terms ‘person’ and ‘persona’.
(iv)
The term ‘non-person’.
(i) The contrast between an ‘impersonal’ and a ‘personal’ God
The Vedas which are the sacred books of the Hindus, have an impersonalist conception of the Absolute; concepts of a personal God and of devotion to such a God are considered only appropriate to lower forms of religion.[ciii] Buddhism, in so far as it deigns to consider such questions, has similar beliefs. The Taoist concept of a ‘supreme being’ is also impersonal:
“It is proper to view the self-existent cosmos and its majestic changes and transformations with reverence and awe, but to compose prayers or hymns to it would be merely futile. The Tao is not concerned with the rise and fall of individuals, but with the smooth effortless progress of its transformations, the well-being of the whole. Therefore [the Taoist] achieves his goal not by imploring the Tao to favour him but by learning to accommodate himself to its harmonious workings.” [civ]
This concept of an impersonal God is also found in Western philosophy as, for example, in the writings of Spinoza:
“[Spinoza] treats of God, understanding, and human passions as thought they were circles and triangles. Nature becomes an enormous silent machine which is indifferent to the value of man. Even if we call the former by the name of God, it does not come nearer the human being. ‘For the reason and will which constitute God’s essence must differ by the breath of all heaven from our reason and will, have nothing in common with them, except the name; as little, in fact, as the dog star has in common with the dog the barking animal.’ ” [cv]
Ideas of an impersonal God are also to be found in Western religious thought though they do not predominate: Mircea Eliade, writing on the development of ideas of God in European civilisation, suggests that the Greeks paid honour, not to statues, but to unwrought stones:[cvi]
“ ... Hermes, before becoming the ‘person’ we know in post-Homeric religion and literature, was at first simply a theophany of stone. These hermai indicated a presence, embodied a power, and at once protected and made fertile. That Hermes came to have the form of a man was due to the action of the Greek imagination, and the tendency people had from very early on more and more to personalise their divinities and sacred forces.” [cvii]
Eliade notes that two tendencies can be thus identified; one where images of the divine are created and another where there is a refusal to create such images - at most symbols of the divine being permitted;[cviii] both these tendencies were present in ancient times and have persisted to the present day. Eliade cites the example of Xenophanes who (writing in the 5th Century BC) noted that whilst the Ethiopians represented their gods as black, the Thracians depicted them as blue-eyed and red-haired and that ‘if oxen and horses ... had hands and could paint’ their gods would be in the image of oxen and horses, thus suggesting that men create gods in their own image; yet Xenophanes himself speaks of one God ‘who neither in shape ... nor in thought’ resembles anything human; he has no eyes and no ears, but himself is ‘wholly eye, wholly spirit, wholly ear.’ [cix]
Eliade’s suggestion[cx] that an image can function as an image of God precisely in so far as it is nonhuman, helps explain why both of the tendencies, just mentioned, have persisted into modern times. On the one hand a stripping away of those human qualities which ‘cloud’ ideas of God is required, yet the logical development of this tendency is a concept of God of which nothing can be said; Maimonides for example, taught[cxi] that no positive attributes whatever can be predicated of God. This tendency culminates in the via negativa of mystical religion and is open to David Hume’s objection that it is indistinguishable from atheism;[cxii] a conclusion which in turn generates the opposite tendency leading to anthropomorphism.
Eliade believes that the distinction between a personal and an impersonal God is essentially reducible to the question of anthropomorphism, if not in its crudest forms then, certainly as ‘psychological anthropomorphism’ [cxiii] where the divine takes on not human physical shape, but human feelings of loving, pitying etc.:
“The ultimate residual anthropomorphism, however, is the theistic notion of God as personal, in contrast to an impersonal conception of the divine.” [cxiv]
Eliade concludes his article with the question:
“The religious, as distinct from the philosophical, problem could be summarised in the simple question: can one pray to a nonanthropomorphic deity?” [cxv]
What conclusions can be drawn from this discussion relating the term ‘person’ to the concepts of ‘ability to communicate’ and ‘worthy of respect’?
With regard to communication the answer lies, I suggest, in Elides’ last question. A personal God is one with whom communication is possible. It may be suggested that the distinction between a personal and an impersonal God rests not in ‘communication’ but in ‘influence’ since the omniscience[cxvi] of God implies that attempts at communication would be redundant. This objection can be countered by noting that the concept of omniscience is itself anthropomorphic and thus presupposes a personal God.
With regard to ‘worthy of respect’ the answer is more problematic in that the very concept of God usually implies omnipotence and an obligation to show respect, though it can again be objected that these concepts are again anthropomorphic. Yet this objection itself can in turn be dismissed in noting that the Taoist respects the Tao even though it is impersonal.
The conclusions - especially that relating to the concept ‘worthy of respect’ - may seem unsatisfactory yet a further conclusion can be drawn which is helpful, for it seems indubitable that the distinction between a personal and an impersonal God lies not in the qualities of a God but in the relationship between God and man. This would support the earlier contention that ‘personhood’ was a concept applicable only in a context of possible relationship between two entities and is not applicable to an isolated entity itself.
Conclusion 10 - 8 : The distinction between a ‘personal’ and an ‘impersonal’ God lies in the existence or otherwise of a relationship based on the possibility of communication between man and God. However, whilst this interpretation is consistent with (T), it is not meaningful in relation to (U’).
(ii) The difference between treating an individual ‘as a person’ and ‘as an object’
Elizabeth Kübler-Ross discussed the practice of treating patients as objects;[cxvii] she has described the typical medical practice in relation to a severely ill patient as beginning by considering him as a ‘person with no right to an opinion’ [cxviii] and progressing to treating him as ‘an object’.[cxix] The treating of a patient ‘as an object’ does not suggest any lack of care on the doctor’s part; indeed, the physician may be acting from the most altruistic of motives - acting, as he sees it, solely in the ‘best interests’ of the patient. Where then does the objection lie?
Foot’s distinction between those moral obligations that flow from Justice and those that flow from Charity is helpful at this point as it shows that although a doctor who treats his patient as an object may well fulfil the obligations that flow from Charity - his interventions may be solely ‘for the sake of’ the patient - he neglects the obligations that flow from Justice. Thus, to suggest that a patient is being treated as an object does not imply that their welfare is being neglected but rather their rights are being ignored. The crucial point is that to treat a patient solely from the perspective of what is believed to be their ‘best interests’ is a denial of 'personhood' in that the requirements of Justice - which are not to intervene without consent - are ignored.
These issues are discussed by Paul Ramsey who sees ‘patient consent’ as the crucial component in the doctor-patient relationship and as being fundamental to the patient being treated ‘as a person’:
“The principle of an informed consent is a statement of the fidelity between the man who performs medical procedures and the man on whom they are performed. Other aspects of medical ethics ... treat the man as a purely passive subject or patient ... But any human being is more than a patient or experimental subject; he is a personal subject - every bit as much a man as the physician-investigator. Fidelity is between man and man in these procedures. Consent expresses or establishes this relationship, and the requirement of consent sustains it.” [cxx]
The obligation to desist from medical procedures in the absence of patient consent is not out of concern for the patient’s welfare - for the patient may not consent to the procedure and possibly suffer damage in consequence - but out of concern for the patient’s rights. However, the obligation to seek consent rests on an even more fundamental obligation which is the obligation to seek to communicate with the patient, for unless communication is attempted, questions of consent are otiose.
It is convenient at this point to draw some conclusions concerning patient rights:[cxxi]
Conclusion 10 - 9 : In taking health care decisions affecting a patient, the principal obligation imposed by the virtue of Justice is to attempt to communicate with the patient; this obligation overrides all obligations to the patient flowing from Charity.
Conclusion 10 - 10 : To take health care decisions for a patient without first attempting to communicate with the patient in order to determine their wishes, is in effect a denial of their 'personhood' and this is so even if all such decisions are taken solely on the basis of what is believed to be in the patient’s ‘best interests’.
The conclusion to be drawn in relation to linguistic usage is:
Conclusion 10 - 11 : In speaking of a carer treating a patient as ‘an object’ rather than as ‘a person’ what is being alluded to is the unwillingness of the carer to communicate with the patient and the refusal to recognise the patient’s rights. Thus, this usage is consistent with both (T) and (U’).
(iii) The
link between the terms ‘person’ and ‘persona’
Heinrich Zimmer, discussing what he calls ‘the mask of the personality’, contrasts the Western concept of personality with the Eastern:
"For the Western mind ... the personality is eternal. It is indestructible not to be dissolved. This is the basic idea in the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body ... The term ‘personality’ is derived from the Latin persona. Persona, literally, means the mask that is worn over the face by the actor on the Greek or Roman stage; the mask ‘through’ (per) which he ‘sounds’ (sonat) his part ... Originally the term persona in the sense of 'personality' must have implied that people are only impersonating what they seem to be.[ [cxxii] ] ... It is not a manifestation of his true nature, but a veil. And yet the Western outlook - which originated with the Greeks themselves and was then developed in Christian philosophy - has annulled the distinction, implied in the term, between the mask and the actor whose face it hides. The two have become, as it were, identical. When the play is over the persona cannot be taken off; ...” [cxxiii]
Indian philosophy, on the other hand:
“... insists upon the difference, stressing the distinction between the actor and the role. ... Indeed, one of the dominant endeavours of Indian thought throughout the ages has been to develop a dependable technique for keeping the line clear between the two.” [cxxiv]
Alan Watts takes up a similar theme in arguing that the term ‘person’ is used in the West to designate the basic spiritual reality of the human being:
“ ... [who] is said to have spiritual dignity because he is a person, as God is three Persons. But a person is strictly what one is as mask or role, at the social or conventional level. The word which should have been used for the ego is used for the self (atman) or spirit (pneuma), which in other traditions is supra-individual. Hence the Christian identification of the spirit with ego, and the inability to see that man is more than ego, ...” [cxxv]
This discussion may seem to be travelling down an esoteric path, yet an essay[cxxvi] by Kenneth Winkler entitled ‘Locke on Personal Identity’ reunites us with our earlier discussion. Winkler writing on Locke’s concept of a ‘person’ says:
“The suggestion that a person is a mixed mode[cxxvii] is not as far fetched as it may seem, because there was a long tradition, rooted in the ancient understanding of persona as a mask or guise, according to which persons are constructions - often social constructions - somehow placed on naturally occurring human beings.” [cxxviii]
Winkler quotes Law (a contemporary of Locke’s) as saying that the term 'person' stands for an attribute of a thinking intelligent being which, Law explained, was the sense in which Cicero used it as when he said:
“If on account of my actions you impose this person on my whole life, Torquatus, you are badly mistaken. Nature wished me to be compassionate: my country wished me to be firm; neither my country nor Nature wished me to be cruel; further, inclination and Nature itself have now drawn off the violent and harsh person [persona] which occasion and the state then imposed.” [cxxix]
Commenting on this passage, Winkler states:[cxxx]
“A role or guise, Cicero warns, is something imposed by human beings, acting individually or in concert, and is not to be confused with the human being on whom it is imposed. That human being might be several persons at once - he might that is occupy several roles or guises at the same time - and he might shake off a persona earlier imposed upon him.” [cxxxi]
In conclusion: the term ‘person’ when understood as ‘persona’ - i.e. possessor of a ‘social role’[cxxxii] - clearly implies an ability to communicate.[cxxxiii] This interpretation also helps explain why the terms ‘person’ and ‘bearer of rights’ have the same extension because, without participation in society, one is an ‘outcast’ or a ‘non-person’, and - as we shall see in the next sub-section - the mark of such an individual is that he is without rights.
Conclusion 10 - 12 : The usage of the term ‘person’ - when understood in the sense of ‘persona’ - is consistent with having an ability to communicate and with the possessing of rights i.e. with (T) and (U’).
