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Creating a true international community

 The French Foreign Minister, M. HUBERT VEDRINE, argues for a multipolar, multilateral world of which a reformed United Nations would be the guardian

What are we to make of the world that we have been living in since the USSR disappeared at the end of December 1991? What can we learn from the last eight years? What are our goals now and how will we achieve them? Nobody disputes the fact that the collapse of one of the two superpowers signalled the end of the Cold War. But what comes next? Personally, I have never believed that we had reached the 'end of history', even as presented in Francis Fukuyama's more recent and subtle version. This is because I do not make an automatic link between the 'market economy' and 'democracy', or between these two terms and 'the end of conflicts'. Nor did I believe President Bush's optimistic announcement that we were entering a 'new international order' based on the supremacy of international law, backed up when necessary by just wars.

Instead, I believed that we were indeed entering a freer world, along with a turbulent period of transition starting with the collapse of the USSR. I believed that both the beneficial and destabilising effects of this event would be felt for a very long time to come. As in the past, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and other empires, so far the downfall has been more or less a controlled one. It was well controlled in central Europe owing to the attraction exercised by the European Union. It was more or less well controlled in central Asia and poorly controlled in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Another feature of this transition is the international conflicts, in spite of the apparent unity brought by globalisation, or even the ideology of globalisation. We are still in this period of transition, which has absolutely nothing to do with the so-called turn of the century. It has even less to do with the millennium, which, if you will allow me to be churlish for a moment, does not actually start under our decimal system until the end of the 2000th year of the Christian era or, in other words, until after 31 December 2000. Therefore, I shall refrain from making any predictions about the twenty-first century. After all, what could people in 1899 and 1900 have seriously predicted about the twentieth century? The question is all the more pointed for the third millennium. What could people in 999 and 1000 have imagined? We should remember the old maxim: 'prediction is a tricky business, especially when it is about the future'. All the same, we should try to forecast future trends and work diligently to find solutions for the problems facing today's world, which will still be with us next year.

I see two main problems: what kind of power and/or co-operation relations will be established between the main areas of our globalised world that embody democracy and the market economy? What sort of relations will this multipolar set of countries have with others that accept these principles, but fall far short of abiding by them in practice, or with the forces that dispute these principles, or with the countries that have not yet genuinely joined the movement? These two issues are linked, of course.

1. The first problem primarily concerns the Unites States' role and place, along with its relations with Europe. I feel that, since 1992, the term 'superpower' no longer adequately describes the United States. The term has too many 'Cold War' connotations and is too exclusively military. American supremacy today is also felt in the economy, in monetary affairs, in technology and in military fields, as well as in lifestyles, language and the mass culture products that are swamping the world, shaping ways of thinking, and exercising a fascination that even works on adversaries of the United States. This is why I use the term 'hyperpower', which the American media find aggressive because of the pathological connotation of the prefix 'hyper' in English when, in fact, it is merely descriptive. The unprecedented questions facing this hyperpower are how to deal with its adversaries ( I will return to this question later) and, more importantly, how to deal with its allies and partners.

In keeping with America's view both of itself and the rest of the world over the last two centuries, most great American leaders and thinkers have never doubted for an instant that the United States was chosen by providence as the 'indispensable nation' and that it must remain dominant for the sake of humankind. Sometimes, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski or Samuel Huntington may have wondered about how this leadership can best be maintained and how to avoid hostile reactions to overbearing hegemony. But at heart, Americans have no doubts and the more forthright amongst them are quick to remind us that the contemporary world is the direct outcome of Europe's complete failure to manage its own and the world's affairs in the first half of the twentieth century. If Europeans truly want to become a 'power' together, which is the end France has been working towards, then they will have to overcome the contradiction between enlarging Europe and strengthening it. Even then, the United States still has to prove its ability to accept a partnership, with Europe in particular, or with anyone else, that is more than transitory or partial. The United States will, in addition, have to give up unilateralism for multilateralism. We would like to believe that it could. This question underlies the whole issue of Europe's common foreign policy and defence policy. It is of special importance for France, since it is impossible to conceive of the multipolar world that we are advocating without a strong Europe.

2. The other major issue in coming years will be that of universality. This mainly concerns relations between the West and all the rest. I use the term 'West' even though, in theory, it makes no geopolitical sense, any more than the term 'Euro-Atlantic' does, for that matter. I choose the term because it is in common use and it does mean what it means, particularly when it is used by some in the place of the expression, 'the free world'.

What is the rest? It starts with Russia, a partner to the leading Western countries, a member of the United Nations Security Council and the G8, and China, which also sits on the Security Council. But the rest covers dozens of other countries as well.