(iv) The
term ‘non-person’[cxxxiv]
The aim of this subsection is to examine how the term ‘non-person’ is used in everyday speech particularly in relation to the concepts ‘worthy of respect’ and ‘ability to communicate’; the hope being that such an examination will help clarify the meaning of the term ‘person’. One difficulty which immediately arises is that the term ‘non-person’ is not in common use though some recent examples[cxxxv] of its use not only clearly link the term to loss of rights but also carry overtones of one who is being ignored or whose communications are being discounted. These perceptions are confirmed by the definition of ‘non-person’ contained in The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, which is of “A person regarded as non-existent or unimportant, or as having no rights; an ignored, humiliated, or forgotten person.” [cxxxvi] Because ‘non-person’ is not a term in common use, a more indirect strategy is required: remembering that our underlying goal is to examine the linguistic evidence for the implication ‘ ‘inability to communicate’ implies ‘unworthiness to bear rights’ ’ and that the term ‘non-person’ is, as it where, no more than a vehicle enabling this implication, let us look for linguistic evidence of the implication itself in contexts where the attribution of 'personhood' is doubtful. It is not to be expected that the assessment of ‘inability to communicate’ will necessarily be explicit; for example, the statement that some individuals are ‘just animals’ implies both that they have no rights and that communication with them would not be possible; an instance of such a usage is found in the correspondence of the novelist Charles Kingsley who when visiting Sligo in 1860, wrote of the native Irish:
“I am haunted by the human chimpanzees I saw along that hundred miles of horrible country. ... To see white chimpanzees is dreadful; if they were black, one would not feel it so much.” [cxxxvii]
Similar examples are legion: Bruce Chatwin mentions[cxxxviii] that the Indians in Patagonia were treated by the English as being of lesser worth than animals; the Kalahari bushmen were dismissed by General Smuts as ‘mentally stunted’ and as ‘desert animals’[cxxxix] and were hunted as game;[cxl] a fate which also befell the gypsies:
“In the past, gypsies could be placed on the rack or killed as fair game by huntsman. In several European countries heathen hunts - what were in effect ‘gypsy hunts’ - were still common down to the 18th century.” [cxli]
In yet more recent times the Nazi Germans considered the Slavs as being subhuman and treated them accordingly.[cxlii] This list could be continued indefinitely and is in danger of becoming a catalogue of man’s inhumanity to man. Whilst, doubtlessly, treating another ‘as an animal’ has implications for the rights of this other and for whether he is believed to be able to communicate, the link between possessing the ‘ability to communicate’ and being a ‘bearer of rights’ is in danger of being lost in the wealth of historical detail. A narrower focus is required; to this end only two examples will be considered; the first concerns the attitudes of the Greeks in classical times to those who could not speak their language and the second is more modern and concerns the attitudes adopted to those who have been reared outside society and who consequently have, at most, a very restricted ability to communicate. In discussing both examples the focus will be on the question of whether the inability to communicate implies a diminution of rights.
The attitude, in classical times, of the Greeks to foreigners
Justin Leiber, in discussing the attitudes of the ancient Greeks to other nations, says:
“Aristotle ... claimed that Persians and other non-Greeks were incapable of rationality and, therefore, were natural slaves.” [cxliii]
Leiber traces Aristotle’s opinions to the sense of awe felt by the Greeks towards their alphabet and language. To the Greeks, their language accorded them a natural preeminence; their alphabet was an ‘explosive invention, one stolen from the Gods, along with fire, by Prometheus’ ; [cxliv] other ‘languages’ being mindless noisemaking:
“Tradition has it that the ancient Greeks invented the word ‘barbarian,’ because they supposed non-Greeks were vocally restricted to mouthing ‘bah, bah’.” [cxlv]
Leiber discusses how Aristotle’s pupil Alexander did not accept his tutor’s views:
“He [Alexander] envisaged a brotherhood of man in which there should be neither Greek nor barbarian, ...[he believed that] a man was no longer just part of his city-state ... He is an individual bound by relations to the other individuals of the world.” [cxlvi]
Leiber uses Alexander’s views[cxlvii] as a step in his argument for taking the ‘ability to reply appropriately to what is said in one’s presence’ as being a criterion of 'personhood'; on reformulation, this becomes the ‘Turing Test’ and is discussed in Appendix F, Section 1.
Feral children and others without language
The 18th and 19th century saw many attempts to find criteria to distinguish between animals and humans. This problem was fundamental to the philosophies of Descartes, La Mettrie, Locke[cxlviii] and others; the scientific writings of such as Linnaeus added a further impetus to attempt its resolution. The cases of ‘feral children’ [cxlix] - that is children raised outside society, presumably by animals - was considered by many to offer the means both to enable the nature of the distinction between man and animals to be clarified, and many of the philosophical controversies of the day (such as, for example, the question of whether ideas were innate) to be resolved. La Mettrie, for example, argued that when such children were interrogated, no evidence was revealed for the existence of prior notions: “Where then”, he asked, “is this immortal share of divinity.” [cl] The most famous of these ‘feral children’ was known as ‘The Wild Boy of Aveyron’ and is the subject of a study by Harlan Lane.[cli] Much of Lane’s analysis concerns the validity of the judgement that the child - called Victor - was mentally retarded; Lane suggests that Victor may have been autistic - a condition not diagnosed until this century.
In looking at this example our goal is to see whether the inability to communicate traditionally led to a diminution of rights; it seems that, traditionally, ‘inability to communicate’ lead to a diagnosis of idiocy and it is incontrovertible that the labelling of an individual as ‘an idiot’ led to a loss of rights. However, this result is unsatisfying as introducing the idea of idiocy appears to be something of a distraction. Two insights - one due to Wittgenstein, one to Lane - show its relevance.
Wittgenstein argued that language ability might be crucial to thought;[clii] absence of language ability would thus appear to imply idiocy if that term is understood as inability to reason.[cliii] Wittgenstein’s arguments will be discussed in the Section 3 but the arguments are restricted to those who never learned a language. What of those who once learned a language but were by force of circumstance - such as social isolation or abandonment - unable to use it for a protracted length of time? Lane addresses this problem; he argues firstly, that the ability to learn language is dependant on the ability to imitate and that there is only a very narrow timespan in the life of a child within which the a child can - if presented with an appropriate social environment - grasp the opportunity to learn a language. Outside of this ‘window of opportunity’, language acquisition is unlikely. Lane’s second conclusion was that even if language ability has been acquired, it can be extinguished through disuse[cliv] and, if the critical period for language acquisition has passed, it cannot be easily reacquired. In support of his second conclusion Lane documents the other cases including that of a Californian girl who was kept in isolation tied to a chair and not released until she was fourteen years old. The example[clv] of most relevance to the situation of PVS patients is that of the Scottish sailor, Selkirk, who was the inspiration for Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. Lane describes Selkirk’s rescue: a Captain Rogers, landing at the island of Juan Fernandez in 1709, there found a sailor ‘as wild as the animals perhaps more so’, who had been put ashore as a punishment over four years earlier. By the time he was discovered he had “ ... ‘almost entirely forgotten the secret of articulating intelligible sounds ... If he had not had books, or if his exile had lasted two or three years more,’ he would have lost all ability to speak.” [clvi] The relevance of Lane’s conclusions to the not dissimilar problem of a PVS patient who is conscious but unable to communicate but who was once (before the advent of his condition) proficient in a language will be considered in Section 5.
The final example to be considered is that of John Merrick - known as ‘The Elephant Man’. This example is useful both because a first-hand account[clvii] of the doctor-patient relationship exists (written by Sir Frederick Treves, the doctor who first found and subsequently treated Merrick) and because certain parallels can be drawn between Treves’ initial attitude to Merrick and some of the attitudes which appear to be commonly adopted towards PVS patients by their physicians.
‘The Elephant Man’
Treves describes his first meeting with Merrick:
“The showman pulled back the curtain ... and speaking as if to a dog - called out harshly ‘Stand up!’ The thing arose slowly and let the blanket that covered its head and back fall to the ground. There stood revealed the most disgusting specimen of humanity that I have ever seen.” [clviii]
Merrick was ‘denied all means of escape from his tormentors’ and, had he shown himself in the streets, ‘he would have been mobbed by the crowd and seized by the police’. [clix]
That Merrick was not accorded ‘rights’ is clear. Could he, however, have been judged to be ‘a person’? Treves - in words redolent of the attitudes of many who discuss PVS patients but showing an acute self-knowledge - said:
“I supposed that Merrick was imbecile and had been imbecile from birth. The fact the his face was incapable of expression, that his speech was a mere spluttering and his attitude that of one whose mind was void of all emotions and concerns gave us ground for this belief. The conviction was no doubt encouraged by the hope that his intellect was the blank I imagined it to be. That he could appreciate his position was unthinkable.” [clx]
It was to be a number of years before Treves again encountered Merrick and the story of ‘The Elephant Man’ could unfold:
“It was not until I came to know that Merrick was highly intelligent, that he possessed an acute sensibility and - worse than all - a romantic imagination that I realised the overwhelming tragedy of his life. ... He had passed through the fire and come out unscathed. His troubles had ennobled him. ... He showed himself ... free from any trace of cynicism or resentment.” [clxi]
Crucial to this development was Treves’ attempt to establish communication with Merrick; but a precondition exists even for attempts at communication: Treves’ willingness to recognise that his judgement that Merrick’s intellect was a blank might be ‘a denial’ based on nothing other than a projection of Treves’ own discomfiture with the supposition that Merrick might be conscious of his situation.
Conclusions to Section 2
The aim of this section was to show - by considering some examples of the use of the term ‘person’ - the connection between it and the concepts of ‘ability to communicate’ and ‘bearer of rights’. The distinction between a personal and an impersonal God was found to support the link between ‘personhood’‘ and ‘ability to communicate’. The close link between ‘being a person’ and ‘possessing a persona’ also suggested that ‘personhood’ is a concept that cannot be understood outside a context of social interaction and, as such, implies an ability to communicate. Conversely, the refusal to recognise an ability to communicate, whether in treating a patient as an object, or, as in Aristotle’s case, treating the communication as meaningless has as a consequence, the treating of the other as a non-person and as lacking in rights. In short, excommunication entails a loss of rights.
Conclusion 10 - 13 : The usage of the term ‘non-person’ suggests an individual who is excommunicated from society and without rights; as such it is consistent with both (T) and (U’).
The examples given in the section on ‘non-persons’ - particularly the case of John Merrick - help explain why the connection between possessing an ‘ability to communicate’ and being a ‘bearer of rights’ occurs: in the absence of even rudimentary communication, it is difficult for empathy to get even a foothold; disgust and horror hold the centre-stage but - being unpleasant emotions - occasion as a response (as if by reflex reaction) the attempt to suppress the emotion or, if this is not possible, to remove the source - i.e. that which is causing the emotion to arise. But the urge to remove the source creates its own difficult emotion - guilt; this, in turn, is assuaged by ‘a denial’ - by protestations of one’s own disinterest and by asserting that what is proposed is ‘for the sake of’ the other. Many of these responses were evident in Treves original attitude to Merrick and they are no less evident in the current attitudes of many physicians towards PVS patients.[clxii] The key to resolving these difficulties - as Treves found - lies in attempting to establish communication; this opens the gate to compassion and it is only then that the terms ‘person’ and ‘rights’ can be anything other than empty rhetoric. The conclusion that I wish to draw here is that an initial ‘leap’ of empathy is required before communication is possible; this ‘leap’ is also a precondition for the according of moral value and rights;[clxiii] as a corollary, a refusal to make this leap entails that communication will not be attempted and neither rights nor moral value will be accorded.
Conclusion 10 - 14 : An initial leap of empathy is a precondition for seeing another as a fitting subject for possessing rights, for being an ‘Object of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ or for possessing the ability to communicate; this gesture of empathy is not a product of rational determination but flows from the adoption of an ‘attitude’. It is the gesture of ‘seeing oneself in another’ that enables ‘personhood’ to be conferred on that other; conversely, the refusal to ‘see oneself in that other’ precludes the attribution of ‘personhood’.[clxiv]
Section 3: Some philosophical authorities
for a ‘social definition’ of personhood
The aim of this section is to show that the concept of ‘personhood’ can be applied to an individual only if that individual has been previously involved in social interaction with others. It indicates that, amongst other things, certain minimal social capacities - in particular, the ability to communicate - have been achieved.[clxv] It cannot be applied to an individual who has been isolated from all social contact. In this it is similar to, for example, the concept of ‘sociability’. More specifically, the aim is to show that of the two concepts ‘the individual’ and ‘society’, (where ‘the individual’ is considered to mean a thinking - and therefore language-using[clxvi] - being) ‘society’ is, logically, the more fundamental.[clxvii]
In furtherance of this aim two arguments are advanced. The first is due to Wittgenstein and is essentially the argument known as the ‘Private Language Argument’ [‘PLA’ for short]. This is to the effect that the concept of an isolated thinking individual - as, for example, envisaged by Descartes in his Meditations - is incoherent.[clxviii]
The second argument is due to P.F.Strawson and is to the effect that the concept of ‘personhood’ is logically primitive and that mental concepts such as ‘consciousness’ must be defined in terms of it and not conversely:
“So the concept of the pure individual consciousness - the pure ego - is a concept that cannot exist; or, at least, cannot exist as a primary concept in term of which the concept of person can be explained or analysed.” [clxix]
Strawson also argues that the concept ‘person’ arises out of a process of mutuality between two individuals and cannot arise in relation to an isolated individual.
Many other arguments can be adduced in favour of the ‘social definition’ of personhood: Gellner’s has been mentioned previously[clxx] and those of Jaspers,[clxxi] Sartre,[clxxii] Herbert Mead[clxxiii] Quassim Cassam[clxxiv] and John Mac Murray[clxxv] should be noted; however, for reasons of space, these will not be considered in this thesis.
We turn first to a consideration of Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument’; then Strawson’s arguments will be considered and finally some conclusions will be drawn.
Wittgenstein and the ‘Private Language
Argument’
Introduction
Descartes, in his Mediations, set himself the task of finding secure foundations upon which to build his philosophy; his method was that of universal doubt:[clxxvi]
“I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false; I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me. I consider that I possess no senses; I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement and place are but the fictions of my mind. What, then, can be esteemed as true? Perhaps nothing at all, unless that there is nothing in the world that is certain.” [clxxvii]
But there is one proposition that, he finds, he cannot doubt:
“I find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist, that is certain. ... I am, however, a real thing and really exist; but what thing? I have answered: a thing which thinks.” [clxxviii]
This is the famous ‘cogito’ argument. This argument is best understood not as an exercise in deductive logic, but experientially in the sense that in the act of thinking, I cannot doubt that I am thinking because to do that would itself be thinking.
The belief that there are areas of ‘subjective self-certainty’ [clxxix] upon which philosophy can be constructed is not confined to Descartes; it has been the unquestioned assumption of much of modern philosophy.[clxxx] The belief that sensations, such as pain, are incorrigible, known only to the subject, is one example of such beliefs. However, many philosophers - Descartes included[clxxxi] - went further and believed, not only that sensations were private but that it was possible for the subject to philosophise about these sensations and to do so in an essentially private way. Marie McGinn discusses how William James, believing that the gateway to knowledge of psychological states was through introspection, thought that the nuances of these states might be lost or distorted if described in ordinary everyday language. James believed that a ‘pure language of subjectivity’- whose terms could be defined entirely on the basis of introspection - was required.[clxxxii] Stewart Candlish describes how Bertrand Russell believed it to be theoretically possible to construct a ‘logically perfect language’ in which ‘there will be one word and no more for every simple object’ and which:
“... would be very largely private to one speaker. That is to say, all the names that it would use would be private to that speaker and could not enter the language of another speaker.” [clxxxiii]
Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument’ was a response to the assumptions
implicit in such arguments.
Wittgenstein had noted how, in discussions of mental processes,:
“The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. ...[and that as a result] The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.” [clxxxiv]
The decisive, and innocent, assumption in Descartes’ line of reasoning - and in James’s and Russell’s - was that an isolated individual could create a language within which thoughts (and doubts!) could be expressed. Wittgenstein argued - in his ‘Private Language Argument’ - that that assumption is incoherent.
The ‘Private Language Argument’
The ‘PLA’ is the most discussed aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.[clxxxv] The argument is also a source of controversy,[clxxxvi] not only are there differing views on its validity and implications but there is even a dispute as to the precise statement of the argument.[clxxxvii] In this discussion only a brief outline of the argument will be given and the focus will be on the application of the argument to the question of whether an individual, solitary from birth, could develop a private language. This is the so-called ‘Robinson Crusoe’ thought experiment. First, however, it is necessary to explain what is meant by a ‘private language’.
Wittgenstein first asks us to “... imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - for his private use.” [clxxxviii] He then continues:
“Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.” [clxxxix]
Wittgenstein’s thesis is that such a language is impossible.[cxc] The reasons[cxci] offered in support of this contention are:
(i) Wittgenstein considers the notion that experiences are private to be fundamentally flawed,
(ii) Wittgenstein argues that a language cannot be learned simply by bare ostensive definition, i.e. a process of ‘pointing’, whether ‘inner’ or outer, is not sufficient. Some public component of interactive training is essential.
However, these are not the points that are normally taken to constitute the ‘PLA’ - though they may well be sufficient to establish it; the ‘PLA’ is usually understood to refer to a much narrower question, namely how, in such a private language, a word could be said to refer to a sensation. To bring the discussion into even greater focus, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine that:
“I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign ‘S’ and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.” [cxcii]
The problem that Wittgenstein has set is whether a sensation could be named. Just before discussing this question, he has noted that even if it could be so named, we could not use this name as we would have no grammar for it’s use - we would not have any context in which it could be placed - because the grammar “... shews the post where the new word is stationed.” [cxciii] Noting, but not pursuing, this objection he then returns to the question of whether the sensation could in fact be named. In discussing this he uses the rhetorical device of subjecting himself to interrogation. He asks ‘How might this be done?’ (remembering, of course, that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated in language.)[cxciv] He replies:
“ ... I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation - and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.” [cxcv]
But what, he asks, is the point of this procedure? Surely, he replies, it is to define the sign because it allows me to “... impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation.” [cxcvi] But what, he asks, is the point of this impressing on myself? It is, he replies, so that I remember it right in the future. Then follows the crucial step:
“But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness.” [cxcvii]
This has often been understood as implying a scepticism about memory: that is, that in using ‘S’ a second time I am not sure whether I am using it in exactly the same way that I used it the first time. Because such memory scepticism is also a problem in public languages, this suggests that the ‘PLA’ is trivial. Most commentators[cxcviii] stress the importance of not interpreting the argument in this fashion. To explain this more clearly, it is first necessary to retrace our steps somewhat and see what Wittgenstein means by the terms ‘language’ and ‘rule’: Wittgenstein argues that that which distinguishes language from mere noise or squiggles on paper is that language uses names in accordance with an implicit or explicit rule by means of which we can tell whether names which seem to be the same are in fact the same.[cxcix]
To return to the problem of naming a sensation ‘S’: in wondering whether, in using ‘S’ a second time, I am not sure whether I am using it in exactly the same way that I used it the first time, three problems - and not just one - are actually involved
1. Could the original correlation between ‘S’ and the sensation have been established?
2. Can, at a later time, this correlation be accessed theoretically? - i.e. being unconcerned with possible errors that may manifest whilst accessing the correlation.
3. Can, at a later time, this correlation be accessed practically? - i.e. is the method of retrieval so error prone as to be of little use?
Of these three questions, only the third concerns the unreliability of memory.
Fogelin is particularly insightful on one aspect of the first of these questions. He notes[cc] that if we glibly assume that we can use the letter ‘S’ as the name of a private sensation we forget that the concepts of ‘name’ and 'sensation' must be established.[cci]
“We enter”, he says, “the world of a private language semantically naked ... We cannot simply borrow logical features from the public language, ...” [ccii]
Fogelin concludes that this does not establish the impossibility of a private language, it only indicates the difficulty involved in its construction. Kenny, however, seems to see the first problem as of crucial significance:
“Wittgenstein is not arguing ‘When next I call something ‘S’ how will I know it really is S?’ He is arguing ‘When next I call something ‘S’ how will I know what I mean by ‘S’?’ Even to think falsely that something is S I must know the meaning of ‘S’; and this is what Wittgenstein argues is impossible in the private language.” [cciii]
Though this passage might appear to concern only the first problem, this appearance is mistaken. It does in fact involve the second problem, because in discussing the ‘meaning’ of ‘S’ the term ‘meaning’ necessarily imports ideas of consistency and checkability. In turn, this presumes possible recurrences of ‘S’. Next, though the first use of ‘S’ is as a definition, subsequent uses of ‘S’ are propositions. It is a characteristic of a proposition that it is either ‘true’ or ‘false’. The truth or falsity of a proposition containing ‘S’ cannot be established unless ‘S’ has a meaning. So it is clear that the problem of the meaning of a term is intimately connected with its possible recurrence. Let us attempt to make this discussion more concrete:
* A sensation arises. I concentrate on it and decide to call it ‘S’.
* Later, a further sensation arises. A memory - M1 - of a previous sensation arises as does the memory - M2 - that I had called this sensation ‘S’. In relation to the original sensation the memory M2 contains no more information than M1.[cciv] Thus, all the memory of the original sensation is contained in M2 .
* Next, I wonder could this new (?) sensation be the same as the sensation which I originally called ‘S’. This ‘wondering’ necessarily brought to mind [is?] the original memory M2 .
* How can I now check whether the sensations are the same or different?[ccv]
* The only tool that I have to check whether they are they same, or not, is the memory M2 . There is no independent, or even additional, criterion available.
Wittgenstein, in a memorable simile, says that to attempt to appeal to M2 for confirmation for that which appeared to be the case (which was itself suggested by M2 ) was:
“As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true.” [ccvi]
The conclusion of this argument is that, because there is no public or independent criterion to determine the truth of falsity of a proposition concerning ‘S’, therefore ‘S’ has no meaning.
Fogelin, however, distinguishes two forms
of the ‘PLA’: the first he calls the ‘public check argument’ and the second,
the ‘training argument’.
The ‘training argument’ is to the effect that as ‘a brute fact of human nature’ humans can in fact not teach themselves a language - i.e. that “... there are no linguistic self-starters.” [ccvii] The conclusion he draws is that Wittgenstein’s reflections show the contingent impossibility of a private language.
The ‘public check argument’ is to the effect that it is necessary to have a method of distinguishing between ‘following a rule’ and ‘thinking one is following a rule’. This is essentially the form of the argument that was given earlier; Fogelin believes this form of the argument to be unconvincing. He argues that the distinction between ‘following a rule’ and ‘thinking one is following a rule’ is not valid because, in the last analysis, ‘following a rule’ reduces to ‘thinking one is following a rule’. The phrase ‘in the last analysis’ means that the test for ‘following a rule’ is always the existence of a consensus in some group who ‘believe that they are following a rule’; to the group ‘following a rule’ and ‘believing that they are following a rule’ are indistinguishable. For example, the rule ‘2+2=4’ is a rule of mathematics because there is a consensus amongst mathematicians that it is so. Fogelin argues that if ‘thinking one is following a rule’ is indistinguishable from ‘following a rule’ in the case of a group then why not so in the case of an individual.[ccviii] Fogelin’s argument is not well founded; a counter-argument can readily be constructed from an analysis of the use of a term such as 'irrational'.[ccix]
Accepting Wittgenstein’s argument that a private language is incoherent what conclusions can be drawn about an individual who was solitary form birth and who was thus unable to acquire a language socially? Could such an individual develop a language of his own? What could one say of the intellectual life of such an individual? This problem is known as the ‘Robinson Crusoe’ problem.
The ‘Robinson Crusoe’ Problem
Candlish accepts the validity of the ‘PLA’ but does not accept that it implies that Crusoe is unable to construct a private language:[ccx]
“Such a Crusoe, unlike a private linguist, lives in a world independent of his impressions of it and thus there could be definite occurrences in it which he could remember or forget; and some of those occurrences could be correlations of signs with objects.” [ccxi]
This seems to fundamentally misconstrue the ‘PLA’: the ‘PLA’ concerned the impossibility of naming sensations. Wittgenstein explicitly discusses[ccxii] the possibility of linking the sensation to the symbol ‘S’, and in turn to some public ‘manifestation’ of the sensation,[ccxiii] so that some correlation might be established as in the following diagram:
[sensation] « ‘S’ « [blood pressure reading]
Wittgenstein argues that in this correlation, the sensation itself becomes utterly irrelevant[ccxiv] - it is like the beetle in the closed box[ccxv] - and what is left is simply:
‘S’ « [blood pressure reading]
In Kenny’s words:
“... ‘S’ is not the name of a private object but a word in a public language.” [ccxvi]
Thus, the ‘PLA’ does not imply the impossibility of an isolated being naming ‘public’ phenomenon - i.e. movements of meter needles or of any object - but of naming private phenomena. Candlish assumes[ccxvii] that the possibility of a Crusoe naming public (i.e. external) phenomena implies that he could construct a private language. Let us assume that Crusoe could name certain objects. Does this imply the ability to create a private language? First consider a simpler question. Does the ability to name external objects imply the ability to lay down, and follow, a rule?
Is Crusoe able to follow a rule?
There is no problem in assuming that our Crusoe can distinguish between a bird and an animal;[ccxviii] both are food and he may indeed have a preference for one rather than the other. Suppose that, by drawing on the sand with a stick, he constructs a table (as in Table 10-2) so that he can keep a record of his hunting successes:
|
animal |
symbol |
|
õ |
S |
|
ÿ |
R |
Table 10-2: Crusoe’s hunting ‘dictionary.’