How does the west see itself today? As a victor first of all. A victor in history, which gives rise to the temptation to declare that history is at an end, as a victor over the USSR, following the victories over Nazism and fascism in a linear view with two stages in 1945 and 1989 to 1991. Secondly, the West sees itself as the expression of a universal cause, in an economy globalised by technology, with humankind united by simultaneous images and, more importantly, by universal values. These values start with the fundamentals of democracy and a market economy and extend to individual freedoms, economic freedoms, the rule of law, free elections, a free press, an independent judiciary, full respect for human rights, etc. This cause should have unanimous support and yet it is often contested. Many countries resist it for various reasons good and bad. Throughout the world, men and women who have embraced democratic ideas and take risks to uphold them still feel that the West, although it may not always be conscious of it, is using genuinely universal values as an instrument to impose its system and its influence. We must not be shocked by this feeling, but seek to understand it.

When faced with these protests the West most frequently responds with self-righteousness. In its eyes, the protesters are lagging behind and they need friendly but firm urging to embrace democracy and the market economy right away. Or else they are what the Americans call 'pariahs', who must be ostracised, or excommunicated as we would have said in earlier times. The desire to see democracy prevail over the world, conflicts settled peacefully and human rights respected everywhere is an admirable one. It is, of course, great goal that we all share. However, we cannot fail to note that declarations, exhortations, inducements, threats and sanctions of the West, meaning the richest countries, do no always immediately produce the expected effects. There has been an ongoing controversy over the link between Western vales and universal values or between what the West considers its just cause to be and universal consensus. Some observers even see it as conflict between civilisations that has yet to be overcome and which may even turn out to be insurmountable. I do not see it this way. The problem remains, however.

Let me give you some examples:

- Overstepping Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the West has proclaimed its 'right to intervene' in humanitarian disasters or massacres, circumventing the Security Council if necessary, and thus deeming States' sovereignty to be void or relative in these cases. Many Southern countries respond that their hard-won sovereignty is their ultimate protection and they ask who shall intervene in whose country and by what right?

- The West is demanding instant democracy from the rest, who reply: 'give us time, after all, you had time'. The emerging countries add: 'open up your markets', and other Southern countries say: 'we still need development assistance'.

- On security issues, the West forbids the rest from having the most fearsome weapons, the same weapons that it holds itself. The West wishes to restrict and slow the spread of so-called dual-use technologies, the list of which is extendible. The West wishes to deter, repress, vanquish and punish but it cannot bear simply to come under threat itself, legitimately invoking the precautionary principle against weapons of mass destruction in particular. But the Southern countries point out that they are entitled to security too, particularly with regard to each other, and that the West, which has never been more powerful, cannot invoke its own security in response to their every move in order to prevent their development.

- The same applies to international justice. While we are convinced that the law is advancing and the impunity of major criminals is declining, many countries, even those that signed the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, want to be sure that this movement means more than merely extending the new powers of West judges beyond borders. Not to mention the countries that have not signed for national reasons, including some important countries, which is very regrettable.

- The same hold true for labour rights and environmental protection. Westerners want to put an end to intolerable situations, such as dangerous work being done by children and make these new standards a key to success in multilateral trade negotiations. Developing countries feel that the developed countries' economies could never had taken off under such constraints.

Not all non-Western countries raise all these objections. But there is not one that does not ask any of these questions.

The paradox in the Western countries' current attitude is that it combines generosity and cynicism. We are so proud of the level of democracy that we have achieved that we want to bring the whole world up to the same level, whether they want it or not. But by demanding of countries that still have some way to go, that they immediately abide by the same democratic standards which we have taken two or three centuries to build up, by refusing to let them go through the intermediate steps that we have been through and by failing to offer any sure-fire shortcuts, are we not really simply holding their heads under water? This question may shock some people, but it cannot be brushed aside. Opinions are very divided, yet many of the UN's 188 members think it's a real problem.

The debate on the pace of change is practically impossible in Europe today because it has become so shocking. And it has become shocking because it is tangled up in the other, completely different, debate about 'cultural relativism'. The idea that democracy is good for Westerners but bad or superfluous for Chinese and Africans, for example, is indefensible. Obviously, it is not what I am talking about. But the fact remains that we do not have any magic formulas that will instantly turn China into a great democracy, or turn the ruins of the USSR into a prosperous and normal economy, or turn the Great Lakes region of Africa into an area of peace and co-operation, or turn Afghanistan into Morocco, or turn the Balkans into Switzerland, and so on. Therefore, we have to think in terms of historical process, of gradual consolidation and step-by-step progress. Too many people have forgotten the more elementary lessons of history, sociology and economics, following the collapse of the USSR and its abusive use of Marxism. They reason in quasi-religious terms, as if the followers of tyranny could instantly be converted into zealous democrats, like St Paul falling to the earth from his horse, blinded by a light from heaven. Russia in 1992 is a perfect example of this illusion. How could ultra-liberal deregulation designed for the West's strong and ultra-developed economies be the right recipe for Russia's situation in 1992, when it was worse off than Western Europe had been after the Second World War? In fact, Western Europe itself started its post-war reconstruction with decades of planning, regulation and government intervention.