Next day he catches a bird and wishes to write down the symbol for it in his hunting record. He thinks that the appropriate symbol is an ‘S’. Can he confirm this? Surely he can go to his table in the sand and compare the animal to the pictures that he has drawn? Thus, he can independently verify that his use of ‘S’ is correct. But is this not an example of a solitary individual following a rule, and does this not invalidate the ‘PLA’ ?
Norman Malcolm seems to believe that such rule-following by an isolated individual cannot occur:
“If you conceive of an individual who has been in solitude his whole life long, then you have cut away the background of instruction, corrections , acceptance - in short, the circumstances in which a rule is given, enforced, and followed.” [ccxix]
Saul Kripke’s seems the better view:
“Does this mean that Robinson Crusoe, isolated on an island, cannot be said to follow any rules, no matter what he does? I do not see that this follows. ... The falsity of the private model need not mean that a physically isolated individual cannot be said to follow rules; rather that an individual, considered in isolation (whether or not he is physically isolated), cannot be said to do so.” [ccxx]
Concluding then that our Crusoe can be said to follow certain rules, can he be said to have a language?
Can Crusoe have a private language?
We have concluded that Crusoe can name external objects and that he can independently verify his use of these names; is this sufficient to be considered a language?
Wittgenstein thinks not:
“Naming is so far not a move in the language game - any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except in a language-game.” [ccxxi]
Wittgenstein considers an example:
“William James, in order to shew that thought is possible without speech, quotes the recollection of a deaf mute, Mr. Ballard, who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had thoughts about God and the world. - What can he have meant? ... Are you sure - one would like to ask - that this is the correct translation of your wordless thoughts into words? ... Do I want to say that the writer’s memory deceives him? I don’t know if I should say that. These recollections are a queer memory phenomenon, ...” [ccxxii]
Wittgenstein’s scepticism relates not to the possibility of Mr. Ballard naming, for example, ‘the world’ but to his having ‘thoughts’ about God and the world.[ccxxiii] This raises the possibility of an ambiguity in the use of the term ‘to think’. Certainly, to recognise and manipulate symbols could be said to be thinking but it would be a peculiarly impoverished form of thought. A monkey, for example, might be trained to press a button with the symbol for a banana, and thereby get a banana. This might be done with other fruit so that one might even imagine a table linking fruit symbols and the appropriate buttons but could this be called the beginnings of language? Does it manifest thought? To use names - even to invent names - is not what is usually meant by thought. Thought as spoken of by Locke and Descartes, for example, relates to conceptual thought. Wittgenstein’s point (in the quotations above) is that conceptual thought - unlike naming - requires language and this language - as distinct from naming - cannot be generated by an isolated individual.
Rush Rhees in his essay ‘Can there be a private language?’[ccxxiv] provides an insightful discussion on these points. Rhees argues there is a common substratum between humans which is the very precondition for language. Language is the expression of this common humanity which only becomes manifest through social interaction:
“The agreement ... is something without which it would not be possible for people to 'see' that their reactions tallied or that anything else tallied. We see that we understand one another, without noticing whether our reactions tally or not. Because we agree in our reactions, it is possible for me to tell you something, and it is possible for you to teach me something.” [ccxxv]
Rhees distinguishes the language that arises from our shared human commonality from the use of - or invention of - marks to denote objects. This latter he compares to a dog running to get my slippers when I call out ‘slippers’.[ccxxvi]
“A bull may charge at a red flag, and rats may be trained to react in one way to red lights ... but neither the bull nor the rat knows what red is, and neither knows that this is red. We might put this by saying that neither of them has the concept 'red' and neither of them has the concept 'colour'. ... If I have the concept, I know how the word 'red' is used. There must be a use, though; there must be what I have been calling common reactions.” [ccxxvii]
Thus, any ‘concept’ - unlike a name - is irremediably embedded in the social use of language. Its ‘meaning’ is its ‘use’ or its ‘grammar’ and this can only become manifest through social interaction. Language is no more related to the noises or marks made by an isolated individual than is conversation, to an echo.
Rhees had been involved in a famous debate with A. J. Ayer on the ‘Private Language Argument’. Ayer had asked as to why, if Crusoe could keep a diary when Friday was present, could he not have kept one when he was alone? Furthermore, why could he not just have invented names for his sensations? Rhees responded:
“Ayer asks why Crusoe should not invent names for his sensations. ... It is possible, certainly, to invent new expressions, ... But it is a different question whether anyone could have invented language. ... The point is that no one could invent just language. Language goes with a way of living. An invented language would be a wallpaper pattern; nothing more. ... A man might invent marks to go with various objects. That is not language. And when Ayer’s Crusoe invents names to describe flora and fauna he is taking over more than he had invented. ... Defoe’s Crusoe could have kept a diary, but Ayer’s could not . .[Defoe’s Crusoe] knows what he is talking about. Ayer’s Crusoe does not and cannot. Ayer’s Crusoe may use marks for particular purposes - to show where he has hidden something, perhaps - and with as great regularity as we care to think. ... But so long as [Crusoe] never has learned a language, in the sense of taking part in a language, it is as meaningless to say of him that he follows words as it would be to say this of an electronic computor.” [ccxxviii]
Conclusions: Wittgenstein
The imaginary Robinson Crusoe, being an intelligent creature, could doubtlessly name objects and manipulate symbols but, because he lacked that background in language which enables the generation of concepts, he would not possess the ability to think conceptually. In particular, though he might experience his own self, he would not have the concept of self or of self-awareness. Could such a being be considered to be a ‘person’?
Descartes, in distinguishing between man and the animals, considered man to be a ‘thinking thing’ - this, clearly, in the sense of being able to think conceptually. Locke, similarly, considered the ability to think conceptually as a precondition for being a person. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a criterion for personhood which might be less onerous than the ability to think conceptually. However, if such an ability is considered to be a necessary condition for personhood then the ‘PLA’ implies that previous social interaction - to the extent necessary to learn language - is also a necessary condition for personhood.[ccxxix] This, in turn, implies that the ability to communicate is a necessary condition for personhood.
Conclusion 10 - 15 : Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument’ implies that an individual’s ability to think conceptually has as a precondition that that individual had, at some earlier stage, an ability to communicate which he did in fact exercise.
Strawson
P. F. Strawson begins his analysis of the concept ‘person’ [ccxxx] by reviewing Wittgenstein’s treatment of the term ‘I’. Wittgenstein had argued that the use of the term 'I' in the proposition:
P1: “I have a toothache.”
is radically different from its use in:
P2: “I have a bad tooth.” [ccxxxi]
Grammatically speaking, both propositions have a subject; Wittgenstein, however, had argued that, though in the second case this grammatical structure mirrors the underlying structure of what was in fact being asserted, in the first case the underlying structure is misrepresented by the grammatical structure. Wittgenstein argued, that if the grammatical structure of the proposition ‘I have a toothache’ was taken to imply that there was an 'owner' of the toothache, considerable philosophical confusion would result.[ccxxxii] An informal distinction can be drawn between the use of the term ‘I’ in both propositions. In P2 the term ‘I’ refers to the ‘outer I’ or body of the individual, its use in P2 is no different from its use in, for example, the proposition “I have a matchbox.” In P1, in contrast, the term ‘I’ is taken to refer to the ‘inner I’ or ‘soul’ or ‘subject of experience’; Wittgenstein disputes the existence of such an ‘inner I':
“The thinking, presenting subject - there is no such thing. ... In an important sense there is no subject.” [ccxxxiii]
This problem can be considered as a special case of a problem which has been central to modern philosophy, namely, how to relate ‘states of consciousness’ to material objects.[ccxxxiv] Strawson considers that Wittgenstein exemplifies (what Strawson terms) ‘the no-ownership theory’ which is that states of consciousness do not, strictly speaking, belong to the person who has them.
Strawson contrasts Wittgenstein’s position with Descartes’; Descartes (in Strawson’s words) held that:
“When we speak of a person, we are really referring to one or both of two distinct substances (two substances of different types), each of which has its own appropriate type of states and properties; and none of the properties or states of either can be a property or state of the other. States of consciousness belong to one of these substances and not to the other.” [ccxxxv]
Thus, if a Cartesian perspective is adopted, the proposition “I have a toothache” implies that there is a subject of experience - the thinking or soul substance ‘Isoul ‘ - who ‘owns’ or has the experience of pain - and there is also a body substance ‘Ibody’, who ‘owns’ the tooth and to whom the physical characteristics of having a toothache are ascribed.
Strawson argues that the ‘no-ownership theory’ is incoherent. His argument is beautifully simple; it is that to attribute experiences to the ‘Ibody’, I must only attribute my experiences, not everybody’s. But in order to attribute just my experiences I am forced to concede an ownership of experiences i.e. an ‘Isoul’. [ccxxxvi] Descartes’ theory is - to Strawson - equally problematic because it cannot adequately explain the link between ‘Isoul ‘ and ‘Ibody’ - why this particular experience should be connected to this particular body - nor can it explain why states of consciousness should be ascribed to anything at all.[ccxxxvii] Furthermore, because Cartesian experiences belong to a private ego a further difficulty is occasioned. Passmore describes it thus:
“If states of consciousness are wholly private there is no possible way in which we could ascribe them to anybody but ourselves ... It would, indeed, be impossible to ascribe them even to ourselves, since ‘there is no sense in the idea of ascribing states of consciousness to oneself unless the ascriber already knows how to ascribe at least some states of consciousness to others’.” [ccxxxviii]
Strawson is led to conclude that:
“...
both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in
holding, as each must, that there are two uses of ‘I’, in one of which it
denotes something which it does not in the other.” [ccxxxix]
and that:
“So
the facts in question do not explain the use that we make of the word ‘I’, or
how any word has the use that word has.
They do not explain the concept we have of a person.” [ccxl]
Strawson’s solution
Strawson sees the problems in both Wittgenstein’s and Descartes’ accounts of the relationship between the ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’ as flowing inexorably from the metaphysic underlying their philosophies. This metaphysic is explicitly set forth by Descartes in his theory of two substances and implicitly in Wittgenstein with a paradoxical:
“... dualism of one subject - the body - and one non-subject.” [ccxli]
This dualistic metaphysic inexorably leads to the problem of how the mental and the physical substances are related and why they find expression as a unity in an individual subject or ‘person’.[ccxlii] This problem can only arise if both the categories - i.e. mental and physical - are conceived of as being logically primitive in the sense that no more primitive term exists by means of which the relationship between mental and physical can be explained.
Strawson cuts this Gordian knot by taking as the ‘basic particulars’ [ccxliii] - not material and spiritual ‘substances’ - but ‘material objects’ and ‘persons’.[ccxliv] A ‘person’, he argues, must be taken, not as a compound of body and mind but, as a single particular. To Strawson, the concept of person is logically primitive, by which he means that mental terms, such as consciousness, must be explained in terms of it, and not conversely:[ccxlv]
“So the concept of the pure individual consciousness - the pure ego - is a concept that cannot exist; or, at least, cannot exist as a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be explained or analysed. It can only exist, if at all, as a secondary nonprimitive concept, which itself is to be explained, analysed, in terms of the concept of a person.” [ccxlvi]
Strawson conceives of ‘basic particulars’ as entities which:
“ ... could be identified and reidentified without reference to particulars of other types or categories than their own,” [ccxlvii]
Other, second order, particulars are identified in terms of these basic particulars. As just mentioned, Strawson argues that there are two types of ‘basic particulars’ - ‘material objects’ and ‘persons’. ‘Material objects’ are categorised by the fact that we only ascribe material object predicates - ‘M-predicates’ - to them; ‘M-predicates’ are predicates of the form ‘... weighs x kilo’ or ‘... is 5 meters long’. Person predicates - ‘P-predicates’ - are predicates of the form ‘... is in pain’ or ‘... is going for a holiday’. Persons are categorised by the fact that we ascribe both M-predicates and P-predicates to them. Not all P-predicates ascribe states of consciousness e.g. ‘... going for a walk’,[ccxlviii] however:
“[P-predicates] may be said to have this in common, that they imply the possession of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed.” [ccxlix]
Strawson argues that P-predicates arise from a process of mutual observation between individuals and not solely from some introspective process. The meaning of P-predicates rests on the linking of both a personal introspective element and an observation of the behaviour of others:[ccl]
“To learn their use is to learn both aspects of their use. In order to have this type of concept, one must be both a self-ascriber and an other-ascriber of such predicates, and must see every other as a self-ascriber.” [ccli]
As an example, Strawson considers the concept of depression; this discussion is summarised succinctly by Passmore:
“Exactly the same concept - e.g. the concept of being depressed - covers the depression which X feels but does not observe and the depression which persons other than X observe but do not feel. To deny this, Strawson argues, is ‘to refuse to accept the structure of the language in which we talk about depression’.” [cclii]
Let us next turn to the implications that may be drawn from Strawson’s analysis both as regards (T) and the more concrete problem of judgements of PVS patient consciousness.
Strawson: some implications
Proposition (T)
According to Strawson, the ascription of personhood is possible only:
“... because I am a person amongst others; ...” [ccliii]
Thus, social interaction is a precondition for the very emergence of the concept of ‘person’. Strawson’s concept of ‘person’ is best understood as arising from the interaction of two individuals when each ‘sees himself’ in the other. It is a concept grounded in, and arising from, empathy. The mutual ascription of ‘personhood’ is nothing other than the recognition of a deep commonality between individuals. An immediate implication of this is that personhood is not a concept ascribable by an isolated individual to himself. Descartes’ isolated subject[ccliv] can no more say of himself that he is a ‘person’ than he can say that he is gregarious. The existence of a social community is a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood. Given, however, such a social community, can the term personhood be ascribed to an individual isolated from that community?
Imagine a Robinson Crusoe figure isolated on an island but observed by others on a neighbouring, but distant, island. They observe Crusoe through a telescope but he, being without such an instrument, is not in a position to even know of the existence of his neighbours.[cclv] These neighbours form a social community and can ascribe the term ‘person’ as between themselves. One such person - Daniel - observes Crusoe. Can Daniel describe Crusoe as possessing consciousness? Can he ascribe ‘personhood’ to Crusoe?
Let us assume that Daniel has no means of communication with Crusoe but can observe his daily activity. Let us further assume that the image that Daniel sees is so unclear that he cannot discern Crusoe’s features or be sure whether he is man or beast. He can, however, distinguish his actions. The question of the personhood of Crusoe reduces - in Strawson’s view - to whether Daniel would use P-predicates or M-predicates to describe Crusoe; the answer to this question necessarily resolves the question of Crusoe’s consciousness.[cclvi]
Daniel, let us imagine, is quite impressed with Crusoe’s skill in hunting and fishing, so much so that he describes Crusoe’s activities as intentional or purposive. Within Strawson’s scheme M-predicates would be inappropriate, hence Daniel would conclude that Crusoe was a person. This might suggest that personhood could be ascribed in the absence of ability to communicate, thus negating (T).
This conclusion, however, is premature. Intentional activity is not the sole prerogative of persons, it is found amongst animals.[cclvii] Daniel Dennett considers the example of the hunter stalking a tiger, and considering what he would do if he were the tiger.[cclviii] Unfortunately, Strawson in considering only P- and M-predicates, has restricted himself to an oversimplified schema.[cclix] A hierarchy of predicate types is required including possibly A-predicates (animal type predicates) and PL-predicates (plant type predicates)[cclx] We must conclude that Strawson’s analysis, in terms of P- and M-predicates, is not of a sufficient subtlety to permit ‘intentionality’ to be precisely located in his schema and, accordingly, does not permit the personhood of Crusoe to be determined. Dennett, however, offers a way forward from this impasse.
Dennett’s ‘Intentional Stance’ (cont.) [cclxi]
Dennett - having outlined his theory of stances and distinguished three types of stance: a ‘design stance’, a ‘physical stance’ and an ‘intentional stance’ - asks whether a fourth type of stance, a ‘personal stance’ i.e. a stance adopted towards another which regards them as being a ‘person’, is required. Dennett argues that the ‘personal stance’ is not an independent stance but can be defined as a subtype of intentional stance. Two questions are of interest:
(i) What is a ‘personal stance’?
(ii) What are the criteria for adopting the ‘personal stance’?
The ‘Personal stance’
Dennett compares[cclxii] his theory of stances to a distinction suggested by MacKay between those systems which have a ‘personal aspect’ and those with a ‘mechanical aspect’, and to one suggested by Strawson who contrasts ‘participation in a human relationship’ with having an ‘objective attitude’ towards another.[cclxiii] Dennett argues that both MacKay and Strawson draw conclusions of an ethical nature from an adoption of a ‘personal stance’ which, to Dennett, are premature; he suggests that they are ‘conflating two choices into one’ by equating the choice of intentional stance with the choice of moral stance. Dennett argues that further confusion is caused if one makes:
“... communicating with a system the hallmark of intentionality or rationality ... Communication, then is not a separable and higher stance one may choose to adopt towards something, but a type of interaction one may attempt within the intentional stance. ... It is all too easy, however, to see interpersonal, convention-dependent communication as the mark of the intentional ...” [cclxiv]
Dennett seeks to resolve these problems by re-examining the meaning of the term ‘personal stance’; he argues that such a stance is not an independent category but is a subcategory of the intentional stance and that it is categorised by the existence of an ability to communicate.[cclxv] He argues, furthermore, that an ‘ability to communicate’ is the criterion for being admitted into the moral community - i.e. for being an ‘Object of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ in the terminology adopted earlier in this thesis.[cclxvi] If Dennett’s elaboration of intention is incorporated into Strawson’s analysis then the following conclusion can be drawn:
Conclusion 10 - 16 : Strawson’s arguments (as elaborated by Dennett) are to the effect that imputing intentionality to a system is not, of itself, sufficient to permit 'personhood' to be attributed to the system; an ability to communicate is also necessary.
Hence, Strawson’s theory, as elaborated by Dennett, implies (T). Before examining the criteria for adopting the ‘personal stance’, let us first revisit the Crusoe example discussed earlier.
Crusoe (and PVS) revisited with the help of Strawson and Dennett
In our earlier thought experiment, we imagined Daniel observing Crusoe from a neighbouring island and we asked whether Daniel could ascribe 'personhood' to Crusoe; we assumed Crusoe’s actions to be of such a complexity (e.g. hunting and fishing) that the ‘intentional stance’ was the obvious stance to adopt. This, as we have just seen is not, of itself, sufficient to justify an attribution of 'personhood' - communication must first be established.
Let us now assume that Crusoe’s actions are of an altogether more limited nature so that an intentional stance is not an obvious choice. In such circumstances Crusoe’s position - as regards attribution of consciousness and personhood - is not unlike that of a PVS patient. Let us call paradigm actions of a physical system ‘reflexP actions’, and those of an intentional system ‘intentional actions’. This will allow us to revisit the earlier discussion[cclxvii] of PVS patient consciousness where the distinction between the medical usage of the term ‘reflex’ - ‘reflexM’ - was distinguished from its use in relation to a physical system - ‘reflexP’. As noted in Chapter 2, there is a class of human actions which are unambiguously reflex (i.e. both ‘reflexP’ and ‘reflexM’) - the ‘tendon jerk’ is one such because it is a mechanical system where the full movement of the jerk is (theoretically) predictable. There are, however, many other responses - particularly as seen in PVS patients where eye-tracking movements and the ‘pulling away from’ painful stimuli are common - which are often described medically as reflex actions (i.e. ‘reflexM’); these actions, however, have a degree of complexity such that, if they are considered simply to be the response of a physical system,[cclxviii] they cannot be (theoretically) predicted. They can, however, be much more readily understood as intentional actions. How should this dilemma be best resolved? Is there good reason to adhere to the prevailing medical system? The differing approaches can be summarised[cclxix] in tabular form (see Table 10-3):
|
PVS patients |
The Medical
Model |
The Dennett /
Strawson Model |
|
Are all actions reflex? |
All actions are
‘reflexM’. |
Dennett: Some actions
are ‘reflexP’ and some actions are ‘intentional’; this implies
that the intentional stance be adopted. Strawson: P-predicates
are appropriate. |
|
Is consciousness present? |
The judgement
that all actions are ‘reflexM’ implies that consciousness is not
present. |
Dennett: The adoption of
the intentional stance implies that consciousness is present. Strawson: The application of
P-predicates implies that consciousness is present. |
|
Is a decision on personhood justified? |
Yes
(though medical discussion of personhood is seldom explicit). |
No - there is a need for
further investigation to determine if communication is possible. |
|
Is personhood to be attributed ? |
Personhood is
not present. |
(ditto) |
|
Is further investigation required as to whether
communication is possible? |
No - the ability
to communicate is excluded on a priori
grounds by the presumed lack of consciousness. |
Yes. |
|
What conclusion can be drawn
from the lack of ability to communicate? |
(ditto) |
Personhood is
not present; Dennett: no moral
obligations exist towards the patient. |
Table
10-3: Contrasting implications to be drawn from the presence of ‘reflexM’ responses.
Dennett’s point that the stance to be adopted is not one to be discovered by an examination of the internal workings of the system is crucial at this juncture; let us examine this in more detail.
Some preconditions for adopting the ‘personal stance’
According to Dennett:
“Of central importance in MacKay’s account in his remarking that the choice of stance is ‘up to us’, a matter of decision not discovery.” [cclxx]
This implies that when faced with ‘ambiguous’ responses to a stimulus (i.e. ‘reflexM’ but not ‘reflexP’ responses) one must first choose whether to regard the system as an intentional system (i.e. a person[cclxxi]) or as a mechanical system (i.e. an object). Once this choice is made then the conclusion as to whether the system possesses consciousness necessarily follows.[cclxxii] The situation is similar in respect of attributing 'personhood':
“ ... .it is not the case that once we have established the objective fact that something is a person, we treat him or her or it in a certain way, but that our treating him or her or it in this certain way is somehow and to some extent constitutive of its being a person.” [cclxxiii]
The great advantage of Dennett’s approach is that it brings the ethical nature of decisions on personhood to centre stage; it removes the veil of pseudo-science surrounding such decisions and it highlights the necessity of attempting to establish communication. The medical model, in contrast, attempts to justify the assertion that consciousness (and by implication 'personhood') is lacking by means of an internal examination[cclxxiv] of the system which determines whether the responses are ‘reflexM‘ or ‘intentional’. This ensures that the moral content of the decision to treat the patient as ‘a person’ or as ‘an object’ - the implicit conclusion following a determination that a PVS patient permanently lacks consciousness - is masked by the erroneous assumption that the question can be resolved by means of a scientific investigation.
A precondition for the attribution of 'personhood'
The nature of judgements which seek to attribute consciousness to PVS patients can be further analysed, first by using aspects of Dennett’s analysis and then by considering some remarks by Strawson and Wittgenstein.
First, to Dennett who argues that:
(i) if, in particular circumstances, the intentional stance is considered to be the appropriate stance to adopt towards a PVS patients, then this does not imply that the patient is to be considered to be a ‘person’ or that he is entitled to moral consideration, both of which require an ability to communicate. In the absence of an ability to communicate, consciousness could indeed be present but the patient would not be ascribed ‘personhood’ nor be entitled to moral consideration.[cclxxv]
(ii) if, however, the physical stance is considered the more appropriate, then Dennett - who is a philosophical behaviourist - would have no hesitation in asserting that the patient had no consciousness.[cclxxvi]
Strawson’s and Wittgenstein’s approach to this second case differs from Dennett’s in that they are not philosophical behaviourists. Both would argue that though, generally speaking, experience (such as pain) must have a behavioural aspect, it is not reducible to behaviour. Particular cases may exist where consciousness might persist in a private sense.[cclxxvii] However, both Strawson and Wittgenstein, in discussing the possibility of such ‘private’ pain and suffering, concur with Dennett in assigning paramount importance to the attitude, or stance, to be adopted towards the individual: the suggestion being that the appropriate attitude will flow from a decision grounded in empathy with the individual rather than from one based on the result of an examination of his ‘internal workings’.
Strawson, for example, in stating that “The concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness.” [cclxxviii] suggests that the decision that an individual has consciousness, flows from the decision that he is a person, and not conversely.