The key issue is the pace of change for societies, whether we are talking about their democratic or economic development. We must have the intellectual and political courage to address this issue, but we must also make absolutely sure that it is not used as a delaying tactic by those who oppose any change, any reform and resist any notion of 'good governance' and who use the worst repressive techniques to maintain the status quo.

Somewhere between the idealists who want to by-pass history and those who are under the delusion that they can stop its advance, we must define and conduct an ongoing and resolute commitment to global democratisation. It must not be a foreign object imposed by the strong on the more vulnerable. It must be carried forward by an ongoing dialectic combining development, modernisation and democratisation. We still have much to do, and no doubt much to do differently, if our values, which we assert are universal and recognised by men and women the world over, are to be truly accepted as such.

This brings me to my conclusion.

We cannot accept a world that is politically unipolar or culturally uniform. Nor can we accept the unilateralism of the single hyperpower. This is why we are fighting for a multipolar, diversified and multilateral world. We think that the United States' role, ensured by its inexhaustible and fantastic creative vitality, would be more readily accepted if it genuinely embraced this goal.

In the face of unilateralism, such as that displayed by the United States Senate, we advocate multilateralism that respects all of the members of the international community, with the United Nations as its guardian. The UN must be strengthened and reformed, particularly the Security Council. The world now needs the Security Council more than ever, but it has to be enlarged to represent today's world, while still maintaining its effectiveness. In the fact of unilateralism, we also advocate the definition of ground rules calling for negotiations between parties and multilateral procedures for settling disputes.

- In the fact of uniformity, we advocate the right to diversity, and even the need for it. Culture is identity. We are defending this principle within the European Union and shall do so with the WTO during multilateral trade negotiations.

- But a multipolar world will not automatically be the answer to all these questions. The multipolar world that we are seeking is conceivable:

- Only if the European Union is one of the poles; a European Union that has achieved institutional balance and reached its geographical limits, once it has controlled enlargement and after forging strategic partnerships with the other leading areas of the world and its immediate Eastern and Southern neighbours; a European Union that is an exemplary pole in the multipolar world.

- Only if the poles co-operate rather than oppose each other. European-American relations give us an idea of the challenges involved in relations with Russia, China, Japan and India.

- Only if the poles themselves respect the rights of all the countries belonging to the multilateral system and do not deny the Security Council its essential role. It would be very instructive to see how the other potential poles in this multipolar world see the Security Council's role.

These principles should also guide our handling of global challenges stemming form the decompartmentalisation of the world. International co-operation is quite simply indispensable for preserving the environment, the foundations of sustainable development and the future of the human race. Co-operation is also indispensable for fighting organised crime, which has worked its way into all the vacuum left by the retrenchment or the collapse of governments.

- Because we believe deeply in the universality of humanist and democratic values, we must question resistance to their spread and seek the right way to deal with countries that have yet to respect them. I encourage debate about these issues. I would offer the following avenues for exploration: less arrogance and more dialogue, fewer sanctions or more appropriate sanctions and more transfers of 'democratic engineering', less free-market dogmatism and greater attention to economic and social development, which have been overlooked too often in recent years; less impatient hectoring and more perseverance in our commitments.

- It is under these conditions that we shall be able to work together to decide what should be maintained and preserved, or even strengthened or re-established, in governments' sovereignty, since, contrary to what is widely believed, many of the problems in today's world stem from the fact that governments are too weak rather than too strong. We shall also be able to redefine the restrictions that need to be placed on the abuse of sovereignty and in which cases the current balance between sovereignty and intervention isn't satisfactory. We shall be able to build up a genuinely international justice system to cover the gaps left by national justice systems. We shall be able to resume a less biased debate on international security, a subject that will continue to concern us for a long time to come.

If our world tomorrow is to be more just, less cruel and more human, we must work tirelessly towards a truly universal consensus for the sake of effectiveness, equity and ethics. We must do it to bring about a true 'international community'. France is working towards this goal with all its strength. Europe could be the catalyst in the process.

 

M. Vedrine was speaking at a conference, 'Entering the 21st Century', organised by the French Institute for International Relations.


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