Wittgenstein in discussing whether an individual might ‘really’ lack consciousness also sees the resolution of the problem in the possibility of being empathic:
“Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. - One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? One might as well ascribe it to a number! - And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems to be able to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too smooth for it.” [cclxxix]
and also:
“My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul. ... The human body is the best picture of the human soul.” [cclxxx]
Guy Robinson’s comment on this last quotation is helpful:
“My attitude is a matter of my whole demeanour toward him involving the rights and duties and customs of my culture. Not something that is simply true or false like an opinion, a matter for argument and proof. Paradigms, attitudes, and ways of looking are not matters of proof and disproof.” [cclxxxi]
This reinforces the conclusion stated at the end of Section 2.[cclxxxii]
Strawson on the possible nature of exclusively ‘private’ experience
As has just been mentioned, both Strawson and Wittgenstein conceded the possibility of purely private experience; Strawson, however, speculates on the possible nature of extended or exclusively ‘private’ experience. He does this in the context of imagining a ‘disembodied consciousness’:[cclxxxiii]
“One has simply to think of oneself as having thoughts and memories as at present, even perhaps ... some quasi-tactual and organic sensations as at present, whilst
(a) having no perceptions of a body related to one’s experience as one’s own body is,[cclxxxiv] and
(b) having no power of initiating changes in the physical condition of the world, such as one at present does with one’s hands, shoulders, feet and vocal cords.” [cclxxxv]
Strawson argues that the experience would be such that:
“... he must always think of himself as disembodied, as a former person. ... he has, as it were, no personal life of his own to lead, he must live much in the memories of the personal life he did lead, or ... achieve some kind of attenuated vicarious personal existence by taking a certain kind of interest in the human affairs of which he is a mute and invisible witness ... In proportion as the memories fade, and the vicarious living palls, to that degree his concept of himself as an individual becomes attenuated. At the limit of attenuation there is, from the point of view of his survival as an individual, no difference between the continuance of experience and its cessation.” [cclxxxvi]
This thought experiment resonates uncannily with the possible experience of a conscious PVS patient who is treated as if they are not conscious. It is a rare philosophical insight into such a condition and is certainly of relevance to any ethical discussion concerning ‘end-of-life’ decisions relating to a possibly conscious PVS patient. If, however, the conscious PVS patient is treated as if they are conscious then one of the preconditions of Strawson’s analysis[cclxxxvii] no longer applies and his conclusion no longer follows. This further reinforces the earlier conclusion that all PVS patients should be treated as if they are conscious.[cclxxxviii]
Conclusion 10 - 17 : Strawson’s analysis of how a disembodied consciousness might experience life suggests that one consequence of treating a conscious PVS patient as if they are not conscious is that, from the point of view of the PVS patient, he is as if dead.
Conclusions: Strawson
The theoretical difficulties involved in attempting to distinguish between ‘intentional’[cclxxxix] unconscious actions and intentional conscious actions have been highlighted in Part 1.[ccxc] Borthwick’s arguments, Libet’s experiments and the phenomenon of ‘blindsight’ were there shown to raise difficulties of such a magnitude as to suggest that the prevailing medical model is unsustainable. Dennett gives further grounds for rejecting the medical model in that his analysis
suggests that the assertion that the absence of non-reflexM actions implies lack of consciousness is unsustainable. Even the narrower conclusion - that absence of non-reflexP actions implies lack of consciousness - would not be accepted by either Wittgenstein or Strawson without qualification.
Some further conclusions can be drawn in relation to PVS patients:
(i) Dennett’s approach suggests that, in attempting to resolve questions of intention, the question of the stance to be adopted is to be resolved by decision and not by some ‘internal examination’. This implies that the question of the PVS patient’s intentionality (and therefore consciousness) is to be resolved not by an examination of such as brain states but by whether patient responses are better explained in terms of intention than in terms of the responses of a physical system. The typical responses of PVS patients to pain stimuli - as described in the literature on PVS - suggest that an intentional system is the more appropriate model.
(ii) Strawson’s and Wittgenstein’s analysis suggests that the choice of attitude to be adopted to a PVS patient - i.e. whether they are to be regarded as ‘a person’ or as ‘an object’ and whether they possess consciousness and can experience pain - is primarily a matter of whether the assessor has empathy[ccxci] towards the patient; it is not the result of some ‘scientific’ process though such pseudo-scientific judgements can, if allowed to go unchallenged, destroy the very possibility of empathy.
(iii) To Strawson and Dennett, the ability to communicate is a prerequisite for the attribution of 'personhood'.
(iv) Strawson’s analysis of ‘disembodied’ experience suggests that the experience of a conscious PVS patient treated as if they are not conscious is such that eventually ‘there is no difference between the continuance of experience and its cessation’.
Section 4: Communication
The aim of this Section is to outline briefly some of the difficulties that may be occasioned by the term ‘communication’ when used as part of a test for determining personhood and to tentatively sketch some possible solutions. The context of the discussion is that of PVS and PVS-like patients and no attempt will be made to address the wider concept of ‘communication’ as this itself has generated an extensive and specialised literature. The main difficulties relating to the use of the term ‘communication’, in a context of PVS and PVS-like patients relate to:
(i) the meaning of the term ‘communication’ in such a context.
(ii) the level of communication envisaged.
(iii) the standard of responsibility required in the making of judgements on the permanent loss of the ability to communicate.
Each of these topics will be discussed separately.
The meaning of the term ‘communication’ in the context of PVS-like patients.
The paradigm is the Bauby case[ccxcii] which showed that all that is required to establish communication is a method of ‘yes/no’ signalling - Bauby used the blink of an eye.[ccxciii] Andrews in his misdiagnosis studies used a test which assumed that the patient was not deaf.[ccxciv] However, in both cases communication was established through fortuitous circumstances and, because such circumstances cannot be presumed to exist in other cases, a more general method of resolving the problem is required.
Assistance in this comes from an unusual source: the possibility of extra-terrestrial life has long been a source of wonder, and in the early 1970’s astronomers - assuming that there was intelligent life elsewhere in the universe - attempted to find methods to communicate with it; yet, without a common language, the problem seemed insoluble. However, some astronomers believed that a common language did indeed exist - mathematics. Mathematics is nothing other than the symbolic representation, and manipulation, of abstract patterns and, whilst mathematical symbols may obviously differ between differing civilisations, the underlying mathematics is part of the very structure of abstract thought or of what is commonly meant by intelligence. A Professor Horowitz,[ccxcv] for example, assumed such a universal ability to understand mathematics and broadcast radio signals into deep space, containing numerical codes of 1’s and 0’s in an attempt to elicit a response and thus generate a cosmic language. Similar experiments were described in a recent issue of the New Scientist[ccxcvi] where attempts to establish a universal language were described as being ‘the very opposite of cryptography’ - meaning that the signal that was used was such as to bear its very meaning on its face, i.e. in the most obvious manner possible.
How would a response to such a signal be recognised as communication? Responses in which a pattern could be discerned - i.e. which were not chaotic or random responses - would be the preconditions for establishing communication. An example may help clarify. Imagine a radio signal sent out in bursts to embody the pattern:[ccxcvii]
1 0 11 0 111 0
Imagine that, subsequently, a signal was received of the form:
11 0 111 01111 0
The ‘response’ certainly embodies a pattern. Must it be regarded as an ‘intelligent’ reply - i.e. as a communication? The answer is no. The response might have been a reflection or echo of the original signal; some mechanical process adding, as it were, a ‘1’ to each number in the original signal; it might have been ‘noise’ or ‘static’ - i.e. a randomly generated signal. How would these other signals be distinguished from true intelligent responses? The solution would be to send a different signal and to see if a pattern again emerged in the response. If again there was doubt as to whether the response was an echo or a true intelligent response, a further signal - different from the previous two - would be sent out and the response again examined. This procedure is continued until the hypothesis that the response signal is an echo, becomes untenable. This, in turn, establishes[ccxcviii] the hypothesis that the response signal is a communication.[ccxcix]
Drawing on this discussion, I suggest (in the context of PVS and PVS-like patients) the following as a test to establish an ability to communicate:
Test: A stimulus - touch, sound etc. - be applied to the patient in a pattern similar to that shown in Diagram 10-2:[ccc]
A [pause] A A [pause] A A A [pause] A A A A [pause] A A A A A [pause] A A A A
[pause] A A A [pause] A A [pause] ..
.. [pause] ..
.. [wait for possible response]
Diagram 10-2: Test for establishing communication.
The tester should then pause and observe in as ‘unfocused’ [ccci] a manner as is possible so that any reaction which might be construed as a ‘1’ - e.g. a single muscle twitch - can be noticed. In the absence of such a response, other stimuli should be attempted - if, for example, the first type of signal that was used was a sound, then the second might be a pinprick to the skin and so on in search of a reaction. These stimuli should involve all sensory modalities, not just hearing or sight, but also touch and smell.
What if a single muscle twitch occurs? Is this necessarily the beginnings of communication? The distinction between communication and echo (or reflected signal) in the astronomical case finds an exact parallel in the case of PVS patients. The ‘1’ might well be a purely physical response - a ‘reflexP’ as discussed earlier. The solution is exactly as would be the case in the astronomical discussion: an amended signal is sent out to see the nature of the response it generates. In the case of the PVS patient, this might be:
A [pause] A A [pause] A A A [pause] A A A A [pause] A A A A A [pause] A A A A [pause]
AA A [pause] .. .. .. [pause] ..
.. .. .. .. .. [wait for possible response]
Diagram 10-3: Second stage test for establishing communication.
If this succession of stimuli is now followed by two muscle twitches the possibility that the response is an echo is weakened and the hypothesis that it is the beginnings of communication is strengthened. Further refinements are obvious.
The great benefit of such a methodology is:
* that, in the present context, it refocuses the discussion: it takes the emphasis away from the distinction between ‘reflex’ and ‘conscious’ actions; a distinction which - as has been seen earlier in Part 1 - is problematic and lacks intellectual rigour. If ‘reflex-like’ responses occur it must be recognised that the existence of such responses carries no implications as regard the existence, or otherwise, of consciousness. The appropriate conclusion to be drawn is that, because these responses are too simplistic to be interpreted as communication, a search must be made for other possible responses.
* that it is transparent to both the medical carers, and the patient’s family. It provides the family with a simple point of focus for their ministrations. Furthermore, it can remove a continuing source of friction between medical carers and the patient’s family which occurs when the carers insist that the patient’s response is a reflex action (and supposedly indicative of a lack of consciousness), whereas the family believe that the patient is attempting to communicate (and accordingly is conscious). The focus is removed from questions of consciousness - which cannot but be contentious - and placed on the question of whether communication can be established. This, in contrast to the issue of consciousness, is eminently capable of resolution.
Once a mechanism for response is identified, then, as in the Bauby case, the method for developing a yes/no signalling system - and hence of communication - is clear.
The level of communication envisaged
It was suggested earlier in the introduction to this chapter that the obligations of Charity to an individual should be gainsaid by those of Justice only if that individual wished otherwise and so expressed his wishes. This implies that that level of communication required to attribute 'personhood' (and thus bring the obligations flowing from Justice into play) is at least that which is sufficient to determine whether the patient consents to a proposed intervention.
The standard of responsibility required
A medical examination which was conducted negligently and which resulted in an erroneous determination that an individual had permanently lost the ability to communicate is, depending on the degree of negligence involved, the moral equivalent of either murder or manslaughter. This clearly suggests the appropriate standard of diligence.[cccii]
Conclusion 10 - 18 : In stating that the ability to communicate is a necessary condition for the ascription of 'personhood'; the level of communication required is at least that which is sufficient to determine whether the patient consents to a proposed intervention. Furthermore, the standard required in determining that a patient lacks the ability to communicate is indicated by the fact that an erroneous determination that such an ability was lacking is, if negligently made, morally equivalent to a wrongful killing.
Section 5: Conclusions
The aims of this chapter were to establish the propositions:
(T): “It is a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood
to an individual that communication, to some minimal standard, be possible with
that individual.”
(U’): “It is a necessary condition for the ascription of ‘rights’ to an individual that that individual possesses ‘personhood’.”
It was noted[ccciii] that this task involved two separate questions, firstly whether (T) and (U’) did in fact command a broad degree of acceptance (particularly amongst philosophers), and secondly, whether there are reasons, in addition to those adduced in the earlier discussion, why (T) and (U’) should be accepted or amended. Earlier sections of this chapter have concentrated on the first of these questions. I will first attempt to summarise the conclusions of these earlier sections. Secondly, I will address the question of whether reasons exist whether the earlier conclusions should, in any way, be amended.
Is there a consensus in favour of (T) and (U’)?
The proposition (T)
Section 1 of this chapter examined Locke’s concept of person and personal identity. Locke required of a ‘person’ that they have a continuity of consciousness and it was shown that this condition implied an ability to communicate.[ccciv]
In Section 2 some linguistic usages of the term ‘person’ were examined; examples considered were those of a ‘personal God’ and the treating of an individual ‘as an object’ and as a ‘non-person’. It was found that the use of the term 'person' was intimately linked to the possibility of communication.[cccv]
The views of some modern philosophers on the concept of ‘personhood’ were examined in Section 3 of this chapter and in Appendix F. Before summarising these views, it is first necessary to distinguish between two distinct categories of individuals; this is because the implications of the definitions of the various philosophers differ, depending on the category in question. Two types of individuals need to be distinguished:[cccvi]
(i) ‘type-A’ individuals are presently unable, and have never been, able to communicate.
(ii) ‘type-B’ individuals are presently unable, but once were, able to communicate to the extent of learning a language.
Wittgenstein’s position in relation to ‘type-A’ individuals is that they cannot develop a private language and are, in consequence, deprived of the ability to think conceptually; as such they are not ‘persons’.[cccvii] Strawson’s position is not clear, though - when viewed through the lenses of Dennett’s elaboration of the concept of intention - Strawson would also deny personhood to ‘type-A’ individuals.[cccviii]
Neither Wittgenstein’s, nor Strawson’s,
position is clear in relation to ‘type-B’
individuals. The most that can be said
is that both Strawson and Wittgenstein would not necessarily deny personhood to
a ‘type-B’ individual - all, it
seems, would hinge on whether the assessor did, or did not, feel empathy
towards the individual in question: once a ‘foothold’
[cccix]
for empathy could be established, then the mental predicates - consciousness
and (possibly) personhood - could be ascribed.
Of the other philosophers discussed,[cccx] some - such as Tooley and Harris[cccxi]- believe that the ability to think conceptually[cccxii] is the mark of personhood. They are obliged, provided Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument’ is accepted,[cccxiii] to refuse to accord personhood to ‘type-A’ individuals. Conversely they would, subject to reservations, accord personhood to ‘type-B’ individuals.[cccxiv] Others - such as Turing, Downie, Rawls, Kluge, Fletcher, Flanagan and Drane - argue that a present ability to communicate is a necessary condition for personhood. These must refuse personhood to both ‘type-A’ and ‘type-B’ individuals. In conclusion:
Conclusion 10
- 19 : The overwhelming consensus amongst philosophers is in favour of
accepting ‘ability to communicate’ as a criterion for the ascription of
personhood, less so as a criterion for its removal; this is consistent
with the conventional usage of the term ‘person’.
The proposition (U’)
The cornerstone of Locke’s discussion on personal identity was that personhood was a ‘forensic’ concept intimately associated with the ascription of rights and responsibilities.[cccxv] The examination of linguistic usage (particularly in relation to the term ‘non-person’ and in the contrast between treating an individual ‘as a person’ and ‘as an object’) showed the intimate link between questions of personhood and eligibility for possessing rights; the one area where this link was not apparent was in distinguishing between a ‘personal’ and an ‘impersonal’ God, in this case the discussion of ‘rights’ seemed inappropriate.[cccxvi]
Strawson’s and especially Wittgenstein’s concern in relation to the term ‘person’ was primarily with its denotation; their analysis touched little on questions of rights and their ascription; thus ,no conclusions can be drawn as regards the place of the proposition (U’) in their philosophies.
Of the other modern philosophers which we have discussed who addressed the link between being a bearer of rights and personhood, only Dennett and Tooley sought to place limitations on this link. As was noted earlier,[cccxvii] certain difficulties were occasioned by their not distinguishing between the concept of ‘personhood’ (i.e. a bearer of rights) and the concept of ‘Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ (i.e. entities, effects on which are to be considered relevant in assessing the morality of any proposed action). That they do not use this distinction - and consequently their conflating of the two categories involved - means that the loss of an individual’s rights entails that that individual would be exiled from all moral consideration; this results in an unnecessary distortion of the discussion.
Tooley dissented from what he regarded as the philosophical consensus which treats ‘X is a person’ as being synonymous with ‘X has rights’. Tooley favoured equating ‘X is a person’ with the proposition ‘X has a (serious) moral right to life’.” The reason for Tooley’s dissent lay in his attempt to ensure that a perception of his - that animals had a ‘right’ not to be tortured whilst not having a ‘right’ to not to be killed - could be expressed within his philosophy without engendering any inconsistency. As argued earlier,[cccxviii] the use of the distinction between ‘person’ and ‘OMW’ would have permitted this perception to be expressed without occasioning the need to depart from the consensus.
Dennett’s dissent from the consensus view derived from his analysis of the example of an insane man; such a man, argued Dennett, is treated as a person even though deprived of his rights.[cccxix] Two alternative resolutions of this problem are possible which do not challenge (U’). Firstly, it is possible to argue that the insane man has in fact no rights but is considered to be an ‘OMW’ and is accorded moral consideration - this was the argument of the preceding paragraph. Alternatively one can argue - and this is the better view[cccxx] - that, because there is a possibility that the insane man can recover,[cccxxi] his personhood subsists though in an attenuated form.[cccxxii] The following conclusion can be drawn:
Conclusion 10
- 20: There is a widesperead acceptance both amongst philosophers and the
wider community (especially if the distinction between ‘person’ and ‘OMW’ is recognised) that
rights can only be ascribed to an individual if that individual is deemed to be
a ’person’.
We can summarise the discussion in relation to both (U’) and (T) in saying that the only reasons offered by the philosophers whose views have been examined in this chapter for not accepting (U’) and (T) are:[cccxxiii]
(i) Whereas the ability to communicate is a necessary condition for ascribing 'personhood' to an individual it is not clear that the loss of the ability to communicate should necessitate the loss of 'personhood'.
(ii) The case of animals who have ‘rights’ not to be tortured whilst not having ‘rights’ not to be killed. (Tooley’s example).
(iii) The case of an insane man who is treated as a person even though deprived of his rights. (Dennett’s example).
The concepts of ‘stickiness’ and ‘precociousness’ (to be discussed below) when applied to the concept of 'personhood' and the distinction between 'personhood' and ‘Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ (discussed in the introduction to this chapter) allow all of these objections to be overcome.
Are there, however, further reasons why (U’) and (T) should not be accepted.
Should (T) and (U’) be accepted or are
amendments necessary?
Much of the controversy that surrounds the application of the concept of 'personhood' relates not to whether the ascription of 'personhood' to an individual implies that rights should be accorded to that individual - for such is, generally speaking, not contentious - but to what types of humans, if any, should not be considered to be persons; the focus of such discussion are usually either foetuses, newborn infants[cccxxiv] or individuals such as PVS patients. The precondition for 'personhood' envisaged in (T) - : “It is a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood to an individual that communication, to some minimal standard, be possible with that individual.” - does not appear to be directly applicable to these cases: it is no more possible to communicate with a year-old infant than with a foetus, yet even those who would unreservedly be in favour of an unrestricted access to abortion - thus implying that a foetus had no rights - would not accept the killing of a year-old infant. Furthermore, a person who suffered a stroke and lost the ability to communicate would, generally speaking, not be considered to have lost their 'personhood' and with it the loss of rights that this entailed.[cccxxv] It seems that the concept of 'personhood' - or, equivalently the proposition (T) - needs some further modification. The concepts of ‘stickiness’ and ‘precociousness’ when applied to the concept of 'personhood' enable such a modification.
The concepts of ‘stickiness’ and ‘precociousness’ as applied to an attribute
The definition of ‘precociousness’ in
relation to an attribute
To say, in relation to an attribute P that it is ‘precocious’ is to assert that an object which currently has not the attribute P, but which, it is believed, will most probably possess it at some future time, is considered to presently possess the property P but in an attenuated form ‘PAT’.
The definition of ‘stickiness’ in relation
to an attribute
To say, in relation to an attribute P, that it is ‘sticky’ is to assert that an object which does not currently possess the attribute P but which once did so and, it is believed, may conceivably do so again, is considered to presently possess the property P but in an attenuated form ‘PAT’.[cccxxvi]
An example may help clarify these definitions.
An example
The criterion for wealth is the possession of riches. Without riches one is not wealthy. Consider, however, a youth who has been promised a considerable inheritance by his rich uncle. The uncle may, of course, change his mind and the youth inherit nothing. However, because there is a high possibility that he will become wealthy the youth is treated very much as if he were already wealthy - not exactly the same but wealthy in a somewhat attenuated form. This could be described by saying that ‘wealth’ was a ‘precocious’ attribute.[cccxxvii]
The uncle did not renege on his promise. The youth received his inheritance but squandered it, in its entirety on gambling. He no longer possesses riches so he is no longer wealthy; but because he was once wealthy and, perhaps, because of his social connections, there is a remote possibility that he may again be wealthy; accordingly he is treated very much as if he were still wealthy - not exactly (no one will give him extensive credit) but he is accorded a certain status and deference. One could say of such a man that he still possesses wealth but in an attenuated form. This could be described by saying that wealth was a ‘sticky’ attribute.
‘Stickiness’ and ‘precociousness’ as applied
to 'personhood'
I suggest that ‘personhood’ is both ‘sticky’ and ‘precocious’ in that:
(i) If it is believed that there is a high probability that an individual (who currently cannot communicate) will have an ability to communicate at some future time (he will, of course, then be a 'person') then he is treated as if he presently has 'personhood' but in an attenuated form.
(ii) If an individual (who currently cannot communicate) once had the ability to communicate (he was, of course, then a ‘person’) and may conceivably do so again, then he is treated as if he presently has 'personhood' but in an attenuated form.
Furthermore, the attenuated form of personhood which is appropriate - call it ‘personhoodAT’ - is simply the right not to be killed even if there is a unanimity that to do so is in one’s ‘best interests’; all other rights are in abeyance.[cccxxviii]
As an example of the first type of
attenuated 'personhood', consider the situation of newborn infants and,
perhaps, foetuses; these have not the present ability to communicate yet they
are treated as (attenuated) persons: ‘attenuated’
because they possess none of the rights of an adult other than the right
not to be killed; all other decisions in relation to their welfare are taken on
moral grounds - i.e. on what is in their ‘best interests’ - not on grounds of their
supposed rights; with the exception of
the right not to be killed, Justice is in abeyance and Charity reigns supreme.[cccxxix]
As an example of the second type of attenuated personhood, consider the example of a comatose patient; their personhood persists throughout the period of unconsciousness in an attenuated form to the extent that all medical decisions can be made on a ‘best interests’ basis except a decision which forseeably results in their death even if this is taken solely with their ‘best interests’ in mind. The situation of the insane patient envisioned by Dennett and discussed earlier can also be analysed within such a framework; the obligation on others is not to kill such an attenuated person even if this appears to be the most charitable thing to do. The obligations of Justice still persist - even if in an attenuated form - and cannot be overridden by the requirements of Charity. All other decisions however are taken on the grounds of Charity.[cccxxx]
‘Precocious’ distinguished from a
‘potential’
‘Precociousness’ should be distinguished from ‘potentiality’: an individual who is a potential person is no more a person that is an acorn, a tree; consequently, a potential person is not a person and has no rights; in contrast - if personhood is accepted to be a precocious attribute - an individual who will very probably become a person is deemed to possess an attenuated personhood and, thus, presently partakes of personhood and presently possesses (limited) rights. The nearness[cccxxxi] of the existing condition to the condition of 'personhood' is what confers attenuated personhood through ‘precociousness’; the ‘nearness’ of the relationship would, perhaps, not be as relevant in a discussion of potentiality.
A revised
proposal
Some groundwork must first be laid:
* It is not possible to question both (T) and (U’) simultaneously;[cccxxxii] to attempt to do so would be like trying to fence the wind - there would be no secure foundation from which to conduct the discussion. Accordingly, for the purpose of this discussion, (U’) is accepted without reservation and the question is then, given this understanding, should (T) be accepted?
* The distinction between ‘Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ and ‘Personhood’ is assumed.[cccxxxiii] For the purposes of this discussion the possession of consciousness is assumed to be the criterion for being an ‘OMW’. It is most important to note that loss of personhood by an individual does not imply that others are no longer under moral obligations to him. The loss of personhood simply means that all the obligations that flow from the virtue of Justice cease, the obligations that flow from the virtue of Charity may still continue.
* Personhood is assumed to be both ‘sticky’ and ‘precocious’.
* Attenuated personhood -‘personhoodAT’ - is understood to be simply the ‘right not to be killed’; it is a narrower right than the ‘right to be let alone’ which characterises ‘personhood’. [cccxxxiv]
For convenience, the various possibilities linking ability to communicate to ascription of 'personhood' are set out in the Table 10-4:
|
|
Ability to
Communicate |
|
||
|
|
in the past |
now |
in the future |
Current status |
|
1. |
- |
Yes |
- |
Has full
personhood. |
|
2. |
Yes |
No |
Some possibility |
Has
a temporary attenuated personhood by virtue of ‘stickiness’. |
|
3. |
Yes |
No |
Highly probable |
Has
an attenuated personhood by virtue of both ‘stickiness’ and ‘precociousness’;
will have full personhood when communication is restored. |
|
4. |
No |
No |
Highly probable |
Has
an attenuated personhood by virtue of ‘precociousness’;
will have full personhood when communication is achieved. |
|
5. |
No |
No |
No |
No
personhood. |
Table
10-4: The relationship between attribution of 'personhood' and ability to
communicate.
With these understandings the question of whether an ability to communicate should be a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood can now be more easily addressed.
Rights have been well described as ‘areas of autonomy’; [cccxxxv] what would it mean to suggest that an individual who had permanently lost the ability to communicate possessed such areas of autonomy?
To say that ‘X is a person’ is to assert the existence of domains where others have no right to take decisions which affect ‘X’ even if they are motivated solely by a desire to act in ‘X’s’ ‘best interests’. Rights flow from the virtue of Justice and function as a bulwark against the interventions of others, even if these spring from the most ‘charitable’ of intentions. To say that ‘X is a person’ is to acknowledge the existence of areas where the furthering of what is perceived as ‘X’s’ best interests should not be the paramount consideration. If ‘X’ is unable to communicate, it is not possible to discuss with him the reasons why a certain course of action is in fact in his best interests, he is beyond persuasion. One solution might be to abstain from any intervention in ‘X’s’ affairs; however, in the cases which are at the heart of this thesis, such an Olympian stance is not possible, nor in other situations does it seem even remotely desirable. As has been pointed out by judges in both the Ward[cccxxxvi] and the Bland cases,[cccxxxvii] not to sanction the withdrawal of ANH is as much a decision as to sanction it; thus, the facts are such that in such cases an intervention must be made.
I suggest that, in cases where communication is not possible, a ‘Principle of Minimal Intervention’ should apply:
In cases where communication is not possible and where it is reasonable to assume that had communication been possible the intervention would be requested, then the intervention is justified provided it is performed in the ‘best interests’ of the individual and is the minimum intervention required to preserve the situation until such time as communication can be restored.
Consider the example of a bystander on the seafront who sees a swimmer in difficulties and in danger of drowning. The bystander knows the swimmer and knows that he is a ‘person’ and well able to communicate; must he not intervene until he has ascertained that his intervention is consented to? Such would be the implication of a strict interpretation of the precedence of Justice over Charity; it would also be nonsensical. The ‘Principle of Minimal Intervention’ would imply that the swimmer could be rescued and taken ashore and cared for until such time as he made his views known. What if he then said the he was attempting to commit suicide and wished to persist in his attempt? The ‘Principle of Minimal Intervention’ is no longer applicable,[cccxxxviii] Justice again rules supreme and intervention to prevent the suicide would infringe the person’s rights.
I suggest that the ‘Principle of Minimal Intervention’ in conjunction with a concept of 'personhood' which is both ‘sticky’ and ‘precocious’ allows all the difficulties mentioned earlier in this Section to be resolved:
* Tooley’s example of the kitten who has the ‘right’ not to be tortured but may be killed is better analysed in terms of ‘Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ rather than 'personhood': the kitten is an ‘OMW’ (because it has consciousness) but has no 'personhood' and accordingly has no rights (because it is not possible to communicate with the kitten). Because the kitten is an ‘OMW’, persons have obligations to the kitten to act in its best interests which implies that they must not torture it; because the kitten has no 'personhood' it may be killed but only if this is in its accord with Charity.
* Dennett’s example is of an insane man who is treated as a person even though deprived of his rights. Dennett is wrong in asserting that the insane man is deprived of all of his rights; he still retains the right to life even though all his other rights may be in abeyance. Thus, this example is best understood as one of attenuated personhood; the attenuated personhood arising because of the ‘stickiness’ of personhood: the insane man was once a person (before the onset of his insanity) and there is some chance that he may recover.
* A newborn infant contrasted with a foetus: the personhood of either, if it exists, arises because of the ‘precociousness’ of personhood. As mentioned earlier, the ‘precociousness’ of personhood arises in proportion to the nearness of personhood being achieved in its own right; accordingly, the ascription of an attenuated personhood - which implies the right not to be killed - is much more readily made in respect of a newborn infant than a foetus.
* the loss of an ability to communicate implying a loss of 'personhood': unless there is a total loss of ability to communicate, 'personhood' persists in an attenuated form because of the ‘stickiness’ of personhood. Thus, the stroke victim who has lost the ability to communicate still has an attenuated personhood provided there is some chance that he may regain the ability to communicate. What though of the PVS patient for whom no possibility of a restoration of the ability to communicate exists? There are, it seems, only two possibilities:
* either, all health interventions in such cases must be made on the basis of the ‘best interests’ of the patient. This implies that all decisions must be made on the basis of Charity; Justice having no relevance; this, in turn, implies that the patient has lost their 'personhood' and that a decision may be made which forseeably results in the death of a patient if this is adjudged to be in their ‘best interests’.[cccxxxix]
* or, some health interventions cannot be made on a ‘best interests’ basis. This implies that some intervention, which is generally regarded as being in the patient’s ‘best interests’, cannot be made because it infringes some supposed right of the patient. Whilst such a course of action is eminently justifiable if there is even a slight hope that the patient’s own views can be canvassed - and might thus be found to differ from what was universally regarded as being in their ‘best interests’ - it seems unjustifiable if all hope of restoring communication is lost; to adhere to it would imply that a course of action which was generally regarded as being not the best course of action for the patient should be pursued. [Note: the discussion here is only concerned with the interests of the patient; the wider social interests are of considerable relevance and will be incorporated into the discussion in Chapter 11.]
____________
The various principles discussed in this chapter can be summarised in the following conclusions:
Conclusion 10 - 21 :The principles outlined in Chapter 10 concerning obligations to others are: [cccxl]
* Obligations to others flow either from Charity or from Justice.
* Obligations flowing from Justice take precedence over obligations flowing from Charity subject only to the ‘Principle of Minimal Intervention’.
* The obligations to an individual flowing from Charity arise because of the ascription of consciousness to that individual; such individuals are known as ‘Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’.
* The obligations to an individual flowing from Justice arise because of the personhood of that individual.
* It is a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood to an individual that communication be possible with that individual.
* It is a necessary condition for the ascription of rights to an individual that they have personhood.
* Individuals who are likely to achieve an ability to communicate or who once had such an ability and for whom there is some possibility that it may be regained, have an ‘attenuated personhood'.
* Attenuated personhood confers a right on an individual not to be killed even if this is universally regarded as being in their ‘best interests’; no other rights are conferred.
Because of their importance the following conclusions are stated explicitly:
Conclusion 10 - 22 : The assertion that all decision-making in relation to a patient who has permanently lost the ability to communicate should be on the basis of the patient’s ‘best interests’ necessarily entails that such a patient has lost their personhood.
Conclusion 10 - 23 : On the understanding that the obligations flowing from Charity are not diminished solely by reason of the loss of personhood, it can be asserted that a loss of the ability to communicate which is judged to be permanent[cccxli] entails a loss of personhood.
____________
The conclusions that were established in this chapter are:
Conclusion 10 - 1 : Rights (and obligations) can be ascribed to an individual if, and only if, that individual is a person.
Conclusion 10 - 2 : Obligations may exist towards individuals who are not persons; such obligations arise from Charity. The class of individuals to whom persons have obligations that flow from Charity are called ‘Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ (‘OMW’s’).
The possession of consciousness is the usual criterion for classifying an individual as an ‘OMW’.
Conclusion 10 - 3 : Obligations flowing from Justice - of which the most important is the right ‘to be let alone’ - take precedence over the obligations flowing from Charity.
Conclusion 10 - 4 : The right to be let alone can be analysed into:
(i) the right to be free from ‘non-beneficial’ interference; this right[cccxlii] flows from both Charity and Justice.
(ii) the right to be free from ‘beneficial’ interference; this right flows from Justice.
Conclusion 10 - 5 : To Locke, possession of personhood is a necessary and sufficient condition for the ascription of rights.
Conclusion 10 - 6 : To Locke, the ability to communicate is a necessary condition for ascription of personhood.
Conclusion 10 - 7 : The maximally relevant conclusion (in relation to the 'personhood' of PVS patients) that could be drawn from a linguistic investigation of the term ‘person’ is that, traditionally, rights were not accorded to those with whom, it was believed, communication was not possible.
Conclusion 10 - 8 : The distinction between a ‘personal’ and an ‘impersonal’ God lies in the existence or otherwise of a relationship based on the possibility of communication between man and God. However, whilst this interpretation is consistent with (T), it is not meaningful in relation to (U’).
Conclusion 10 - 9 : In taking health care decisions affecting a patient, the principal obligation imposed by the virtue of Justice is to attempt to communicate with the patient; this obligation overrides all obligations to the patient flowing from Charity.
Conclusion 10 - 10 : To take health care decisions for a patient without first attempting to communicate with the patient in order to determine their wishes, is in effect a denial of their 'personhood' and this is so even if all such decisions are taken solely on the basis of what is believed to be in the patient’s ‘best interests’.
Conclusion 10 - 11 : In speaking of a carer treating a patient as ‘an object’ rather than as ‘a person’ what is being alluded to is the unwillingness of the carer to communicate with the patient and the refusal to recognise the patient’s rights. Thus, this usage is consistent with both (T) and (U’).
Conclusion 10 - 12 : The usage of the term ‘person’ - when understood in the sense of ‘persona’ - is consistent with having an ability to communicate and with the possessing of rights i.e. with (T) and (U’).
Conclusion 10 - 13 : The usage of the term ‘non-person’ suggests an individual who is excommunicated from society and without rights; as such it is consistent with both (T) and (U’).
Conclusion 10 - 14 : An initial leap of empathy is a precondition for seeing another as a fitting subject for possessing rights, for being an ‘Object of Intrinsic Moral Worth’ or for possessing the ability to communicate; this gesture of empathy is not a product of rational determination but flows from the adoption of an ‘attitude’. It is the gesture of ‘seeing oneself in another’ that enables ‘personhood’ to be conferred on that other; conversely, the refusal to ‘see oneself in that other’ precludes the attribution of ‘personhood’.
Conclusion 10 - 15 : Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument’ implies that an individual’s ability to think conceptually has as a precondition that that individual had, at some earlier stage, an ability to communicate which he did in fact exercise.
Conclusion 10 - 16 : Strawson’s arguments (as elaborated by Dennett) are to the effect that imputing intentionality to a system is not, of itself, sufficient to permit 'personhood' to be attributed to the system; an ability to communicate is also necessary.
Conclusion 10 - 17 : Strawson’s analysis of how a disembodied consciousness might experience life suggests that one consequence of treating a conscious PVS patient as if they are not conscious is that, from the point of view of the PVS patient, he is as if dead.
Conclusion 10 - 18 : In stating that the ability to communicate is a necessary condition for the ascription of 'personhood'; the level of communication required is at least that which is sufficient to determine whether the patient consents to a proposed intervention. Furthermore, the standard required in determining that a patient lacks the ability to communicate is indicated by the fact that an erroneous determination that such an ability was lacking is, if negligently made, morally equivalent to a wrongful killing.
Conclusion 10
- 19 : The overwhelming consensus amongst philosophers is in favour of
accepting ‘ability to communicate’ as a criterion for the ascription of
personhood, less so as a criterion for its removal; this is consistent
with the conventional usage of the term ‘person’.
Conclusion 10
- 20: There is a widesperead acceptance both amongst philosophers and the
wider community (especially if the distinction between ‘person’ and ‘OMW’ is recognised) that
rights can only be ascribed to an individual if that individual is deemed to be
a ’person’.
Conclusion 10 - 21 :The principles outlined in Chapter 10 concerning obligations to others are: [cccxliii]
* Obligations to others flow either from Charity or from Justice.
* Obligations flowing from Justice take precedence over obligations flowing from Charity subject only to the ‘Principle of Minimal Intervention’.
* The obligations to an individual flowing from Charity arise because of the ascription of consciousness to that individual; such individuals are known as ‘Objects of Intrinsic Moral Worth’.
* The obligations to an individual flowing from Justice arise because of the personhood of that individual.
* It is a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood to an individual that communication be possible with that individual.
* It is a necessary condition for the ascription of rights to an individual that they have personhood.
* Individuals who are likely to achieve an ability to communicate or who once had such an ability and for whom there is some possibility that it may be regained, have an ‘attenuated personhood'.
* Attenuated personhood confers a right on an individual not to be killed even if this is universally regarded as being in their ‘best interests’; no other rights are conferred.
Conclusion 10 - 22 : The assertion that all decision-making in relation to a patient who has permanently lost the ability to communicate should be on the basis of the patient’s ‘best interests’ necessarily entails that such a patient has lost their personhood.
Conclusion 10 - 23 : On the understanding that the obligations flowing from Charity are not diminished solely by reason of the loss of personhood, it can be asserted that a loss of the ability to communicate which is judged to be permanent[cccxliv] entails a loss of personhood.